Programme - AMC Conference 2025

Participants:

• Hannah Harris – Marie Curie Fellow, IAEA
• Manuel Kreutle – Doctoral Researcher, Forschungszentrum Jülich
• Michaelan Sinnett – Intern, African Nuclear Disarmament Verification Hub (ANDV), VERTIC
• Nicolás Ayala Arboleda – Leadership team member, Young Pugwash

Chairs: Kim Westerich-Fellner – Postdoctoral researcher, Forschungszentrum Jülich & Erik Andersson Sundén – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 4

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

Nuclear Risk Reduction via Scientific Cooperation with North Korea

by Hannah Harris

Scientific cooperation between nuclear adversaries has the potential to bolster strategic stability while reducing the risks of nuclear escalation or miscommunication. Nuclear-armed and notoriously withdrawn, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nonetheless has been a contributive member of the international scientific community for decades. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs are ultimately situated within the nexus of many interrelated disciplines in the physical and biological sciences. Therefore, a big picture understanding of Korean science history and the situation today is necessary. This presentation summarizes my research over the last ten years regarding the untold history of international scientific cooperation with North Korea as it pertains to nuclear armament and proliferation. I discuss my unique professional viewpoint coming from astrophysics and astronomy and outline specific strategies and policy recommendations for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to engage with North Korea and promote peaceful denuclearization through science diplomacy and collaboration.

The (Social) Construction of Digital Twins for Safeguards in Nuclear Waste Management: A Stakeholder Analysis as a basis for prototype Development

by Manuel Kreutle and Irmgard Niemeyer

Digital twins, virtual representations of physical systems regularly updated with data, have gained attention across various field and industries, including nuclear safeguards. This paper borrows concepts from the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) framework to explore the development of digital twins for safeguards in nuclear waste management through the lens various stakeholder groups, including inspectorates, facility operators, inspectors, operator employees, and the safeguards research community. The study examines the design requirements that reflect the differing expectations of these groups and identifies a broad set of these: from inspectorates’ need for coupling monitoring devices, predictive modeling, and reduced operational costs, to inspectors’ requirements for safety, training tools, and minimal user input. Facility operators and their employees emphasize operational continuity, safety, and data privacy, while the research community values simulation capability and comprehensive system modeling. A stakeholder-informed feature set is proposed, including central data storage, remote access, simulation-based testing, graphical user interfaces, and privacy-preserving mechanisms. Based on this analysis, a digital twin prototype is introduced. It is built on a PostgreSQL-based database model that integrates physical and organizational components of safeguards systems. A Python API connects this model to other modules, enabling simulation of radiation transport and LiDAR scans using tools such as OpenMC and Helios++. A graphical user interface supports user interaction, visualizing both declared and observed system states. The paper concludes that the development of digital twins for nuclear safeguards is a socially negotiated process shaped by a network of actors with divergent yet overlapping goals. Ignoring the requirements of any one group risks the failure of the technology’s adoption. Future work should include empirical validation through stakeholder interviews and participatory design methods to refine the prototype and ensure long-term usability.

Adopting societal verification as a method for verifying nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the potential role of African civil society

by Michaelan Sinnett and Noel Stott

Many African countries have expressed a strong interest in adopting nuclear energy to achieve their socio- economic and developmental goals in recent years. Nuclear technology is, for example, seen as a source of clean and sustainable power generation able to ensure energy security while mitigating climate change by significantly reducing the use of fossil fuels.

Under the NPT, states have an inalienable right to research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the dual-use nature of nuclear technology poses a significant challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and any present or future treaty that explicitly prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons by all states. Verification measures to ensure that such technologies are not being used for military purposes will thus need to be enhanced and if, and when, complete disarmament by a nuclear-armed state occurs that it is complete and irreversible.

While it is unclear as to which international organisation will be mandated to verify disarmament, this article discusses whether there is a role for non-state actors, specifically civil society organisations (CSO), in monitoring a state’s compliance with international treaties. The paper aims to examine how societal verification could be adopted to supplement a future disarmament verification regime and a states’ compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

To conceptualise the research question, this article briefly explores the concept of societal verification. The article, examines the potential role of CSOs in verifying nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, highlights both the promise and limitations of societal verification. The paper concludes by proposing the involvement of African civil society in societal verification activities through their wide networks, including those established in support of the goals of both the NPT and the TPNW.

Surveying the Potential Impact of Quantum Technologies on Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

by Nicolás Ayala Arboleda

Technologies being developed during the second quantum revolution hold the potential to create significant changes in a wide array of fields, as is highlighted by the United Nations proclaiming 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology. However, the potential of these technologies in nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, as well as their potential impact on strategic stability, remain severely under-researched. This paper aims to contribute in filling this gap by identifying a set of quantum technologies which may have significant impacts in the aforementioned areas. The text provides a brief introduction to the identified technologies, as well as to their current or potential effects on nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These range from applications in computing, to use cases in sensing, communications and beyond. The paper then presents a set of recommendations for maximising the potential contributions of these technologies to the aforementioned fields, while minimising potential harms, through an approach based on Responsible Research and Innovation. This methodology lends itself to this particular case, as there still remains much uncertainty surrounding the future of quantum technologies.

Participants:

• Cristina Valeria Puga-Álvarez – Assistant professor, Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador - ESPE & Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE)
  
• Karim Haggag – Professor of Practice, The American University in Cairo & member of AMC’s working group 5
• Polina Sinovets – Director, Odesa Center for Nonproliferation

Chair: Omar Layachi – Non-resident fellow in peace and conflict studies at the LinX Lab, Linx (Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de l'X) Ecole polytechnique

Discussants: Shorena Lortkipanidze – Founder, Civil Council on Defense and Security; Tom Sauer – Professor, Universiteit Antwerpen & member of AMC’s working group 1

Venue: Lecture Hall VIII (no live streaming)

Shaping Global Norms: Exploring an International Framework to Prohibit Armed Attacks on Nuclear Infrastructure

by Cristina Valeria Puga-Álvarez

The targeting of nuclear facilities during armed conflicts poses severe risks to international security, environmental stability, and civilian safety. Incidents such as Israel's 1981 airstrike on Iraq's Osirak reactor and Russia's military activity around Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant underscore the catastrophic consequences of such actions, including radioactive contamination and humanitarian crises.

Despite repeated calls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and discussions at forums like the Conference on Disarmament, efforts to establish a binding international framework prohibiting attacks on nuclear infrastructure remain stalled.

This proposal explores the potential for revitalizing global initiatives to create an international treaty explicitly banning such attacks. Key norms include recognizing nuclear facilities as inviolable civilian objects under international humanitarian law (IHL), banning preemptive strikes during peacetime, and establishing accountability mechanisms. Drawing lessons from past successes in advancing global treaties on landmines and chemical weapons, this study examines strategies for overcoming current diplomatic deadlock.

The paper concludes with actionable recommendations, including leveraging multilateral platforms, fostering coalitions among states, and engaging civil society advocacy. A robust treaty can institutionalize protections for nuclear facilities, mitigate risks in future conflicts, and strengthen global security amidst escalating geopolitical tensions.

Ukraine and the Widening Cracks in the Edifice of Global Nuclear Order

by Karim Haggag

The current debate regarding the implications of the Russian-Ukraine war on the global nuclear order portrays the conflict is a singular event that will have far-reaching implications. While much of the current concern is justified, especially given Ukraine’s unique nuclear history, the war’s impact on global nuclear order is best assessed in a historical context. The Ukraine war is only the latest in a long series of milestone developments over the course of the last three decades that have had profound implications for global nuclear politics and the non-proliferation regime: the India-Pakistan nuclear tests of 1998; the 2005 US-India nuclear deal; the breakdown of the US-Russia strategic arms control framework; North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT, among others. In one sense, the war adds to the stress on the global nuclear order produced by these earlier developments. The first order effects of the conflict will likely further erode strategic stability; undermine the prospects of reviving strategic arms control; and contribute to the polarization of global nuclear politics between advocates of the NPT and the TPNW. The second order effects could be more profound. More advanced nuclear sharing arrangements between NATO members to bolster deterrence could erode the distinction between nuclear possession and non-possession. The intervention of Iran and North Korea could greatly complicate international diplomacy to address these twin non-proliferation challenges. Most concerning would be the long-term tensions between the policy framework of non-proliferation and deterrence.

The day after: the impact of Russia’s invasion on Ukrainian political elites’ and public attitudes toward nuclear weapons

by Polina Sinovets and Adérito Vicente

Debate on nuclear policy in Ukraine has primarily centered on regret over the disarmament decisions of the 1990s rather than a desire to acquire nuclear weapons. However, while acknowledging the deterrent value of nuclear arms, skepticism toward the possibility of developing an indigenous nuclear weapons program has prevailed. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and more prominently after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, this debate has been salient in Ukraine. Our analysis of Ukrainian public opinion and political-elite attitudes toward nuclear weapons reveals the coexistence of two perspectives. On the one hand, a significant proportion of Ukrainians view nuclear weapons as essential for safeguarding national independence and enhancing defense capabilities; thus there is widespread disappointment over Ukraine’s decision to relinquish the nuclear weapons on its territory following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, most Ukrainians recognize that neither their defense industry nor their foreign policy is currently prepared to pursue a nuclear-weapons option. This has led Ukrainians to prioritize obtaining international security guarantees and pursuing integration into NATO.

Participants:

• Madeline Berzak – Nuclear Risk Program Manager, The University of Chicago Existential Risk Lab
• Chris Ferrero – Associate Professor, Coastal Carolina University
• Paul Lundberg – Bachelor student, Department of Government, Uppsala University

Chair: Sharon Weiner – Associate Professor, American University

Discussants: Camilla Orjuela – Professor, University of Gothenburg; Lisa Hecht – Postdoc, Technische Universität Dresden

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

Sentient Shrimp and Nuclear Winter: The Conceptualization of Nuclear Risk in Effective Altruism and the Nuclear Field

by Madeline Berzak

This paper develops a typology to examine how nuclear and existential risk is conceptualized within two distinct yet increasingly intersecting communities: the effective altruism movement and the broader nuclear field. Both communities strive to mitigate existential risks but approach them with contrasting moral frameworks, institutional logics, and epistemic tools. This study draws on document analysis, and interdisciplinary theory to explore how communities can miscommunicate, and ultimately stall progress on risk mitigation. The findings suggest that both communities operate with unique forms of rationality, and these differing approaches reveal fundamental differences in how each models uncertainty, assigns moral weight, and constructs risk in an increasingly complex world. This paper ultimately examines how existential risk is socially constructed, and understanding this reveals differences and tensions in stakeholder groups on the limits to modelling risk.

The In-Group versus the Oikumene: Nuclear Moral Reasoning in Orthodox Christianity

by Chris Ferrero

This paper presents the ongoing findings of a research program on Orthodox Christianity and nuclear norms. It builds on a lecture that I delivered at the Alva Myrdal Center in March 2024 entitled “Orthodox Christianity and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century” in which I explained the problem of Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy (Adamsky 2019) and provided preliminary impressions from my field work with Orthodox Christians. In this 2025 conference presentation, I present the complete findings of my 2024 field work with Orthodox Christians in Sweden as well as ongoing findings from in-depth interviews with Orthodox Christian elites. I show that contrary to the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church, Orthodoxy Christianity does not legitimize nuclear threats on behalf of Orthodox Christian civilization or any other group. Instead, Orthodox Christians overwhelmingly interpret their faith as requiring nuclear disarmament. However, the belief that Orthodoxy requires nuclear disarmament does not necessarily translate to calls for immediate, unilateral disarmament, nor does it strip many Orthodox Christians’ views of any nuance. I find that political identity acts as a moderating variable. Orthodox Christianity generally leads one to view nuclear weapons as immoral, but citizens of countries that possess nuclear weapons or belong to a nuclear alliance are less categorical in their rejection of nuclear weapons and more likely to recommend caution in taking unilateral steps toward disarmament. Political in-group considerations are in tension with fundamental Christian precepts. These findings are consistent with experimental surveys (i.e., Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013) suggesting that many people believe nuclear weapons are an acceptable tool of statecraft when political in-group interests are at stake.

NATO nukes on Swedish soil: The correlation between postmaterialism and attitudes toward nuclear weapons

by Paul Lundberg

Attitudes toward nuclear weapons is a well-studied field within political science; however, not in the context of the postmaterial values articulated by Inglehart. This study aims to show that individual attitudes toward nuclear weapons are based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, together with emancipatory needs typical of postmaterial priorities. The quantitative study takes place in Sweden, currently a country on the threshold of becoming a nuclear host to NATO nuclear warheads.

This article finds evidence for its hypothesis: there is a negative correlation between postmaterial values among individuals and their attitudes toward nuclear weapons. There are also findings suggesting a strong negative correlation between age and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. The well-studied right-left scale continues to correlate with attitudes concerning nuclear weapons; however, this connection is not as significant as the one with cultural values and priorities.

The panel will consider the imperatives, downsides, and possibilities for Western or NATO Arctic states to engage with Russia on strategic tensions and regional security concerns in the Arctic, while still holding Moscow to account for its aggression against Ukraine and other violations of the rules based international order. While NATO Arctic states have generally placed severe restrictions on direct diplomatic engagement with Russia in the current circumstances, most also recognize the value of continued engagement through multilateral forums like the NPT Review Process, and through less formal engagement and discussions. What are the dangers posed when rising strategic tensions and expanding military patrols in the Arctic occur in the context of diplomatic isolation and the absence of regular mutual contact that risk misperceptions and misinterpretations of the other’s actions? What are the ongoing requirements for building capacity for carrying out regional commitments to cooperate in search and rescue operations, oil spill mitigation, and Coast Guard operations? Apart from the imperatives and downsides of such engagement in the current circumstances, what are the possibilities in the short and medium term, and what might be appropriate mechanisms or forums for such engagement? In the context of caution regarding official engagement, to what extent are informal Track II encounters underway? Would there be value in states encouraging and providing resources for expanding such initiatives?

Participants:

• Axel Wernhoff – Ambassador for Arctic Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• Nancy Teeple – Defence Scientist-Strategic Analyst, Defence Research and Development Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (DRDC CORA)
• Aqqaluk Lynge – Author & Former President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council and member of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

Chair: Ernie Regehr – Senior Fellow in Defence and Arctic Security, The Simons Foundation Canada

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

Participants:

• Benjamin Jung – Doctoral student, RWTH Aachen University & Technische Universität Darmstadt
• Fabian Unruh – Doctoral Researcher, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
• Max Schalz – Research associate, RWTH Aachen University
• Noel Stott – Senior Researcher, VERTIC

Chairs: Cecilia Gustavsson – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 4; Peter Andersson – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 4

Venue: Lecture Hall VIII (no live streaming)

Reconstructing North Korea’s Plutonium Production History with Bayesian Inference-Based Reprocessing Waste Analysis

by Benjamin Jung, Johannes Bosse and Malte Göttsche

Although North Korea’s nuclear program has been the subject of extensive scrutiny, estimates of its fissile material stockpiles remain fraught with uncertainty. In potential future disarmament agreements, inspectors may need to use nuclear archaeology methods to verify or gain confidence in a North Korean fissile material declaration. This study explores the potential utility of a Bayesian inference-based analysis of the isotopic composition of reprocessing waste to reconstruct the operating history of the 5MWe reactor and estimate its plutonium production history. We simulate several scenarios that reflect different assumptions and varying levels of prior knowledge about the reactor. The results show that correct prior assumptions can be confirmed and incorrect prior information (or a false declaration) can be detected. Model comparison techniques can distinguish between scenarios with different numbers of core discharges, a capability that could provide important insights into the early stages of operation of the 5 MWe reactor. Using these techniques, a weighted plutonium estimate can be calculated, even in cases where the number of core discharges is not known with certainty.

Verifying operational histories of nuclear reactor with archival records in nuclear archaeology

by Fabian Unruh and Malte Göttsche

Most nuclear reactors are inevitably linked to the production of plutonium. A reliable reconstruction of their operational history can be part of nuclear verification.Whilemost of the work in nuclear archaeology focusses on utilizing forensic measurements in reactors, the prospect of using existing reactor archives is scarcely explored. Existing analyses have remained superficial.

We accessed the archives of the Mehrzweckforschungsreaktor Karlsruhe (MZFR), which was a peacefully used research reactor in Germany, to demonstrate potential analysis approaches for hypothetical verification exercises. Our analysis consists of three steps. First, the screening of available data for relevant information and its challenges such as missing data. Second, the self-consistency of the archival data is checked with statistical methods as the credibility of documents provided by the investigated party might not be taken for granted. Third, the sensitivity for detecting past undeclared reactor operations by an analysis of the data is evaluated.

We expect most of the documented measurements to be correlated through physical processes. This allows inspectors to verify reactor operation periods and rule out clandestine material diversion. The methods used, being exemplary applied to the MZFR archives, can pose as a starting point for reconstructing operational histories of nuclear reactors using archival data.

Reconstructing past uranium enrichment programmes: Mission (im)possible?

by Max Schalz and Malte Göttsche

Nuclear archaeology aims at reconstructing the past operating history and fissile material production of a nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). So far, mostly nuclear archaeology methods applied to the plutonium path (i.e., reactors and reprocessing facilities) have shown promising or successful results. In contrast, nuclear archaeology of uranium enrichment proves challenging due to multiple factors, including the varying U234 concentrations in natural uranium.

In this work, we use an NFC simulator to apply nuclear archaeology simultaneously to the plutonium and the uranium path. We model a closed NFC and reconstruct the plutonium production based on the composition of the spent (reactor) fuel. Then, we investigate if this newly gained information can provide a useful basis to reconstruct the operational history of the enrichment facility. In the study, we vary key enrichment parameters and assess their impact on the reconstructed HEU quantities. If successful and transferable to other scenarios, this approach could solve one of the challenges of applying enrichment nuclear archaeology.

The verification of the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme: Lessons for future unilateral or multilateral disarmament initiatives

by Noel Stott and Andre Buys

On 24 March 1993, South Africa’s then President, acknowledged what was long suspected—that the country had nuclear weapons before it acceded in 1991, to the NPT. He also announced that it had ‘rolled back’ its capability completely. While a great deal has been written on South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme, most analysts have focused on possible reasons why the programme was embarked on, whether the weapons were built with foreign assistance and why, was it terminated. South Africa’s disarmament provides the only practical experience of attempting to verify the quantity of fissile material produced outside of international safeguards. This experience may be particularly instructive about the promise and problems of verifying irreversible disarmament. The paper analyses how the dismantlement process was undertaken and verified to ascertain key steps that might be considered in the future by other States’ undertaking disarmament processes. Interrogating the technical aspects of the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons programme and its post-facto verification by the IAEA, may identify possible processes and lessons that could be applicable in future unilateral or multilateral disarmament initiatives. Placing an emphasis on accounts by participants in the programme’s development and dismantlement (‘insiders’ rather than non-South African scholars), as well as descriptions written by the inspection teams, this paper may assist in supporting the development and strengthening of practical and effective measures for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons and concludes by identifying further research questions that could provide a uniquely South African perspective from which to examine the ‘challenge’ of verification.

Participants:

• Agata Bidas – Student, University of Vienna
• Leila Hennaoui – Associate Professor, Hassiba Ben Bouali University of Chlef
  
• Jo-Ansie van Wyk – Professor, University of South Africa & member of AMC’s working group 2

Chair: Almuntaser Albalawi – Researcher, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Discussants: Carolina Pantoliano – Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of Glasgow; Sterre van Buuren, Research Assistant, Sciences Po

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

Legal Pathways to Justice: Addressing the Legacy of Nuclear Testing and Advancing Global Disarmament

by Agata Bidas

The devastating impacts of nuclear weapons testing on communities and ecosystems remain an unresolved issue. Marginalised populations, particularly in post-colonial territories, are disproportionally affected by these harms, yet legal responses are often inconsistent. This paper critically examines national compensation frameworks and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, analysing their effectiveness in addressing these injustices. Case studies from the United States and France are selected to explore how postcolonial legacies shape legal responses, offering perspectives from these two states with extensive nuclear testing histories in colonised or remote territories (such as Marshall Islands and French Polynesia). Through qualitative analysis of legal documents, policies, and their sociopolitical contexts, this research identifies gaps and inequities in existing frameworks, such as the U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act and France’s Morin Law. Moreover, the TPNW’s victim assistance provisions are critically assessed and analysed for their potential to establish global standards for reparations. By integrating insights from international law, postcolonial theory, and human rights advocacy, the paper proposes an equitable global framework, including a UN-led international compensation fund.

This research emphasises that addressing historical injustices is essential for strengthening global disarmament norms and for reinforcing the international commitment to a nuclear-free future.

Reimagining Nuclear Disarmament: The TPNW’s Role in Decolonizing the Global Nuclear Order

by Leila Hennaoui

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) represents a groundbreaking effort to challenge the inequities entrenched in the global nuclear disarmament regime. Emerging from the frustrations of nonnuclear weapon states marginalized by the dominance of nuclear-armed powers, the TPNW disrupts the hierarchical global order established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While the NPT institutionalized a colonial structure that privileges a few states with nuclear weapons, the TPNW reflects a decolonial approach by reframing nuclear weapons as symbols of global injustice and humanitarian catastrophe.

This paper examines the TPNW as a transformative legal instrument, arguing that it goes beyond traditional arms control mechanisms by fostering a normative shift that delegitimizes nuclear weapons as instruments of power. Drawing parallels with anticolonial movements, the paper explores how the treaty elevates the voices of Global South nations, creating a framework for equitable participation in disarmament efforts.

Through a decolonial lens, this analysis underscores the TPNW’s potential to inspire broader structural changes in global nuclear governance while addressing its limitations and challenges in achieving universalization.

Apartheid South Africa's nuclear disarmament, 1989-1993: A reappraisal

by Jo-Ansie van Wyk

South Africa voluntarily disarmed its nuclear weapons arsenal and programme between 1989 and 1993. With at least 35 years' scholarship and hindsight, what instructive lessons can be drawn from the South African nuclear disarmament experience to avert and address contemporary nuclear crises? Using a constructivist approach, the paper considers and appraises the role of several state and non-state actors and factors (e.g. regime status-seeking behaviour, survival and alienation, international punitive measures (e.g. sanctions, embargoes), International Law, democratic pressure, and surveillance technology) that led to a critical juncture in the apartheid regime and its nuclear weapons programme. Deduced from this historical example, the paper offers a path to nuclear peace.

Participants:

• Zahra Bagheri – Researcher, University of Hamburg
• Shabir Dar – Postdoctoral Fellow, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 4
• Christopher Fichtlscherer – Researcher, IFSH Hamburg & RWTH Aachen
• Viktor Thorén – Team Lead R&D, Scienta Envinet

Chairs: Jaewoo Shin – Senior Analyst, Open Nuclear Network; Benjamin Jung – Doctoral student, RWTH Aachen University & Technische Universität Darmstadt

Venue: Lecture hall IX

Single-Detector Muography to Verify the Absence of Fissile Material in Nuclear Disarmament Efforts

by Zahra Bagheri, Moritz Kütt and Dieter Horns

Verifying the absence of fissile material in former nuclear weapon deployment sites is essential for global disarmament and non-proliferation. Methods relying on passive emissions from nuclear materials are limited by background radiation interference, while active techniques pose radiation safety risks. We proposes a novel alternative using cosmic-ray-induced muons and muography to detect concealed fissile material, such as plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, within large structures.

Inspired by muography’s use in archaeology and geology, this approach employs a single-detector muon telescope to generate transmission images, detecting density variations indicative of fissile material without the size constraints of dual-detector systems. The study establishes a minimal muon energy threshold for penetration through structures without fissile material, calculates the baseline muon flux, and identifies detectable changes in intensity due to concealed material.

Simulations using Geant4, a Monte Carlo particle transport tool, integrated with the EcoMug cosmic ray source generator, will model various structural scenarios. We present simulation results for muon measurements in the experimental hall “Shielded Experimental Hall” (SHELL) at the University of Hamburg Campus. Using these simulations, we also plan to conduct validation measurements in the future.

Coincidence gamma-ray spectrometry to improve sensitivity in radionuclide monitoring – Development of a background model

by Shabir Dar, Erik Andersson Sundén, Cecilia Gustavsson, Alf Göök, Peter Jansson, Volodymyr Khotyayintsev, Johan Nyberg, Catarina Söderström and Peter Andersson

In any nuclear explosion, the initial heat and radiation is accompanied by delayed radiation from radioactive products. The atmospheric transport of the radionuclide precursors of this radiation allows for detection of a nuclear explosion across the borders from the state of origin. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all the forms of nuclear explosions. To ensure compliance, more than 300 monitoring facilities have been established in the International Monitoring System, including 80 radionuclide monitoring stations, in order to detect and deter from nuclear testing. In addition, national radionuclide monitoring and performing complementary monitoring of environmental radioactivity, for purposes ranging from nuclear safety to detection of nuclear tests.

The gamma-gamma coincidence technique is a powerful method that enhances the sensitivity to certain nuclides by using correlated gamma rays. By suppressing the background from naturally occurring radioactivity, this technique may be used to improve the sensitivity of radionuclides relevant to detection of nuclear tests. This study aims to evaluate the use of modern, state-of-the-art segmented high-resolution High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors and apply the gamma-gamma coincidence technique to enhance the sensitivity.

Essential to the objective of enhancing the sensitivity is to use Monte Carlo simulation software, Geant4, in optimization of a detector. In this work, the development of a background source model is described. In order to provide a means for realistic coincidence detector background, the background of natural and artificial radionuclides is investigated. For this purpose, measurements of an unused particulate filter for collection of airborne radionuclides is used, as well as a measurement of a used filter. In addition, the external background the from surrounding detector setup and the lab environment is examined by use of an empty measurement (no filter). Finally, the resulting background model is applied to the simulation of a background spectrum of a coincidence detector, and the results are discussed with focus on the implications of the background model on the design of coincidence detectors to optimized sensitivity.

On the Evolution of Cheating-Resistant Gamma Signatures for Warhead Confirmation

by Christopher Fichtlscherer and Moritz Kütt

A key challenge for successful nuclear disarmament and arms control is the development of reliable and efficient verification technologies. These would, for example, confirm whether dismantled objects are actually nuclear warheads. It is often suggested to base warhead confirmation on the gamma emissions from the radioactive material within the weapon, which act like a signature. Different systems utilize low-resolution gamma spectroscopy to minimize the disclosure of sensitive information. In low-resolution gamma spectroscopy, the passive gamma spectrum information is collapsed to only a very small number of energy bins. However, recent research has shown that low-resolution gamma signatures might be prone to cheating and change over time with aging weapons. Here, we present a new method based on a genetic algorithm to identify cheating-resistant and age-invariant low-resolution gamma-spectroscopy signatures for warhead confirmation. This method could be used in future verification efforts to determine reliable signatures.

Facilitating Radioxenon Monitoring Networks

by Viktor Thorén

The measurement of atmospheric radioxenon is a key component of the CTBT verification regime and an established method for detecting nuclear weapons tests or monitoring activities such as the operation of nuclear power plants. The Swedish SAUNA systems for radioxenon detection, developed by FOI and manufactured by Scienta Envinet, have been operating in the International Monitoring System for many years.

The latest addition to the SAUNA series, QUBE, is a cost-effective variant that facilitates the establishment of dense networks that offer redundancy, flexibility, increased detection probability, and enhanced precision in pinpointing the location of emission sources. Scienta Envinet supports these networks through its Network Monitoring Centre (NMC) software, which consolidates data from various radionuclide monitoring instruments into a central interface equipped with advanced data analysis tools.

To make full use of the new networks, Scienta Envinet is dedicating significant effort to developing analysis techniques for source localization, with a focus on streamlining this task to make it a reliable part of the day- to-day operations. This presentation will showcase initial results from this tool based on real-world measurements and describe how the NMC assists users in managing their monitoring networks and in sharing their data with collaborators across countries and organizations.

Showcasing novel AMC Data on Arms Control Agreements, this panel delves into the history and evolution of arms control over the past century. From the early post-World War I efforts to mitigate militarization to the landmark treaties of the Cold War, and their gradual unravelling in more recent decades. The discussion will reflect on key historical trends and what they might tell us about the future trajectory of arms control.

Participants:

• Jakob Hallgren – Director, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Siri Jansson – Research assistant, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 3
• Lars-Erik Lundin – Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
• Peter Wallensteen – Professor emeritus, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 2

Chair: Magnus Öberg – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 3

Venue: Lecture hall VIII (no live streaming)

Participants:

• Kateryna Boyko – PhD Student, Uppsala University
  
• Valeriia Hesse – Research Analyst, Open Nuclear Network (ONN), a programme of PAXsapiens
• Ying Li – Research assistant, James Martin Center of Nonproliferation Studies
• Sharon Weiner – Associate Professor, American University

Chair: Chiara Fargnoli – Research Associate, Harvard Kennedy School

Discussants: Astrid Kause – Professor, School of Sustainability, Leuphana University Lüneburg & Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University; Rhys Crilley – UKRI Future Leaders Fellow, University of Glasgow

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

Nuclear Scare as a Propaganda Tactic in the Soviet Union and Russia

by Roman Horbyk and Kateryna Boyko

The “nuclear scare” was a well-known and persistent propaganda tactic in the Soviet Union, aimed at influencing and controlling the Western policies (Barghoorn 1964; Fischer 1999; Fischer 2018). While current Russian regime frequently uses threats of nuclear weapons in its foreign relations and diplomacy, it has only very recently come to be seen as a continuation of the Soviet doctrine (Ventsel et al 2021; Sinovetz & Shultz 2023; Giles 2023). This presentation will contribute to closing this gap by examining the historical evolution of this approach, exploring its ideological underpinnings, operational mechanisms, and socio- political impacts.

Drawing on theories of securitisation (Buzan et al 1999) and reflexive control (Bjola 2019), the study employs a comparative historical approach, analyzing official rhetoric from Soviet and post-Soviet periods, archival materials, and declassified documents, including the recently discovered KGB manuals on propaganda and political intelligence (Horbyk et al 2023). The findings will demonstrate both continuities and discontinuities between the Soviet and Russian uses of nuclear threats as a tool of reflexive control. In this context, the paper will highlight yet another, propagandistic, role of nuclear weapons in the service of “sharp power” (Walker 2018) and aggressive foreign policy.

Best Practice Guidance for Countering Radiological and Nuclear Disinformation in Multilateral Forums

by Valeriia Hesse, Rainbow (Yudian) Tao, Elin Bergner and Marcy R. Fowler

Nuclear and radiological (N&R) disinformation can lead to conflict escalation by distorting threat perceptions, provoking miscalculations, and undermining trust in institutions. This can lead to impulsive military or political responses, particularly in regions affected by conflict, such as Ukraine.

The paper will present best practice guidance for international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and media content creators to counter N&R disinformation effectively. Building on insights from cross-sectional disciplines – cognitive and behavioral sciences, media, strategic communications, gender studies, and information sciences – the paper will examine existing strategies and evaluate their impact on nuclear and radiological contexts. By analyzing disinformation campaigns in Ukraine, the paper will identify methods used to disseminate misleading narratives and successful countermeasures deployed by various stakeholders.

The findings will draw on a comprehensive review of multi-language literature, informational interviews with experts, and desk research. The resulting guidance will emphasize the importance of context-sensitive, evidence-based interventions that utilize digital tools, promote fact-based narratives, and address systemic vulnerabilities. The guidance will enable stakeholders to build resilience against nuclear and radiological disinformation and mitigate the related escalation through tailored strategies that are effective across diverse platforms and audiences.

Hypersonic Weapons and US-Russia Crisis Stability

by Ying Li

In recent years, the rapid advancement and increasing battlefield deployment of hypersonic weapons have intensified concerns regarding their impact on crisis stability between the United States and Russia. Scholars and defense analysts warn that hypersonic weapons may undermine mutual nuclear deterrence by altering the offense-defense balance and elevating the risk of nuclear miscalculation, thereby increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear conflict.

This thesis examines the development of hypersonic weapons in both the U.S. and Russia, assessing their implications for mutual assured destruction and the mechanisms underlying nuclear misjudgment. By modeling U.S.-Russia nuclear deterrence across three scenarios—current status, initial deployment of hypersonic weapons, and advanced deployment of hypersonic weapons—this study evaluates whether hypersonic capabilities compromise strategic deterrence. The findings indicate that hypersonic weapons do not fundamentally disrupt mutual assured deterrence between the United States and Russia. Rather, the principal risk arises from heightened possibilities of nuclear misjudgment or miscalculation, exacerbated by warhead and trajectory ambiguities associated with hypersonic weapons and the implementation of "Launch on Warning" policies. These factors collectively increase the danger of inadvertent nuclear conflict.

Rationality under Attack: Understanding Decision-Making in a Crisis Involving Nuclear Weapons

by Sharon Weiner and Moritz Kütt

Research to understand decision-making in a crisis spans multiple fields that collectively have built upon or refuted the assumption that rationality plays a central role in the process by which humans navigate uncertainty and make choices. In sharp contrast are the assumptions prevalent in political science, security studies, and U.S. nuclear strategy about decision-making in a crisis that involves a nuclear weapons attack. Here, rational choice continues to play a fundamental role because decision-makers are assumed able to weigh the costs and consequences of their actions.

There is little empirical evidence to assess whether, in a nuclear crisis, a decision-maker will be more or less rational. To fill this gap, we use a Virtual Reality (VR) simulation to generate data about how humans make decisions when they think they are in a nuclear crisis. Our analysis calls into question three basic tenets of rational choice. First, participants tended to make decisions without seeking much additional information. Second, less than half of the participants who had clearly stated preferences selected from the available options the one most likely to maximize their stated goals. Third, more than half of the participants made decisions anticipating the outcome would make them worse off.

Participants:

• Camilla Orjuela – Professor, University of Gothenburg
• Raphael Pangalangan – Human Rights Officer, United Nations Human Rights Office
• Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla – CEO & Founder, JASA, and Co-Founder, Qazaq Nuclear Frontline Coalition (QNFC)
• Imari Yasuno – Member, Nagasaki YWCA

Chair: Janina Dannenberg – Postdoctoral researcher, University of Hamburg

Discussants: Brian Palmer – Associate Professor, Uppsala University; Stephanie Verlaan – Researcher, European-University Viadrina

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

Fighting nuclear weapons at the municipal level: Civil society, local politicians and foreign policy contestations

by Camilla Orjuela and Quinissa Putrirezhy

The threat of nuclear war has historically led to popular mobilization for disarmament, in the form of public protests, advocacy work and awareness raising. While national governments and the UN system are key players for abolishing nuclear arms – not least through the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – anti-nuclear efforts also take place at sub-national level. When countries fail to support nuclear disarmament, cities sometimes take their own position, issuing declarations and refusing the production, transportation and deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. Today, thousands of municipalities have taken a stand against nuclear weapons. This relocation of nuclear policies to the municipal level highlights the increasingly blurred lines between local, domestic and international politics. Critics see this “localization” of foreign policy issues as a potential threat to national security and policy coherence, while others welcome it as a step towards the democratization of foreign policy. This paper studies how and why civil society and political actors pursue the prohibition of nuclear arms at the sub-national level and analyzes the conflicts that arise in the process. It presents preliminary findings from an ongoing research project which uses qualitative methods to map and trace the processes through which municipalities and regions involve in the struggle against nuclear weapons.

Addressing the challenges and barriers to the full realization and enjoyment of the human rights of the people of the Marshall Islands, stemming from the State’s nuclear legacy

by Raphael Pangalangan

In its resolution 51/35, the Human Rights Council requested that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) prepare a report on addressing the challenges and barriers to the full realization and enjoyment of the human rights of the people of the Marshall Islands, stemming from the State’s nuclear legacy.

OHCHR conducted three visits to the Marshall Islands during which it held consultations with the Presidential Envoy for Nuclear Justice and Human Rights, members and representatives of the Nitijela (parliament), the Council of Iroij (chiefs), government ministries, the National Nuclear Commission, community members in Majuro and Kwajalein Atolls and survivors from the nuclear testing period, among others. Consultations with the Embassy of the United States of America to the Marshall Islands and the United States Department of Energy, United Nations entities, civil society organizations and academics were likewise conducted. The report builds on those discussions and oral tradition (bwebwenato), as well as the report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes on his visit to the Marshall Islands and the United States, submissions received pursuant to the call for inputs launched by OHCHR and other documentary sources.

In keeping with the resolution’s focus on transitional justice to address the nuclear legacy, in the present report, OHCHR engages in a form of truth-telling by outlining key moments, impacts, points of contention and efforts to seek justice. It discusses the human rights implications of the nuclear legacy and the role of truth-seeking in addressing them.

Nuclear Colonialism and Resurgence in Central Asia: Civil Society, State Power, and Decolonial Resistance

by Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla

This study investigates the revitalization of the nuclear dynamics in the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic, emphasizing the formation of new coalitions and actors dedicated to nuclear and climate justice. It analyzes the evolving landscape of local nonprofits, with a particular focus on the pivotal roles of youth and women, as well as their partnerships with international organizations. The research highlights how young practitioners and theorists are actively decolonizing narratives surrounding disarmament policy and nuclear history while other senior players are challenging the government's pro- nuclear stance, especially about NPP developments and the revival of uranium extraction. Furthermore, it examines the organized resistance from various civic entities against this pro-nuclear lobby and addresses the recent state nuclear oppression. Additionally, the implications of newly enacted legislation regarding the Semey NTS will be explored, including its legislative journey and its repercussions for Qazaq nuclear frontline communities. This comprehensive analysis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of grassroots movements in the context of global disarmament efforts.

Becoming Nisei Hibakusha: Manifestation of Intergenerational Nuclear Legacy in Nagasaki

by Imari Yasuno

Nisei Hibakusha is the Japanese term for second-generation atomic bomb survivors. In this study, I challenge the predominant biomedical definition of Nisei Hibakusha. Based on qualitative interviews with 10 informants in Nagasaki, I demonstrate how the intergenerational legacy of radiation also manifests itself as a social identity, not just as volatile inheritance of sickness. Applying the concepts of “biological citizenship” and “biosociality” in the analysis of the lives of Nisei Hibakusha reveals complex notions of toxified bodies where the biological is closely tied to identity, socialization and legal status, impacting the sense of belonging of survivors. The legacy of toxicity plays out in the imagination of a toxified body as well as in kinship, emotional/spatial attachment, and ghost/haunting experiences. The nuclear legacy appears in the most nuanced form in the everyday practices of survivors. Hence, I argue that the biomedical being is not a sufficient determinant of Nisei Hibakusha. Rather, the everyday experiences of interacting with society and their own interpretation of toxicity make them “become” one.

Participants:

• Syeda Saiqa Bukhari – PhD student, University of Vienna
• Ali “Mehdi” Isse – PhD Candidate, Princeton University
• Doğukan Cansın Karakuş – Postdoctoral researcher, European Centre for Minority Issues & member of AMC’s working group 2
  

Chair: Peter Wallensteen – Professor emeritus, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 2

Discussants: Armend Bekaj – Researcher, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 2; Ferdinand Alec Arslanian – Independent Researcher & member of AMC’s working group 2

Venue: Lecture Hall IV

Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons; Case study of South Asia

by Syeda Saiqa Bukhari

South Asia, characterized by historical tensions and unresolved conflicts, has witnessed significant geopolitical shifts with the nuclearization of India and Pakistan. This development not only introduced a delicate strategic balance but also raised concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and its humanitarian implications. This study presents a research endeavor aimed at unraveling the perceptions of nuclear weapons in South Asia, particularly focusing on India and Pakistan. The primary objective of this research is to analyze how India and Pakistan perceive the humanitarian aspects of nuclear weapons usage. Specifically, it aims to explore their perspectives on the impacts of nuclear weapons on human health, the environment, food security, migration, and the economy. Additionally, the research seeks to assess the risks and likelihood of authorized, unauthorized, or accidental use of nuclear weapons in the region. The research employs a mixed-method approach, incorporating both primary and secondary data collection methods. Structured interviews will be conducted with key stakeholders, policymakers, and experts from India and Pakistan to gather firsthand insights into their perceptions of nuclear weapons. These interviews will be complemented by an extensive review of secondary sources, including academic literature, policy documents, and international agreements. The collected data will be analyzed using a comparative political method and thematic analysis to discern patterns and draw meaningful conclusions. The findings of this research are expected to offer valuable insights into the prevailing attitudes towards nuclear weapons in South Asia and their potential humanitarian consequences. Moreover, the research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the motivations driving the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and its implications for regional stability.

Between Coercion and Inducements: Ensuring Compliance in Nuclear Disarmament under the NPT and TPNW

by Ali “Mehdi” Isse

This paper examines how international compliance with nuclear disarmament treaties is driven by a balance of coercion and inducements, focusing on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Under the NPT’s regime, compliance has historically been encouraged through a mix of security guarantees, economic incentives, and institutional monitoring—“carrots”—backed by punitive measures and diplomatic pressure—“sticks”— for those who waver. We assess cases where sanctions, enforcement actions, and security assurances have been used (or have failed) to ensure NPT compliance and influence national nuclear policies. Conversely, the newer TPNW represents an inducement-based approach, stigmatizing nuclear arms without direct enforcement mechanisms, relying on normative pressure to induce change. We analyze the tensions and synergies between these treaties: the NPT’s status as a cornerstone of the nuclear order versus the TPNW’s aspirational ban, and how each address (or neglects) coercive enforcement and incentives. Through historical references—from the coercive dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear program to the inducements that led states like Ukraine and Libya to renounce nuclear capabilities—we highlight the critical role of international pressure tactics and incentives in shaping nuclear compliance. The analysis offers policy-relevant insights into strengthening global disarmament efforts, arguing that a strategic blend of pressure and persuasion is essential to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons.

Incentives and Confidence-building Over Coercion: Turkey and Brazil's Mediation of the Tehran Agreement Amid the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

by Doğukan Cansın Karakuş

This study examines Turkey and Brazil's distinctive mediation approach in the 2010 Iranian nuclear issue, emphasizing their use of positive sanctions as a strategic alternative to the P5+1's reliance on negative sanctions. Turkey and Brazil proposed a fuel-swap agreement to Iran under the Tehran Declaration, combining incentives like sanctions relief and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy—aligned with the NPT—with a facilitative approach rather than coercive measures to address Iran's stockpile of low- enriched uranium (LEU). Using primary sources from Brazil and Turkey and insights from semi-structured interviews with Ahmet Davutoglu, former Turkish Foreign Minister and mediator in the Teheran agreement, this study advances sanction theory by demonstrating how positive sanctions—such as incentives and trust- building measures—can foster compliance by reducing the resistance and backlash often linked with punitive sanctions. Turkey and Brazil’s mediation underscores the potential for mediators to develop credible and cooperative frameworks for high-stakes negotiations. Findings suggest that incentives, rather than punitive sanctions, may more effectively enhance compliance and cooperation in contentious international security contexts, presenting a valuable model for future diplomatic efforts.

Participants:

• Astrid Kause – Professor, School of Sustainability, Leuphana University Lüneburg; Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
• Benoît Pelopidas – Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po
• Samara Shaz – Graduate Student, University of Chicago
• Jana Wattenberg – Marie Skłodowska Curie Global Fellow (funded by UKRI), Aberystwyth University
• Sharon Weiner – Associate Professor, American University

Chair & discussant: Laura Considine – Associate Professor, University of Leeds

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

People’s Reactions to the Nuclear Weapons’ Threat: Mapping Post-Cold-War Research and Evidence

by Astrid Kause, Helen Fischer, Zia Mian and Susan T. Fiske

More than three decades have passed since the last major reviews by US psychology researchers of people’s responses to the threat from nuclear weapons. With widespread perceptions that nuclear weapon threats are increasing and may be comparable to levels not seen since the worst periods of the Cold War, there could be value in psychologists documenting and explaining people’s reactions to these threats. As a first step, we map what psychologists and researchers from related fields such as political science have been doing since the end of the Cold War to measure and understand people’s reactions to the nuclear weapon threat. A systematic search in Web of Science and SCOPUS identified 18,505 hits. Screening resulted in 256 suitable articles. We assessed (a) the quantity of published articles over time; (b) the development of the research community, through author collaborations and focal journals; (c) how potentially generalizable and replicable findings were, as indicated by appropriate samples; (d) shared methods and measures. We find renewed interest in the field but not yet a coherent research community, and only some evidence for its evolution from occasional, scattered, one-off studies toward a coherent and coordinated scholarly field.

European publics' attitudes towards nuclear weapons and disarmament

by Benoit Pelopidas

In a context in which the US withdrawal from Europe, the resumption of nuclear testing, the renuclearization as well as denuclearization of European security are all conceivable under the second Trump Presidency, this paper investigates the state of European public opinion on these issues, its evolution over time and whether attitudes are correlated with particular forms of knowledge about nuclear history and politics. It does so thanks to an unprecedented survey of a representative sample (700 to 1000 per country, 7000 total) of residents of nine European states (the two nuclear weapons states, all five hosting states, Sweden and Poland) which was designed and conducted in 2019 and then replicated in 2024. Thanks to this replicated survey, this paper also assesses the validity of the common hypotheses of a generational shift in attitudes towards nuclear disarmament post-Cold War and of durable popular support for the policy of nuclear deterrence in France and the UK. It finally investigates whether and how the war in Ukraine has influenced European publics’ attitudes towards nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing and nuclear disarmament through open ended questions.

Protecting Nuclear Weapons from AI Risks

by Sharon Weiner and Samara Shaz

While artificial intelligence (AI) has been steadily integrated into mainstream and military technology over the past decade, scrutiny has significantly increased about the dangers of this integration. Public and organizational concerns on the long-term sociopolitical and technological effects of AI are regularly highlighted in both academic and popular media. Of particular concern is the integration of AI into nuclear weapons strategy and force structure. In this project, we assess the fears about AI that are articulated about its integration with nuclear weapons, those concerns about the broader use of AI that are not applied to nuclear weapons, and what this difference reveals about contemporary nuclear fears, the values and priorities associated with nuclear weapons, and the relationship between nuclear weapons and different conceptualizations of existential risk.

Managing feelings about gender in the nuclear profession

by Jana Wattenberg

Literature on the sociology of emotions emphasizes the cultural dimension of feelings. Cultures create scripts for feelings. In the nuclear weapons field, cultures of nuclearism and anti-nuclearism provide rules for feelings about nuclear weapons. Feminist scholars argue that these cultures are gendered and refer to gendered dimensions of discourses as evidence. However, so far, very few studies have shown whether and how gender influences how people think and feel about nuclear weapons. My paper aims to contribute to this research area by examining how organizations and individuals manage feelings about gender in the nuclear weapons field. I use Arlie Hochschild’s concept of feeling rules to identify and analyze cultural scripts that seek to regulate how women feel about working in the nuclear profession. The empirical material of my analysis is constituted of publications on women’s work, recruitment materials, policies, initiatives and interview data.

Participants:

• Almuntaser Albalawi – Researcher, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
• Roald H. L. Bloemendal – Student MSSc Peace & Conflict Studies, Uppsala University
• Robert E. Kelley – Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
• Laura Mertes – Postdoc, TU Darmstadt, PRIF (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt)

Chairs: Peter Andersson – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 4; Max Schalz – Research associate, RWTH Aachen University

Venue: Lecture Hall VIII (no live streaming)

Transferring Nuclear Enrichment Technology: Cooperation Models, Proliferation Risks, and Safeguards Considerations

by Almuntaser Albalawi and Leonardo Bandarra

Recent global changes have renewed discussions about the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, particularly uranium enrichment, in potential cooperation agreements. Discussions about uranium enrichment cooperation date back to the 1970s, when advanced nuclear states began collaborating with countries seeking nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. A recent example includes the possibility of such a transfer as part of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and strategic partners such as Saudi Arabia. This paper analyzes models of nuclear enrichment cooperation with different arrangements (bilateral/multilateral; transfer/black-box), drawing on historical case studies: (1) a bilateral model, characterized by full technology cooperation, exemplified by the 1975 nuclear agreement between Brazil and West Germany, (2) a multilateral model, in which full ownership with restricted access is granted to certain members, as seen in URENCO, and (3) a black-box model with non-nuclear weapons states, in which the host country has no access (at least in principle) to, or ownership of, the enrichment facility or certain parts of it. The paper focuses on several key aspects: regional stability and proliferation risks, the challenges to IAEA safeguards implementation in verifying the non-diversion of peaceful uses under these models, and the effectiveness of technical constraints, including remote monitoring, near real-time material accountancy, and remote shutdown systems.

Iran's demonstration in downblending its enriched uranium stockpile indicates a roughly even chance of signalling a diplomatic pathway to resolve its enriched uranium stockpile in future negotiations

by Roald H. L. Bloemendal

Based on IAEA reports, this paper assesses Iran’s use of its stockpile of enriched uranium as a confidence building measure, and how it can fill the demand-supply gap of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) in global markets as part of a potential pathway towards a new nuclear agreement with the United States.

IAEA reports indicate that Iran blended down a notable portion of its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium into HALEU, twice in February 2024 and once in May 2024. This can be considered a costly signal. By blending down notable quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to HALEU, which is fit for civil purposes, there is a roughly even chance that Iran is signalling that there is a route whereby Iran could dispose of its current stocks of HEU as part of a broader nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States is unlikely to materialize in the short-to-medium-term. Even if the parties could agree on the terms of the agreement, Tehran very likely remains reluctant to engage in nuclear talks because of a lack of trust that any deal could be abided by the United States in the long-term. Despite Tehran’s reluctance, blending down HEU into HALEU is a credible path for Iran to take and will very likely be an issue that is taken into consideration in any future negotiations.

Understanding the Modern Gas Centrifuge

by Robert E. Kelley

Gas ultracentrifuges are by far the most common choice for enriching uranium isotopes in the 21st century. All modern machines are based upon a prototype first developed by Dr. Gernot Zippe. The designs have evolved over the years and are now in common use in at least 10 states. There have been huge improvements in materials and performance that are not always understood outside the technical community. External observations of centrifuges can also lead to erroneous assessments of capacity and performance. This has great significance in nonproliferation assessments that depend on things like external photographs and unscientific histories. This paper looks at historical development of this proliferation-relevant technology based on a real history and some modern cases.

Plutonium production of the Chinese fast breeder reactor

by Laura Mertes and Malte Göttsche

China has a long history of civilian and military use of nuclear reactors. To reach less dependence on coal, China relies on the expansion of nuclear energy, including fast breeder reactors. For this reactor type, the consumption of fissile material is less than the production. The Chinese sodium-cooled reactor CFR-600 is planned with an electrical capacity of 600MW. However, it produces a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium as well. The first CFR-600 may already be operational, the second is planned for 2026. There are concerns that China may use breeder reactors for military purposes, as it vastly expands its nuclear weapons program. How much and how fast the Chinese warhead inventory can grow depends on the additional fissile material stockpiles it can produce.

In the light of this development and the current global political circumstances, we present results on the CFR-600 plutonium production based on burnup simulations using OpenMC.

Participants:

• Leonardo Bandarra – Senior Researcher, University of Duisburg-Essen
• Jens Wirstam – Deputy research director, Swedish Defence Research Agency
• Neslihan Yanikömer – Research Associate, Forschungszentrum Jülich

Chairs: Noel Stott – Senior Researcher, VERTIC; Sara Lindgren – Inspector, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

“Verification only works in a Collaborative Atmosphere”: Exploring Conditional Trust and the “Human Factor” of Nuclear Verification

by Leonardo Bandarra

The motto “trust but verify” features frequently in nuclear non-proliferation and arms control politics. Yet, little research has been conducted on the relationship between the two. This article examines the complex relationship between trust and verification by asking: How does trust influence the implementation of nuclear verification? For this purpose, we focus on nuclear verification implementation agents, specifically inspectors and analysts responsible for conducting assessments of compliance with non-proliferation commitments at the operational level within organizations such as the IAEA, Euratom, and ABACC. We introduce the concept of conditional trust, referring to the minimum amount of trust required to ensure that verification activities are conducted rightfully and confidently. This concept is developed under a framework of two levels, explored below: (1) cognition, addressing aspects associated with mental processes such as mindset, images of self and other, and emotions; and (2) the infrastructures that lay the context, allowing for the collection and assessment of data. We argue that trust is not only a prerequisite for successful verification but also an outcome of these processes and that it should be kept and fostered.

Strategy for Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Insights from the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification

by Jens Wirstam

Since its entry-into-force in 1970, the landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has united its Parties around the three pillars of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT obligates all states parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to… nuclear disarmament.” Progress toward nuclear disarmament requires confidence that there will be robust mechanisms through which Parties can verify each other’s nuclear disarmament commitments.

In December 2014, U.S. Department of State and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) launched the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in partnership with a diverse group of countries, to explore the question of how to multilaterally verify future nuclear disarmament. Over the past ten years, the Partners have worked collaboratively to identify technical and procedural challenges associated with the effective verification of future disarmament efforts and develop practical solutions to overcome those challenges. Although work remains to be done, this paper will describe IPNDV’s progress by highlighting the most important lessons that the Partners have learned so far about nuclear disarmament verification.

Looking beyond the prevailing tensions in the global security environment, the concepts, tools, and technologies that the IPNDV has identified and tested and the capacity that it has built, particularly among non-nuclear weapon states, will be a critical resource for future negotiators when the time again is ripe for progress in nuclear disarmament. Whether such progress eventually comes as a revival of traditional nuclear arms control agreements or as a part of a more comprehensive effort, the insights gained through the IPNDV will pave the way to robust and effective verification regimes capable of assuring all countries that nuclear disarmament is advancing as agreed.

Optimizing Verification Strategies for Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament: A Systems-Based Approach

by Neslihan Yanikömer and Irmgard Niemeyer

Achieving complete nuclear disarmament from the current global landscape is an intricate and multi-stage process, demanding robust measures to ensure compliance and sustain peace. Among these measures, effective verification emerges as a cornerstone for fostering trust, preventing clandestine rearmament, and safeguarding hard-won disarmament efforts. This study introduces a systems-based framework to evaluate and optimize verification strategies tailored to the distinct stages of disarmament.

Using graph theory, potential rearmament paths are mapped, focusing on the most feasible strategies states might use to reassemble nuclear capabilities under varying levels of verification rigor. This analysis is complemented by a two-person game theory model, designed to identify optimal verification strategies in response to these pathways.

To ground the analysis, a comparative case study examines how state-level characteristics influence the allocation of verification resources across three critical phases of disarmament: initiation, drawdown, and complete end-state. Findings reveal that strategic resource allocation is crucial, as the effectiveness of verification systems plateaus beyond certain budget thresholds. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that as each stage advances, the cumulative impact significantly strengthens the overall effectiveness of the verification regime. The success of achieving adequate irreversibility in complete disarmament depends on the overall duration of the disarmament process.

The Black Sea region is experiencing geopolitical tensions, significantly impacting the landscape of nuclear security and amplifying existing nuclear risks. This panel discussion will delve into the multifaceted challenges and potential threats arising from this complex environment. It will explore the state of nuclear security infrastructure and practices within the Black Sea littoral states, assess the implications of the ongoing Russia’s War in Ukraine on nuclear safety and security in the region, and analyze the broader risks of nuclear proliferation and escalation.

This panel discussion aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nuclear security challenges in the Black Sea region given the present geopolitical situation. It will offer insights into the critical role of democratic frameworks, the impact of regional power dynamics, and the essential contributions of non-state actors in mitigating risks and fostering a more secure nuclear environment. The discussion will be of significant value for policymakers, academics, and the public seeking to navigate the complex security landscape of the Black Sea.

Participants:

• Shorena Lortkipanidze – Founder, Civil Council on Defense and Security & PhD candidate, Tbilisi State University
• Irakli Mchedlishvili – Board Member, Civil Council on Defense and Security
• Tamar Pataraia – Associate professor, University of Georgia & Civil Council on Defense and Security
• Lars van Dassen – Executive Director, World Institute for Nuclear Security

Chair & discussant: Thomas Jonter – Professor, Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament & leader of AMC’s working group 6

Venue: Lecture Hall IV

The Russia’s Reach in the Black Sea Region

by Shorena Lortkipanidze

The presentation will analyze the implications of Russia's regional influence and military activities in the Black Sea Region. It will assess potential risks associated with the presence of nuclear threats, the impact of geopolitical competition and decreasing international cooperation. The broader implications for regional stability will be also addressed in the context of increasing democracy crisis, hybrid warfare and evolving geopolitical realities.

The role of Academia and NGOs in promoting Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation, Case of Georgia

by Irakli Mchedlishvili

This presentation will highlight the crucial contributions of academia and non-governmental organizations in enhancing nuclear security and nonproliferation efforts in the Black Sea region. It will explore academia’s and NGOs role in fostering dialogue among stakeholders to strengthen public awareness and increase the understanding among governmental decision makers for needed actions. The work of the Georgia based think tank Civil Council on Defense and Security will be analyzed in this respect: what are the challenges faced by civil society organizations and how can they be tackled in the context of democratic backsliding and geopolitical competition?

The Role of Democratic Governance in Global Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation: Case of Georgia

by Tamar Pataraia

The presentation will explore how democratic principles and practices contribute to strengthening nuclear security and nonproliferation efforts, using Georgia as a case study. It will examine the importance of transparency, accountability, public participation, and the rule of law in ensuring responsible nuclear oversight and mitigating risks within the region. It will also highlight the connection between democratic backsliding and nuclear security.

What is New and What is Different? Some reflexions and deflections

by Lars van Dassen

WINS has closely followed the developments in the nuclear sector in Ukraine since the start of the war. In world history is has happened three times that nuclear facilities have been occupied by another state. Three times the victim has been Ukraine – three times the perpetrator has been Russia. Which are the consequences for nuclear security in Ukraine and the region? Which are some of the consequences on a global scale. Which can be the consequences for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the short and long run. And how can we prepare ourselves for a considerably more instable Black Sea region – and world.

There are many examples of mistakes, miscommunication and accidents in the history of nuclear weapons. Many can be tied to the human factor. Tired, depressed, drunk, drugged, stressed or even just bored officers, all is part of the reality when it comes to handling these weapons of mass destruction. The same counts for long hours, monotonous work, and night shifts, all which increases the risk of mistakes and accidents.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, failures do not have to be continuous in order to be dangerous, and the difference between a trivial error and a catastrophic error lies not in the error itself, but in the surrounding situation. With nuclear weapons you don’t get another chance. If you accidently set of a bomb, you can’t learn from your mistake like you do in many areas of life.

What does/could the human factor play when it comes to nuclear war, and is it taken seriously? How does humans work physically and mentally in different situations and circumstances? And if our fallibility is part of what makes us humans, can this “problem” be solved by relying on technologies, including AI?

Participants:

• Lisa Hecht – Postdoc, Technische Universität Dresden
• Per-Olof Michel – Associate professor, Michel Mentor Ltd
• Benoît Pelopidas – Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po
  

Chair: Josefin Lind – Secretary General, Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

This panel introduces the new report “Nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament in the Nordic region: lessons from the past and possible routes ahead for increased Nordic cooperation on nuclear disarmament” by the AMC and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Presentations cover the history of nuclear disarmament advocacy in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to highlight current and future possibilities for Nordic cooperation in this area. Topics include how Denmark and Norway have managed to balance their engagement in both conventional and ambitious disarmament initiatives with their security commitments to NATO, how Finland has navigated its historic non-alignment policy by maintaining a pragmatic and gradualist approach to disarmament, and how Sweden has advanced more comprehensive policies of nuclear disarmament that have diminished over time as the security context has shifted. Another topic concerns how fostering Nordic cooperation in this area could leverage shared traditions and normative power to position the Nordics as a leading unit on nuclear disarmament and arms control, both within and outside of NATO.

Participants:

• Astrid Brodén – Programme Manager, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
• Kjølv Egeland – Senior Researcher, NORSAR & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Emma Rosengren – Research Fellow, Swedish Institute of International Affairs & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Tapio Juntunen – Lecturer, Head of Degree Programme, Tampere University & member of AMC’s working group 6

Chair & discussant: Peter Wallensteen – Professor emeritus, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 2

Venue: Lecture Hall VIII (no live streaming)

The Ukraine war under a nuclear shadow has triggered off a series of events in the nuclear security and non-proliferation arena. The war has raised questions about the normalization of kinetic military operations carried out by states against nuclear facilities, which has sensationalized an immediate danger of nuclear war in Europe. Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons has also become the focus of attention in Europe as well as Asia where many countries reconsider the effect of the conventional “nuclear umbrella”. Strengthening global nuclear security under the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) Treaty has become unprecedentedly important in maintaining the world nuclear nonproliferation norm. To this end, technical and operational grounds of the NPT also need to be strengthened. This session will focus on the issues of technical improvement of nuclear materials management and control, improvement of the international monitoring system of nuclear explosions, and potential military security risk of targeting nuclear facilities, the growing European need for nuclear deterrence, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament initiative.

Participants:

• Lars-Erik De Geer – Retired Director of Research, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) & CTBTO PrepCom
• Victor Gilinsky
• Masaki Saito – Professor Emeritus, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Chair: Masako Ikegami – Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology & leader of AMC’s working group 7

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

Bringing Non-Proliferation Up to Date: How things look from the United States

by Victor Gilinsky

The rupture in the post-WWII world order threatens to leave the Nonproliferation Treaty in the proverbial ash-heap of history. International support and cooperation is lacking for improvement of nuclear materials management, the topic of this session. It is a time to try to understand the larger nuclear realities and what can be done to restrain nuclear weapon use in the new environment. United States nonproliferation policy has been reduced to readying military action with Israel against Iran. The corrosive effect of this on the Treaty is enormous—a major member joining with a non-member against a member. Iran may be violating the spirit of the NPT, but it has not so far violated the Treaty. At the same time, the United States has ignored Israel’s violation of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty with its 1979 nuclear test off South Africa. A vivid reminder of the change in Europe is the muted reaction to the German chancellor saying Germany may need nuclear weapons—something unimaginable only recently—followed by a similar statement from Poland. Will this be the response in Asia, too? Everyone knows nuclear threats and counter-threats are dangerous, and yet they continue. Countries maintain the weapons at great expense, and constantly simulate their use, guided by professors of strategy. Can we believe they will never be used? And if they are, what will be the lasting effect on the organization of society? Can that dreadful prospect change the debate?

The controversial very low-yield and unannounced nuclear test in North Korea on 12 May 2010

by Lars-Erik De Geer

It started in 2010 when CTBT particulate radionuclide stations at Okinawa and Ussuriysk reported fresh fission products in air samples collected on 15-16 May. Then in October same year a South Korean parliamentarian revealed detections of two radioactive xenon isotopes in samples collected on 13-14 May at their national noble gas station at Geojin near the northeast border to North Korea (NK). The scene was set and since my first defining paper in 2012 around ten peer-reviewed papers have been published that argued for or against the radionuclide signatures being due to a small underground nuclear test (UNT) at the NK nuclear test site. The debate focused on the characteristics of a potentially corroborating seismic signal. The radionuclide sequence complies very well with a small UNT that accidentally leaks very short-lived noble gases in a quite prompt (~9 sec) high-pressure-driven process, followed by an operational gas-release within a day. I consider the 2010 event a jewel in the history of CTBT verification; a nuclear test detected in a yield-range more than 1000 times smaller than the original design goals. Further the detection was a real example of data fusion with nearly all verification technologies contributing to the conclusion. The US has obviously banned all its CTBT-related staff to mention the May-2010-event, except groups that tried to deny it on seismic grounds. It is hard to understand why, if not for some, not very commendable reasons. Worse is, however, that CTBTO, as an international organization, so bluntly follows suit.

Enhancing the Proliferation Resistance of Plutonium and Uranium to make them unusable for Building Nuclear Weapons: A New Theory

by Masaki Saito

Science and technology have brought many blessings to the human society. However, as a result of the wrong use of science and technology, we have created a monster like a "nuclear weapon" that will destroy human society. Based on the latest scientific findings, this lecture will introduce a new theory to increase uranium and plutonium proliferation-resistant; uranium and plutonium can be used strictly for peaceful use of nuclear energy but cannot be converted to nuclear weapons by increasing the proportion of isotope, such as U-236 or Pu-238, with high nuclear proliferation resistance of uranium and plutonium. Pu-238 generates about 300 times more decay heat than Pu-239. By dramatically increase of the proportion of Pu-238 by transmutation of minor actinides (MA: Np, Am, etc.), plutonium gets difficult to convert to nuclear weapons, i.e., Protected Plutonium Production: PPP (P3). If reprocessed uranium containing U-236 is re-enriched, it will be difficult to produce nuclear weapons grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) of U-235 because U-236 will be enriched together with U-235: Protected Uranium Production (PUP). The mechanism of the P3 was discussed at IAEA advisory meetings held in 2003 and 2006, bringing together experts from around the world including IAEA experts. The P3 mechanism has been demonstrated experimentally in two research reactors with different neutron energy spectra: the fast neutron experimental reactor “Joyo” in Japan, and the thermal neutron test reactor “Advanced Test Reactor” at the Idaho National Laboratory in the United States. Albert Einstein stated, “It is easier to denature plutonium than it is to denature the evil spirit of man”.

Participants:

• Luis Rodriguez – Assistant Professor, George Mason University & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Emma Rosengren – Research Fellow, Swedish Institute of International Affairs & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Henrik Salander – Ambassador, Swedish Academy of War Sciences
• Hebatalla Taha – Associate Senior Lecturer, Lund University & member of AMC’s working group 6

Chair & discussant: Thomas Jonter – Professor, Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament & leader of AMC’s working group 6

Venue: Lecture Hall IV

Latin America and the Making of the Nuclear Club

by J. Luis Rodriguez

Recent scholarship on law-making and nuclear politics explores hierarchies in international security and how developing countries navigate them as institutions develop. There is less attention to how developing countries participate in the process of building unequal institutions and why they accept them. I explore these questions by examining the codification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the 1960s and comparing the Brazilian and Mexican participation in designing this treaty. Using the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, I focus on the negotiating process and argue that developing countries accept inequalities in global security institutions if, through the negotiation process, they reach a shared understanding regarding the best approach to addressing a security challenge alongside great powers and conclude that a resulting institution is more balanced than the original proposal. Participation, thus, serves as a mechanism to express and modify interests and shape inequalities. Brazil and Mexico managed to reduce some NPT inequalities by securing prerogatives for developing countries and getting concessions from nuclear powers. The Brazilian and Mexican participation in the NPT design exemplifies how developing countries exercise their voice when crafting security treaties and why they are willing to bear the costs of exiting when dissatisfied.

Rethinking Nuclear Order: Feminist Interventions and the Politics of the New Agenda Coalition

by Emma Rosengren and Hebatalla Taha

This paper takes as its point of departure two trends that have challenged the conventional literature on nuclear weapons but are rarely in conversation. The first is the increased attention to states that do not possess nuclear weapons as important actors whose decision-making processes are worthy of study. The historical oversight of non-nuclear weapon states in the literature has significant conceptual implications, as the extensive focus on nuclear weapon states has reinforced the premise of universal nuclear desire. The second trend is the recognition of feminist perspectives as essential to understanding the nuclear age. By studying linkages between masculinity and nuclear posturing, feminist scholars argue that in contexts where positive associations are made between military strength, masculinity, and nuclear weapon possession, it is hard to imagine nuclear renunciation and disarmament as anything other than potential emasculation or feminization. To challenge, and potentially disrupt, these linkages, it is necessary to turn to those countries that have chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, this paper analyses how non-nuclear states have engaged, and contested, the nuclear-armed world through a feminist lens, by analyzing the New Agenda Coalition, formed in 1998 by the governments of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia (which immediately withdrew), South Africa, and Sweden. The focus is on the policies, strategies, and statements mobilized by these states from 1998 until 2017.

The New Agenda Coalition: influential but short-lived

by Henrik Salander

One of the main starting points of the forming of the New Agenda Coalition was that the non-aligned movement, the NAM, hadn’t been successful in its efforts as a group in the NPT context. The NAM had always chaired the review conferences but not influenced their outcome in a way corresponding to the weight and number of its membership. Salander will discuss a few traits and characteristics of the New Agenda, some of which made the coalition partly successful during its comparatively brief effective life. He will also describe how and why the negotiations between the nuclear five and the NAC in the NPTRC 2000 (the coalition’s break-through) became fruitful, and also why a similar process will be very difficult to repeat or copy in future conferences. It is unlikely that other countries, both Western and non-aligned, will allow the same process to materialize soon again, if ever.

Participants:

• Syeda Saba Batool – Research Officer, Strategic Vision Institute
• Ludovica Castelli – Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
• Laura Considine – Associate Professor, University of Leeds

Chair: Lyubomir Sakaliyski – Doctoral researcher, University of Vienna

Discussant: Cristina Valeria Puga-Álvarez – Assistant professor, Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador - ESPE & Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE)

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

Reassessing the NSG's Role in Nuclear Disarmament: Analyzing Geopolitics under the framework of NPT Article VI for Global Stability

by Syeda Saba Batool

This paper will assess the evolving role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the global non-proliferation regime, examining its effectiveness, challenges, and the implications of its policies on international security and nuclear disarmament. The NSG must reassess its role in global non-proliferation by prioritizing equitable enforcement of its guidelines, addressing geopolitical biases, and aligning its policies with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations. This approach is essential to maintain its credibility and effectiveness in fostering international security and nuclear disarmament. The linkage between Article VI of the Treaty on the NPT, advocating for complete nuclear disarmament, and the NSG highlights a paradox within the global non-proliferation regime. While Article VI emphasizes disarmament obligations for all nuclear weapon states as defined by the NPT, the geopolitical dynamics of the NSG, particularly its preferential treatment of India – a non-NPT state – undermine this goal. This paper argues that NSG membership criteria must be transparent and uniformly applied to uphold non-proliferation norms and avoid incentivizing nuclear armament. A criteria-based approach to admitting non-NPT states, rather than selective exemptions, can preserve the NSG’s credibility and strengthen the broader nuclear disarmament objectives. Without reform, the NSG risks undermining its role as a pillar of the non-proliferation regime, directly contradicting Article VI's disarmament aspirations.

The ‘Linkage Dilemma’: Europe’s Approach to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities Against Attacks

by Ludovica Castelli

Attacks against nuclear facilities are typically associated with the Middle Eastern region. Yet, episodes have also occurred in Europe. In 1943, Allied forces carried out the first attack against a nuclear facility, targeting the Norsk Hydro hydrogen-electrolysis plant in Norway, a central element of Nazi Germany’s effort to develop nuclear weapons. Fast forward to 2022, the Russian military targeted the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility in Ukraine, Europe’s largest operational nuclear facility. Over the nearly eight decades separating these two episodes, European countries have been at the forefront of the debate on how to define, address, and prevent such incidents. The 1980s, particularly, were a pivotal decade for discussions on the issue. As negotiations progressed on the Radiological Weapons Convention and the first incidents of attacks on nuclear facilities since World War II emerged, Sweden spearheaded efforts to raise and integrate the issue of nuclear facility protection within the convention negotiations. The Swedish proposal marked the inception of formal discussions on nuclear facility protection as well as the onset of divergent viewpoints on the matter.

Subsequently, debates intensified regarding the intersection between traditional radiological weapon concerns and the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities, resulting in pronounced divisions among European stakeholders. In parallel, these years witnessed the highest concentration of episodes of attacks ever recorded. This article seeks to trace the development of European states’ approach, both as individual entities and as a collective, regarding attacks on nuclear facilities, with a focus on the early 1980s. As this practice persists as an enduring feature of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, remaining permissible as a policy option, it becomes pertinent to examine the historical engagement of European states with this issue. How have European states – individually and collectively – engaged with and influenced the debate on protecting nuclear facilities against such attacks?

The significance of nuclear weapons waste for disarmament: A study of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in nuclear New Mexico

by Laura Considine

Scholarship on the international politics of nuclear disarmament does not meaningfully engage with the politics of nuclear waste. This article makes the case for nuclear weapons waste as an integral part of the US nuclear weapons complex and of international nuclear politics more broadly. Waste is not simply a by- product or one of many reasons for nuclear disarmament, but is a component of nuclear weapons politics that needs to be actively investigated and addressed. I argue that nuclear waste matters and develop a technopolitical and narrative framing grounded in work from outside of IR through which to begin to incorporate weapons waste into our understandings of the global nuclear weapons complex. This is expressed through three propositions: that waste is not just a by-product but a core part of the nuclear weapons system; that nuclear waste governance exhibits dynamics of technopolitics; and that nuclear waste infrastructures have narrative and temporal significance. The article develops these statements through fieldwork on the sites of US nuclear weapons waste complex in New Mexico, focusing specifically on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) the only permanent geologic disposal site for nuclear weapons waste in the United States.

Participants:

• Rhys Crilley – UKRI Future Leaders Fellow, University of Glasgow
• Chiara Fargnoli – Research Associate, Harvard Kennedy School
• Carolina Pantoliano – Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of Glasgow
• Tom Sauer – Professor, Universiteit Antwerpen & member of AMC’s working group 1

Chair: Adérito Vicente – Assistant Professor, Center for Legal, Economic, International and Environmental Studies (CEJEIA), Lusíada University of Porto

Discussant: Chris Ferrero – Associate Professor, Coastal Carolina University

Venue: Lecture Hall VIII (no live streaming)

Disarmament in the Third Nuclear Age

by Carolina Pantoliano and Rhys Crilley

The concept of the new, or 'third nuclear age' is gaining increasing traction in academic and policy circles. However, to date there remains little engagement with what the development of a third nuclear age means for the theory and practice of nuclear disarmament. This paper addresses this gap by synthesising and building upon current conceptualisations and analyses of the third nuclear age, and outlining how disarmament is both already integral to the third nuclear age (as demonstrated by the ascendancy and entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) as well as being a much needed solution to the interlinked nuclear crises of today. We begin with an overview of the third nuclear age, before then outlining the overlooked role that disarmament is playing, and can play, in moving beyond today's crises.

The European Sky Shield Initiative: an Instrument to Promote European Strategic Autonomy, Deterrence, and Nuclear Non-proliferation

by Chiara Fargnoli

Europe is currently navigating a period of significant turmoil given the geopolitical, economic, and security challenges it faces. Moreover, Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine, together with the deployment of the new hypersonic intermediate-range missile known as Oreshnik, has exacerbated threat perceptions among European states and NATO members regarding Moscow’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Another factor that heightens tension in Europe is the uncertainty regarding the United States’ security commitments to European Allies under the second Trump administration. Given these precarious circumstances, Europe needs to assume greater responsibility and develop new capabilities. Europe can achieve this objective by investing in missile air defense capabilities, creating a European-integrated air defense mechanism, while strengthening deterrence. This strategic thinking, focused on increasing spending on missile air defense capabilities while creating a European missile defense shield, is reflected in the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), a procurement initiative launched by Germany in 2022. ESSI aims to address Europe’s vulnerability to ballistic and long-range missiles and deter Russian attacks. The paper seeks to demonstrate how ESSI, while it can play a fundamental role in achieving greater European strategic autonomy, can also prevent nuclear proliferation within Europe, enhancing collective security and developing conventional capabilities. Despite facing political, technical, financial, and strategic complications, ESSI’s strategic benefits outweigh its drawbacks. ESSI can reinforce collective security, bolster NATO’s cohesion, and contribute to a more resilient European defense posture. This paper argues that ESSI, while imperfect, is a necessary step toward enhancing European security and deterrence while achieving greater strategic autonomy in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

Strategic conventional weapons as the ultimate deterrent

by Tom Sauer

According to the international legally binding Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear deterrence policies are not supposed to be continued indefinitely. In addition, nuclear deterrence policies have many flaws: they struggle to be credible because of the enormous destructive capacity; in case of failure and in case of use of nuclear weapons, the odds are that its use will be contrary to international law; and the use ofn (only) hundreds of nuclear weapons may kill billions of people. On top of that, emerging and disruptive technologies (like cyber and AI) and weapon systems (like hypersonic weapons) are generally regarded as being destabilizing for nuclear deterrence.

The paper argues that nuclear weapons should be delegitimized and ultimately eliminated as demanded by the NPT and the TPNW. Luckily, there is an alternative for the nuclear-armed states: conventional deterrence with modern, strategic conventional weapons (such as hypersonic missils). The main advantage of conventional deterrence is that it is more credible than nuclear deterrence and that the use of conventional weapons yield less collateral damage. The disadvantage – that strategic conventional weapons may be used more than nuclear weapons – do not weigh up against the advantages.

7B: The Wicked Problem of Verification in Nuclear Arms Control

Participants:

• Peter Andersson – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & leader of AMC’s working group 4
• Sophia Hatz – Associate Professor, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 8
• Stephen Herzog – Professor, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies & member of AMC’s working group 1
• Masako Ikegami – Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology & leader of AMC’s working group 7
  

Chair: Armend Bekaj – Researcher, Uppsala University & member of AMC’s working group 2

Venue: Lecture Hall IX

Technical verification and monitoring of nuclear disarmament

by Peter Andersson

In future disarmament treaty negotiations, verification is expected to play a crucial role. This chapter examines the primary approaches to verifiable nuclear disarmament, including the fissile material approach—where states commit to ceasing production and/or disposing of materials necessary to sustain a nuclear chain reaction—as well as nuclear warhead dismantlement and other measures such as bans on nuclear test explosions. The chapter begins by examining the precedent set by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which currently verify the commitments of non-nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Examples are provided of advanced radiation measurement techniques used to ensure the non-diversion of fissile material from civilian fuel cycles, including radiation measurements on spent nuclear fuel.

Building on the standards established by NPT verification, we assess how complete nuclear disarmament can be verified. Key challenges and potential solutions are discussed, such as the verification of historical fissile material production with nuclear archaeology, trade-offs between the verification objective and the need for minimal intrusiveness, information barriers, authentication and certification mechanisms, and zero-knowledge proofs. The relatively favorable conditions for verifying bans on nuclear weapon testing are highlighted, given the availability of several remotely detectable signatures from test explosions.

Opportunities and Risks from Advanced AI in Nuclear Verification

by Sophia Hatz and Amritanshu Prasad

Nuclear verification plays a fundamental role in international stability by ensuring that states honor their commitments to arms control and disarmament. Yet, nuclear verification faces persistent challenges in detecting secret activities and processing vast, heterogeneous data sources. Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) offer promising tools to enhance the accuracy, scalability and timeliness of verification. For example, computer vision systems can automatically detect subtle changes in satellite imagery of nuclear facilities, and natural language processing can rapidly analyze multilingual open-source intelligence at unprecedented scale. However, leveraging advanced AI for nuclear verification also introduces new risks—including false positives, adversarial manipulation, and potential erosion of trust in verification regimes. This chapter provides an assessment of AI’s potential in nuclear verification, surveying current applications, evaluating their comparative advantages, and assessing associated risks.

Layered Verification: Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament and Highly Latent Nuclear States

by Stephen Herzog

The concept of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament is gaining increasing attention in multilateral diplomacy, policy analysis, and scholarly research. Yet, continuous monitoring and verification of future disarmed nuclear states is insufficient for ensuring irreversibility. A nuclear-weapon-free world also will require careful attention to advanced civilian nuclear energy programmes. In this chapter, I therefore describe a framework called layered verification that is intended to eliminate pathways to weaponisation among highly latent nuclear states. The framework uses multiple interlocking international and country-specific non-proliferation approaches to reveal attempts to cross the nuclear threshold. Implementing layered verification will require considerable political will and financial costs. Nevertheless, it offers promise for detecting and deterring militarily significant non-compliance with disarmament commitments.

Reassessing the legitimacy of the NPT verification regime: a sociological analysis

by Masako Ikegami

The NPT regime is in crisis with multiplex challenges; emerging de facto nuclear weapon states, spreading civilian nuclear technology and fissile materials in the current “nuclear renaissance”, re-emphasis of nuclear deterrence to nullify Article VI disarmament obligation, distrust and frictions between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNSW), inconsistent compliance practices and the double standard. Such discrepancies could eventually result in a system failure by eroding the legitimacy of the NPT regime. This study focuses on the NPT verification system and its inconsistent implementation as a root cause of discrepancy that erodes the legitimacy of the NPT.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed with nuclear weapons 80 years ago. Those two events have become reference points for global nuclear politics and scholarship on them has been abundant. This roundtable is asking one main question: Are there limits of interpretation to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, if so, how are they decided? For instance, realists such as Susan Martin ("The Continuing Value of Nuclear Weapons", Contemporary Security Policy, 2013) would claim that the material reality of the weapons is beyond debate and sets limits to intepretation. In contrast, Nick Ritchie ("Valuing and devaluing nuclear weapons" 2013) identifies intersubjective limits of the interpretation of nuclear weapons related events. Finally, Jacques Derrida claimed that nuclear weapons are "infinitely textual" suggesting no limits to interpretation. Based on several studies of the reception of those events across time and place (in the Middle East, Sweden and France in the early years, in European public opinion in 2019 and 2024 across nuclear-armed and non-nuclear armed states based on unprecedented surveys and in museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2024) to better understand how varied those interpretations are and what shapes this variation.

Participants:

• Thomas Jonter – Professor, Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament & leader of AMC’s working group 6
• Benoît Pelopidas – Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po
• Hebatalla Taha – Associate Senior Lecturer, Lund University & member of AMC’s working group 6
• Sterre van Buuren – Research Assistant, Sciences Po

Chair: TBC

Venue: Lecture Hall IV

The Use of Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Swedish Perceptions, 1945-49

by Thomas Jonter

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how Sweden perceived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the period 1945-49. Sweden is an interesting case given the background that the political, military, and scientific elites started to investigate the possibilities to initiate both a civilian and military program in the immediate post-war years. There are many interpretations with different angles in the literature, however, the focus in this article is on the theoretical boundaries of interpretations. How did various sectors of the Swedish society perceive the bombings and to what degree do they correspond with different interpretations in the literature.

How the bombings were portrayed are investigated in three different Swedish elite communities: the military, the scientific community, and media. Was the use of nuclear weapons interpreted differently in those communities and did the perception(s) change over time? How did these three different sectors of the Swedish society view the U.S justification to use nuclear weapons? What sources were used in the initial assessments, and what information formed the basis for later analyses of the bombings? In what way, if any, were Hiroshima and Nagasaki used as reference points in the argumentation to initiate a civilian and military program by different actors in the Swedish society in the time frame 1945-49? Finally, how can the Swedish perception be understood in the light of the debate on the use of nuclear weapons in Japan.

Nuclear Memories for the Future: Gaps and Forgetting in European Publics’ Understandings of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

by Benoît Pelopidas, Sterre van Buuren and Alexander Sorg

Using two novel surveys of representative samples of Europeans in nine countries, we identify two gaps in Europeans’ understandings of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, there is a gap in awareness of Hiroshima versus Nagasaki, which obscures the potential significance of the Nagasaki bombing for evaluating the morality and controllability of nuclear explosions. Second, there exists a gap between older and younger generations’ knowledge and perceptions of the bombing. Younger generations perceive the bombings as overall less impactful yet do not have alternative memories of nuclear events. The dominance of Hiroshima over both Nagasaki and other nuclear-historical events is explored in terms of its implications for Europeans’ ability to understand the possibility of future nuclear harms. We put forward global nuclear testing and cases of the lucky avoidance of nuclear explosions as productive ways to supplement currently existing memories and to connect them to the future.

Hiroshima in Egypt: interpretations and imaginations of the atomic age

by Hebatalla Taha

This article focuses on Egyptian interpretations of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US at the end of the Second World War. It surveys the reactions and responses of influential thinkers between 1945 and 1951, a crucial period prior to decolonisation. The objective of this research is to capture a specific moment in time and understand how it shaped imaginations of the future. The article argues that the bombings of Japan generated fantasies and anxieties about the postcolonial future. Intellectuals were enthusiastic about the possibilities of nuclear science and energy, but at the same time they engaged in nuanced and critical debates about the emergence of a nuclear-armed world, including its intertwinement with race and colonial power. In addition to exploring Egyptian thought on the nuclear condition, this historical analysis allows us to better understand Egyptian nuclear decision-making after independence. Revisiting this period, furthermore, illustrates the importance of imagined futures in shaping nuclear choices.

Participants:

• Elin Bergner – Research Coordinator, Open Nuclear Network
• Janina Dannenberg – Postdoctoral researcher, University of Hamburg
• Lena Wittenfeld – Research Associate, Bielefeld University

Chair: Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla – CEO & Founder, JASA, and Co-Founder, Qazaq Nuclear Frontline Coalition (QNFC)

Discussants: Jana Wattenberg – Marie Skłodowska Curie Global Fellow (funded by UKRI), Aberystwyth University; Sibylle Bauer – Director of Studies, Armament and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) & leader of AMC’s working group 5

Venue: Lecture Hall XI (no live streaming)

Gendered Disinformation in the Radiological and Nuclear Realm – an Introduction

by Elin Bergner

Malign information influence operations, including disinformation campaigns, have garnered heightened attention in the nuclear and radiological domain, especially in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine and controversies surrounding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and Ukraine’s purported nuclear ambitions. Concurrently, growing scholarship has explored gender biases in shaping perceptions of nuclear disarmament, deterrence, and risk reduction, alongside research demonstrating differential radiation impacts on men and women.

However, little research has examined the gendered dimensions of disinformation in the nuclear and radiological sphere. This includes how gendered narratives may influence public perceptions of disarmament and deterrence or influence emergency response and communication during crises. Similarly, the role of biased datasets in shaping AI-driven large-scale disinformation campaigns in this field remains underexplored.

This study seeks to investigate the nexus of gender and disinformation in the nuclear and radiological context. Drawing from cases across the CBRN spectrum, it will explore how disinformation actors may exploit gender stereotypes to target genders differently, influence the credibility of actors in the information space and leverage AI in ways that could ultimately influence public opinion and policy on disarmament and deterrence and impact emergency response. Additionally, it will advance recommendations for gender perspectives in counter-disinformation strategies.

Contrary or Complementary: A Review on Gender Perspectives in Nuclear Disarmament and Justice

by Janina Dannenberg and Mathilde Kraft

The discourse surrounding gender in relation to nuclear disarmament and nuclear justice encompasses a range of topics, from sex-segregated analyses of sensitivity to radiation, to the position that women and queer individuals hold in nuclear justice movements, up to questions regarding the working culture and institutional hierarchies within relevant international regimes. It also reflects on epistemological power which is based on recurring patterns of intersectional devaluation through processes of naturalization and feminization. When viewed collectively, the conceptualizations of gender in these discussions are far from congruent, with each possessing its own legitimacy. In the literature review presented, we categorize these conceptualizations using a framework developed for analysing gender perspectives within discussions on gender in environmental and sustainability-related literature. These perspectives correspond to different academic trends and waves of social movements that are connected to the nuclear discourse. Specifically, we will examine the occurrences, potentials, and limitations of viewing gender within nuclear discourses as a category of difference, a structural category, a procedural category, or an epistemological category. For the literature analysed, we will also discuss the relationship of the respective gender analysis to other power relations relevant to this field.

Out of the Shadows - the Nuclear Taboo and its (Un)Intended Effects in the Light of Sweden’s Turn to NATO

by Lena Wittenfeld and Sandra Bandemer

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its repeated nuclear threats have sent shockwaves across Europe. In the context of the contemporary global nuclear order, the nuclear taboo has been widely reconfirmed as a central norm. We adopt a critical feminist lens to examine the “shadows” of the nuclear taboo. We hold that the nuclear taboo and its effects serve to legitimize specific power structures while marginalizing alternative perspectives, namely non-state-centric, non-militaristic and feminist perspectives. To analytically demonstrate this, we examine the nuclear taboo’s norm effects by tracing its mutually reinforcing unintended permissive effects of normalizing and silencing. We posit that discursive reproductions of the nuclear taboo enable nonnuclear, conventional militarization. Additionally, while some argue that the notion of a nuclear taboo and the consistent practice of nuclear deterrence constitute a contradiction in terms, we show how both ideas are practically reconciled. Hence, the aim of this paper is to reveal the relation of the nuclear taboo, militarization, and nuclear deterrence. To test the plausibility of our argument, we take a closer look at Sweden as formerly neutral state that have become NATO members in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In doing so, we contribute to the emerging literature on norm effects, strengthening the link between feminist IR and norms research and offering a novel perspective on the nuclear taboo and the parallel practice of nuclear deterrence.