Olle Risberg
Researcher at Department of Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff
- E-mail:
- olle.risberg@filosofi.uu.se
- Visiting address:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postal address:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
Short presentation
My research focuses on foundational issues in ethics and (meta-)normativity, including moral objectivity, epistemological skepticism, reasons and rationality, and the nature of harm.
During 2021–2024 I will be engaged in the project The Wisdom of the Crowd, which is funded by the Swedish Research Council, as principal investigator.
During 2024–2029 I will be a Pro Futura Scientia fellow at Uppsala University and SCAS.
For more information, please see my external website.
(Photo: Cato Lein)
Research
Please see: https://sites.google.com/view/olle-risberg/publications
Publications
Recent publications
Part of Philosophical Review, 2025
Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press, 2025
Skepticism and Moral Disagreement
Part of Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge, 2024
Part of Ethics, p. 179-184, 2024
Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 535-545, 2024
- DOI for Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
- Download full text (pdf) of Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
All publications
Articles in journal
Part of Philosophical Review, 2025
Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 535-545, 2024
- DOI for Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
- Download full text (pdf) of Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
Part of Utilitas, p. 229-237, 2023
- DOI for Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
- Download full text (pdf) of Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm
Part of Theoria, p. 748-754, 2023
The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem
Part of Utilitas, p. 88-97, 2023
Part of Philosophy and phenomenological research, p. 541-565, 2023
Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
- DOI for Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
- Download full text (pdf) of Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 2573-2596, 2023
Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm: A Reply to Immerman
Part of Journal of Moral Philosophy, p. 233-242, 2023
- DOI for Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm: A Reply to Immerman
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Part of Noûs, p. 51-80, 2023
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 553-565, 2023
Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2023
- DOI for Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
- Download full text (pdf) of Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
Part of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p. 420-445, 2022
Part of Ergo, p. 509-536, 2022
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022
- DOI for Hope for the evolutionary debunker: How evolutionary debunking arguments and arguments from moral disagreement can join forces
- Download full text (pdf) of Hope for the evolutionary debunker: How evolutionary debunking arguments and arguments from moral disagreement can join forces
Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 164-174, 2021
- DOI for Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
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Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
Part of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, p. 283-303, 2020
Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 1539-1548, 2020
- DOI for Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
Part of Journal of the American Philosophical Association, p. 189-207, 2019
- DOI for A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
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Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 351-365, 2019
Part of Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2018
The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, p. 542-559, 2018
The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, p. 735-742, 2018
- DOI for The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
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Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
Bergström om metaetisk naturalism
Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
Naturalism, non-naturalism eller misstagsteori?: Bergström och Olson om normativa skäl
Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, p. 1-11, 2017
Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems For Schroeder
Part of Utilitas, p. 101-107, 2016
- DOI for Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems For Schroeder
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Om Tännsjös försvar av den motbjudande slutsatsen
Part of Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, p. 1-11, 2014
Ethics and the Question of What to Do
Part of Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Books
Studentlitteratur AB, 2021
Chapters in book
Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press, 2025
Skepticism and Moral Disagreement
Part of Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge, 2024
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 15, Oxford University Press, 2020
Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
Part of Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Routledge, 2020
Comprehensive doctoral thesis
Manuscripts (preprints)
Other
Part of Ethics, p. 179-184, 2024
Part of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, p. 175-180, 2024
- DOI for Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs
- Download full text (pdf) of Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs
Review of Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational, OUP 2018
Part of European Journal of Philosophy, p. 800-804, 2019