Olle Risberg
Researcher at Department of Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff
- E-mail:
- olle.risberg@filosofi.uu.se
- Visiting address:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postal address:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
Visiting researcher at Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS)
- E-mail:
- olle.risberg@swedishcollegium.se
- Visiting address:
- Villavägen 6C
752 38 Uppsala - Postal address:
- Villavägen 6C
752 38 Uppsala
Download contact information for Olle Risberg at Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SCAS)
Short presentation
I'm a docent and researcher in practical philosophy. My research focuses on foundational issues in ethics and (meta-)normativity, including moral objectivity, epistemological skepticism, reasons and rationality, and the nature of harm.
During 2024–2029 I will be a Pro Futura Scientia fellow at Uppsala University and SCAS. My Pro Futura project focuses on gradability, or "matters of degree", especially in normative contexts.
For more information, please see my external website.
Photo: Cato Lein
Research
Please see: https://sites.google.com/view/olle-risberg/publications

Publications
Recent publications
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Därför behövs ett nytt Nobelpris
Part of Svenska Dagbladet, 2026
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Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press, 2025
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The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero
Part of Utilitas, p. 156-162, 2025
- DOI for The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero
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När får vi ett Nobelpris i humaniora?
Part of Svenska Dagbladet, 2025
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Part of Philosophical Review, p. 405-454, 2025
All publications
Articles in journal
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Därför behövs ett nytt Nobelpris
Part of Svenska Dagbladet, 2026
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The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero
Part of Utilitas, p. 156-162, 2025
- DOI for The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero
- Download full text (pdf) of The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero
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När får vi ett Nobelpris i humaniora?
Part of Svenska Dagbladet, 2025
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Part of Philosophical Review, p. 405-454, 2025
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In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl
Part of Noûs, p. 796-808, 2025
- DOI for In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl
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Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 232-238, 2024
- DOI for Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
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Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 535-545, 2024
- DOI for Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
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Ethics and the Question of What to Do
Part of Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, p. 376-412, 2023
- DOI for Ethics and the Question of What to Do
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A Simple Counterfactual Account of Plural Harm
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 553-565, 2023
- DOI for A Simple Counterfactual Account of Plural Harm
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Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm
Part of Theoria, p. 748-754, 2023
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Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
Part of Utilitas, p. 229-237, 2023
- DOI for Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
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The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem
Part of Utilitas, p. 88-97, 2023
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Part of Philosophy and phenomenological research, p. 541-565, 2023
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Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
- DOI for Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
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Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 2573-2596, 2023
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Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm: A Reply to Immerman
Part of Journal of Moral Philosophy, p. 233-242, 2023
- DOI for Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm: A Reply to Immerman
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Part of Noûs, p. 51-80, 2023
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Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 553-565, 2023
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Part of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p. 420-445, 2022
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Part of Ergo, p. 509-536, 2022
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Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022
- DOI for Hope for the evolutionary debunker: How evolutionary debunking arguments and arguments from moral disagreement can join forces
- Download full text (pdf) of Hope for the evolutionary debunker: How evolutionary debunking arguments and arguments from moral disagreement can join forces
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Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 164-174, 2021
- DOI for Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
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Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
Part of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, p. 283-303, 2020
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Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 1539-1548, 2020
- DOI for Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
Part of Journal of the American Philosophical Association, p. 189-207, 2019
- DOI for A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
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Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 351-365, 2019
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Part of Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2018
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The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, p. 542-559, 2018
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The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, p. 735-742, 2018
- DOI for The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
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Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
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Bergström om metaetisk naturalism
Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
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Naturalism, non-naturalism eller misstagsteori?: Bergström och Olson om normativa skäl
Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, p. 1-11, 2017
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Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems For Schroeder
Part of Utilitas, p. 101-107, 2016
- DOI for Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems For Schroeder
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Om Tännsjös försvar av den motbjudande slutsatsen
Part of Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, p. 1-11, 2014
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Ethics and the Question of What to Do
Part of Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Books
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Studentlitteratur AB, 2021
Chapters in book
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Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press, 2025
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Skepticism and Moral Disagreement
Part of Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge, 2024
- DOI for Skepticism and Moral Disagreement
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The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
Part of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 15, Oxford University Press, 2020
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Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
Part of Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Routledge, 2020
- DOI for Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
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Comprehensive doctoral thesis
Manuscripts (preprints)
Other
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Part of Ethics, p. 179-184, 2024
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Part of International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, p. 175-180, 2024
- DOI for Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs
- Download full text (pdf) of Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs
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Review of Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational, OUP 2018
Part of European Journal of Philosophy, p. 800-804, 2019