Olle Risberg
Researcher at Department of Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff
- E-mail:
- olle.risberg@filosofi.uu.se
- Visiting address:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postal address:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
More information is available to staff who log in.
Short presentation
My research focuses on foundational issues in ethics and (meta-)normativity, including moral objectivity, epistemological skepticism, reasons and rationality, and the nature of harm.
During 2021–2024 I will be engaged in the project The Wisdom of the Crowd, which is funded by the Swedish Research Council, as principal investigator.
During 2024–2029 I will be a Pro Futura Scientia fellow at Uppsala University and SCAS.
For more information, please see my external website.
(Photo: Cato Lein)
Research
Publications
Recent publications
- Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm (2024)
- Problems for Moral Debunkers (2024)
- Skepticism and Moral Disagreement (2024)
- Benefits Are Better than Harms (2023)
- Plural Harm (2023)
All publications
Articles
- Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm (2024)
- Problems for Moral Debunkers (2024)
- Benefits Are Better than Harms (2023)
- Plural Harm (2023)
- Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit (2023)
- Doing Harm (2023)
- Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm (2023)
- Explaining Normative Reasons (2023)
- The weight of reasons (2023)
- Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm (2023)
- Meta‐Skepticism (2023)
- The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living (2023)
- Causal Accounts of Harming (2022)
- A Simple Analysis of Harm (2022)
- Hope for the evolutionary debunker (2022)
- Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit (2021)
- Harming and Failing to Benefit (2020)
- Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism (2020)
- The Preemption Problem (2019)
- Review of Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational, OUP 2018 (2019)
- A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism (2019)
- The Problem of Justified Harm (2018)
- Bergström om metaetisk naturalism (2018)
- Metaetikens metodologi (2018)
- The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy (2018)
- Inledning: (2018)
- Naturalism, non-naturalism eller misstagsteori? (2017)
- Weighting Surprise Parties (2016)
- Om Tännsjös försvar av den motbjudande slutsatsen (2014)
- Ethics and the Question of What to Do
- General Introduction
- Ethics and the Question of What to Do
- From Evolutionary Theory to Moral Skepticism, via Disagreement
Books
Chapters
