

Quotation and Quotatives Uppsala, 14-15 November 2024

Organizer

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Venue

Campus Blåsenhus, <https://maps.app.goo.gl/cr3u1zqJi5dVEpHv7>. Rooms: as below.
Coffee breaks will be outside our room, lunches (for the speakers) will be as below.

Program

14 November, Room: Blåsenhus, [12:130](#)

9:30-10:45 Hazel Pearson: "Lewis with a twist: what communication verbs can teach us about de se reports"

10:45-11:15 Coffee

11:15-12:30 Philippe de Brabanter: "There are no varieties of quotation"

12:30-14:00 Lunch, Segerstedtshuset

14:00-15:15 François Recanati: "Oblique reference in the mental file framework"

15:15-15:45 Coffee

15:45-17:00 Lieven Vandelanotte: "New adventures in quotation-land"

18:30 Dinner for speakers at Domtrappkällaren (<https://www.domtrappkallaren.se>),
S:t Eriks gränd 15. Google maps: <https://goo.gl/maps/91cva8ikbjjPY1sQ8>

15 November, Room: Blåsenhus, [12:128](#)

9:30-10:45 Una Stojnic [TBA]

10:45-11:15 Coffee

11:15-12:30 Peter Pagin: "Iterated belief contexts"

12:30-14:00 Lunch, Café Alma

14:00-15:15 Bart Geurts: "Expressing consent"

15:15-15:45 Coffee

15:45-17:00 Regine Eckardt: "Non-cooperative narration"

Abstracts of Talks

Hazel Pearson

Lewis with a twist: what communication verbs can teach us about de se reports

I argue that the Lewisian treatment of de se reports in terms of self-ascription of a property is not fully adequate: the truth conditions of such reports must in addition specify the 'Realizer' of the reported attitude. I present data suggesting that the individual fulfilling the Realizer role is grammatically determined by covert material present in the syntactic structure of de se (and de te) reports; the behaviour of pronouns in attitude reports formed with verbs of communication provides crucial evidence for this view. The resulting semantics sheds light on a number of longstanding problems in the analysis of de se reports, as well as pointing the way towards a new approach to indexical shift in languages like Amharic.

Philippe de Brabanter

There are no varieties of quotation

In this paper, I start by debunking the distinction between scare quoting and mixed quotation (Cappelen & Lepore, 1997, 2005, 2007). More surprisingly, perhaps, I proceed to show that there is no principled way of distinguishing between pure quotation and direct discourse reports. I conclude by showing that it's not even clear that a 'natural kind' quotation can actually be defined – i.e. defining the object 'quotation' is hard to do in a non-arbitrary way. On a more positive note, I show how the appearance of there being varieties of quotation actually results from different ways that a particular communicative act, depiction, interacts or integrates with syntax.

François Recanati

Oblique reference in the mental file framework

In several writings over the past forty-five years (starting with my first book, Recanati 1979) I mentioned the important phenomenon of *oblique reference*:

There is oblique reference to some individual x when the mode of presentation through which the speaker refers to x is not the way the speaker herself thinks of x but the way some other person thinks of x .

In such cases, to understand the utterance you need to understand that the speaker is, as it were, *echoing* some other person and referring to x as that other person would. That the referring expression is used echoically can be indicated by putting it within quotation marks, as in the following examples (from Recanati 1987 and Recanati 2000 respectively):

- (1) Hey, 'your sister' is coming over !
- (2) 'Quine' has still not finished his paper

In this talk I will characterize the relevant notions (mode of presentation, etc.) in terms of mental files, and I will account for oblique reference by appealing to a particular kind of mental file, whose role will be explained and illustrated.

Lieven Vandelanotte

New adventures in quotation-land

In this talk I would like to analyse some of the forms and functions of quotation and, more broadly, metarepresentation, in internet memes and related forms of social media discourse, relying on past and ongoing work (Dancygier & Vandelanotte 2017, forthcoming, submitted; Vandelanotte 2019, 2020). The frequent use of forms of metarepresentation in these contexts of use arguably derives from the ease with which they can instantly call up attitudes and stances where space is at a premium. In one sense, memes, quote-tweets and the like provide ready illustrations of some core notions in quotation-land, such as the constructed nature of quotation and its characterization in terms of demonstration or depiction (e.g. Wierzbicka 1974, von Roncador 1980/1988, Tannen 1989, Clark & Gerrig 1990, Fludernik 1993, Recanati 2000, Clark 2016). On the other hand, the new adventures we can witness in online discourse genres pose new questions and involve new forms of language use (and adjustment of language to image use) specific to these genres. With reference to the illustrations below, for instance, consider the following observations and strategies:

- the complex nature of the depicted content in Figure 1, involving a *be like* meme, enabling a complex network of stance meanings to emerge;
- the reliance on a 'fictive' deictic ground in Figure 2, in which the image of the stock character 'Scumbag Steve' represents a type of behaviour rather than a specific speaker of the bottom quote;
- the creative re-use of partial quotations (taken from two 'threaded' tweets by one author) in the context of a dialogic grid meme (the 'David Beckham Be Honest' meme) in Figure 3, as a way to critique the quoted original.

These and other types are certainly of interest to linguists and discourse analysts, who attempt to integrate image-text forms of communication into linguistic theories such as construction grammar, and who study the mechanisms of meaning emergence at play (e.g. Dancygier & Vandelanotte forthcoming). In their appeal to notions of quotation, fictivity, indexicality, pretence, and echoing, I hope the discussion can spark philosophical interest as well.

Certain people on here be like:



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3

References

- Clark, Herbert H. 2016. Depicting as a method of communication. *Psychological Review* 123(3): 324–347.
- Clark, Herbert H. & Richard J. Gerrig. 1990. Quotations as demonstrations. *Language* 66(4): 764–805.
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- Dancygier, Barbara & Lieven Vandelanotte. Forthcoming. *The Language of Memes: Patterns of Meaning across Image and Text*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Dancygier, Barbara & Lieven Vandelanotte. Submitted. Embodiment and simulated interaction in online stance expression.
- Fludernik, Monika. 1993. *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness*. London: Routledge.
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- Tannen, Deborah. 1989. *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vandelanotte, Lieven. 2019. Changing perspectives: Something old, something new. *Pragmatics* 29(2): 170–197.
- Vandelanotte, Lieven. 2020. (Non-)quoting and subjectivity in online discourse. *E-rea* 17(2): online. <https://doi.org/10.4000/erea.9782>
- von Roncador, Manfred. 1980. Gibt die Redewiedergabe Rede wieder? *L.A.U.T. (Linguistic Agency University of Trier) Series A: Paper no. 71*.
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- Wierzbicka, Anna. 1974. The semantics of direct and indirect discourse. *Papers in Linguistics* 7(3–4): 267–307.

Peter Pagin

Iterated belief contexts

When Tim says 'John believes that The Earth is flat', the truth-conditions seem to depend on what Tim means by 'believes' and by 'The Earth' but not on what John means by 'The Earth'. However, when Bill says 'Tim believes that John believes that The Earth is flat', there is an intuition that the truth-conditions depend on both what Bill means by 'believes' and on what Tim means by 'believes'. This seems not to add up. So what has gone wrong?

Bart Geurts

Expressing consent

Meta-communication comes in many forms, ranging from quite explicit to barely noticeable. Quotation and verbs of saying are in the first category. The second category is a mixed bag that contains forms of body language (nodding, facial expressions), supportive humming (“mhmm”), and particles such as “okay” and “yes”. I argue that all these forms of meta-communication have been instrumental in the evolution of language and its use, and that a subset of the second category was crucial in the transition from chimp-style communication to early human discourse. This subset served to express consent, as in:

S1: “Gimme that!”

S2: "Okay."

I argue that basic exchanges of this type marked the first beginnings of a normative style of communication that is unique to humans. On this premise, I predict that the first speech-act types served to initiate and coordinate joint activities. First came requests and cohortatives ("Let's..."), followed by promises and permission giving. Assertions evolved out of promises.

Regine Eckardt (joint work with Daniel Altshuler)

Non-cooperative Narration

While nonreliable narrators are a widely discussed topic in literary semantics, the present paper draws attention to impersonal narratives that violate the maxims of cooperative discourse. Mystery novels offer prime evidence for this type of violation. A first analysis of A. Christie's *A Murder Is Announced* illustrates how the text, a third-person narrative, uses intricate means to distract the reader from the actual murderess, Ms. Blacklock. The text uses techniques like (a) strategic ambiguity between narration and free indirect discourse; (b) the hiding of causal links between events; (c) ambiguities and vagueness of timeline of events, (d) use of meaningful prosody to convey cues without explicating them, (e) direct speech without naming the speaker, (f) systematic violations of the maxim of quantity.

Similar techniques are evidenced in other mystery novels and crime fiction. When readers interpret third-person narration as adhering to the principles of cooperative discourse, these texts create the impression of being informative while veiling crucial information to the reader. Techniques are all the more effective where they violate implicit discourse grammar rather than bluntly stating non-truths or leaving obvious gaps in discourse. After a review of examples, I discuss three general questions:

- In the absence of a narrator, which fictitious or real conscious agent can be blamed for being non-cooperative?
- Do we find the same techniques in deceptive first-person narration, notably Christie's legendary *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd*?
- Which morals are to be drawn for our reading of non-cooperative informative texts in real life?