Erik Carlson
Professor at Department of Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff
- E-mail:
- Erik.Carlson@filosofi.uu.se
- Visiting address:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postal address:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
Biography
Employment
Professor of Practical Philiosophy, Uppsala University, 2006-present.
Education
B.A., UppsalaUniversity, 1986. Ph.D., Uppsala University, 1994. Docent, Uppsala University, 1998.
Publications
Book (peer-reviewed)
(1) Consequentialism Reconsidered. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995.)
Edited book
(2) Omnium-gatherum. Philosophical essays dedicated to Jan Österberg on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. (Uppsala: Dept. of Philosophy, UppsalaUniversity, 2001. Co-editor: Rysiek Sliwinski.)
Articles in peer-reviewed journals
(3) “Brink’s and Pietroski’s Obligation Execution Principle”. (Analysis 55, 1995: 275-279.)
(4) “Cyclical Preferences and Rational Choice”. (Theoria 62, 1996: 144-160.)
(5) “The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs”. (Philosophical Studies 85, 1997: 95-107. Reprinted in Michael J. Zimmerman and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer, 2005.)
(6) “Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert”. (Utilitas 9, 1997: 307-318.)
(7) “A Note on Moore’s Organic Unities”. (The Journal of Value Inquiry 31, 1997: 55-59.)
(8) “Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics”. (Economics and Philosophy 14, 1998: 283-306.)
(9) “Van Inwagen on Determinism and Moral Responsibility”. (The Journal of Value Inquiry 32, 1998: 219-226.)
(10) “Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb’s Problem”. (Analysis 58, 1998: 229-231.)
(11) “Is Our Existence in Need of Further Explanation?”. (Inquiry 41, 1998: 255-275. Co-author: Erik J. Olsson.)
(12) “The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism”. (Utilitas 11, 1999: 91-96.)
(13) “Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism”. (Philosophical Studies 96, 1999: 253-268.)
(14) “Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity”. (Noûs 34, 2000: 277-290.)
(15) “Aggregating Harms — Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches?”. (Theoria 66, 2000: 246-255.)
(16) “The Presumption of Nothingness”. (Ratio 14, 2001: 203-221. Co-author: Erik J. Olsson.)
(17) “The Badness of Killing and Letting Die”. (The Journal of Value Inquiry 35, 2001: 535-539.)
(18) “Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value”. (The Journal of Ethics 5, 2001: 335-360.)
(19) “In Defence of the Mind Argument”. (Philosophia 29, 2002: 393-400.)
(20) “Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action”. (Erkenntnis 57, 2002: 71-89.)
(21) “On a New Argument for Incompatibilism”. (Philosophia 30, 2003: 159-164. Reprinted with corrigenda in vol. 32, 2005, pp. 443-448.)
(22) “Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield”. (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 2003: 730-737.)
(23) “Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans”. (Philosophical Studies 113, 2003: 181-200.)
(24) “Broome’s Argument Against Value Incomparability”. (Utilitas 16, 2004: 220-224.)
(25) “A New Time Travel Paradox Resolved”. (Philosophia 33, 2005: 263-273.)
(26) “Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity”. (Theoria 73, 2007: 3-27.)
(27) “Extensive Measurement with Incomparability”. (Journal of Mathematical Psychology 52, 2008: 250-259.)
(28) “Parity Demystified”. (Theoria 76, 2010: 119-128.)
(29) “Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”. (Journal of Mathematical Psychology 54, 2010: 345-351.)
(30) “The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued”. (The Philosophical Quarterly 61, 2011: 171-174.)
(31) “Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability”. (Mathematical Social Sciences 62, 2011: 71-76.)
(32) “Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Online First, doi: 10.1007/s10677-012-9352-9.)
Articles in peer-reviewed anthologies and encyclopedias
(33) “Intransitivity without Zeno’s Paradox”. (In Michael J. Zimmerman and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer, 2005, pp. 273-277.)
(34) “Incomparability and Measurement of Value”. (InR. Feldman et al. (eds.), The Good, the Right, Life, and Death, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 19-43.)
(35) “Incommensurability in Ethics”. (In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2006, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L144.)
(36) “Intransitivity”. (In H. LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, in press.)
(37) “Value theory (axiology)”. (In S. O. Hansson and V. Hendricks (eds.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, in press.)
(38) Commissioned: “Organic Unities”. (In I. Hirose and J. Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford University Press: forthcoming.)
Articles in non-peer-reviewed journals, anthologies and enyclopedias (selection)
(39) “Några teorier om egenvärde”. (“Some Theories of Intrinsic Value”.) (Filosofisk tidskrift 16, 1995: 75-85.)
(40) “Time Travel and Troublesome Self-Encounters”. (In S. Lindström, et al. (eds.), Odds and Ends, Uppsala, 1996.)
(41) “Kan vi veta vad vi tror?”. (“Can We Know What We Believe?”) (Filosofisk tidskrift 19, 1998: 17-20.)
(42) “Existence, Beneficence, and Design”. (In E. Carlson and R. Sliwinski (eds.), Omnium Gatherum, Uppsala, 2001. Co-author: Erik J. Olsson.)
(43) “Counterfactuals and Compatibilism ”. (In K. Segerberg and R. Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord, Uppsala, 2003.)
(44) “On Some Recent Examples of Intransitive Betterness”. (In K. Segerberg and R. Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality, Uppsala, 2003.)
(45) “John Broomes argument mot ojämförbara värden”. (Filosofisk tidskrift 24, 2003: 44-51.)
(46) “Cirkulär tid och den eviga återkomsten”. (Filosofisk tidskrift 27, 2006: 33-37.)
(47) “Cirkulär tid – ett varv till”. (Filosofisk tidskrift 28, 2007: 29-30.)
(48) “Parity Defined in Terms of Betterness”. (In T. Rønnow-Rasmussen et al. (eds.), Hommage a Wlodek, www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek, 2007.)
(49) “Formal Methods in Ethics”. (In J. Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 408-419.)
(50) “Aggregate and Average Utilitarianism”. (In J. E. Crimmins and D. G. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, New York & London: Continuum, in press.)
(51) “Defining Goodness and Badness in terms of Betterness without Negation”. (In E. Dzhafarov and L. Perry (eds.), Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior, World Scientific, 2011, pp. 51-66.
Reviews
(52) Review of Torbjörn Tännsjö, Hedonistic Utilitarianism. (Utilitas 12, 2000: 248-249.)
(53) Review of Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound. (The Philosophical Quarterly 51, 2001: 561-563.)
(54) Review of Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World. (Theoria 67, 2001: 268-272.)
(55) Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will. (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2002, http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2002/1/carlson-pereboom.html.)
(56) Review of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004, http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2004/10/carlsson-clark.html.)
Invited lectures and conference talks
(1) “Consequentialism and Alternative Actions”, Stockholm University, 20 February 1992. (Invited.)
(2) “A Version of Consequentialism”, Australian National University, Canberra, 14 March 1994. (Invited.)
(3) “Some Theories of Intrinsic Value”, at the conference Filosofidagarna, Umeå, Sweden, 7 June 1995.
(4) “Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism”, at the conference Utilitarianism Reconsidered, New Orleans, 23 March 1997.
(5) Invited commentator on a paper at the symposium “Literary Interpretation”, Uppsala, 3 June 1998.
(6) Invited chair at a session on “Evaluation and Technique” and invited participant in a roundtable discussion on “Value Inquiry Today and Tomorrow” at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, 10-16 August 1998.
(7) “Actualism, Possibilism, and Control over the Future”, at the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, Poland, 23 August 1999. Invited chair of a session in the section “Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory”.
(8) “Organic Unities, Weak Lexicality, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value”, at the symposium Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy: Some Common Themes, Lund, Sweden, 29-31 October 1999. (Invited.)
(9) “The Fine-tuned Universe and the Explanation of Our Existence”, at Gothenburg University, on 2 December 1999. (Invited.)
(10) “Organic Unities, Weak Lexicality, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value”, at the conference ISUS 2000, Winston-Salem, USA, 24-26 March 2000. Invited chair for one session.
(11) “Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action”, University of Leipzig, 4 May 2000. (Invited.)
(12) “Freedom, Responsibility, and the Fixity of the Past”, at the conference Time and Ethics, Dunedin, New Zealand, 9-12 February 2001.
(13) “Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans”, at the conference Choice and Value, Corpus ChristiCollege, Oxford, 1-2 June 2001. (Invited.)
(14) “Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans”, Workshop on Action, Uppsala, 8-10 November 2001. (Invited.)
(15) “Counterfactuals and Compatibilism”, at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 4 December 2001. (Invited.)
(16) “Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans”, at the School of Economic & Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 13 December 2001. (Invited.)
(17) “Är det möjligt att resa bakåt i tiden?” (“The Possibility of Travelling Backwards in Time”), at the Philosophical Society in Umeå, 4 April 2002. (Invited.)
(18) “Actualism, Deliberation, and Action-Guidance”, UmeåUniversity, 5 April 2002. (Invited.)
(19) “On Some Recent Examples of Intransitive Betterness”, ISUS Conference, Lisbon, 11-13 April 2003.
(20) “Chang and Broome on Value Incomparability”, Workshop: Philosophical Theories of Value, LundUniversity, 25-26 April 2003. (Invited.)
(21) “Broome’s Argument Against Value Incomparability”, Filosofidagarna, Linköping, 12-14 June 2003.
(22) “Incomparability and Measurement of Value”, Workshop on Value, SCASSS, Uppsala, 23 April 2004. (Invited.)
(23) “Incomparability and Measurement of Value”, Moral Philosophy Seminar, OxfordUniversity, 14 June 2004. (Invited.)
(24) “Tidsresor” (“Time Travel”), at the Philosophical Society in Uppsala, 14 October 2004. (Invited.)
(25) “Incommensuable Values”, Uppsala-Groningen Conference, Uppsala 13 April 2005. (Invited.)
(26) Invited chair of the ethics session at Filosofidagarna, Uppsala, 9-11 June 2005.
(27) “Incomparability and Measurement of Value”, Workshop at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 18 August 2005. (Invited.)
(28) “Incomparability and Measurement of Value”, ECAP 5, Lisbon, 27 August 2005. (Invited.)
(29) “Objectivism and Subjectivism about Moral Rightness”, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 23 May 2006. (Invited.)
(30) “Parity Defined in Terms of Betterness”, Filosofidagarna, Umeå, June 2007. (Invited.)
(31) “Extensive Measurement with Incomparability” LMPS, Beijing, 10 August 2007.
(32) “Objectivism and Subjectivism about Moral Obligation”, Workshop at LundUniversity, 10-11 September 2008. (Invited.)
(33) “Objectivism and Subjectivism about Moral Obligation”, University of Groningen, 22 October 2008. (Invited.)
(34) “Free Will and Moral Responsibility”, Dept. of Law, UppsalaUniversity, 23 March 2009. (Invited.)
(35) “Measuement with Incomparability”, Filosofidagarna, Lund, June 2009. (Invited.)
(36) “Measuement with Incomparability”, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, 25 September 2009. (Invited.)
(37) “Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”, University of Groningen, 10 September 2010. (Invited.)
(38) “Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”, PurdueUniversity, 31 October 2010. (Invited.)
(39) “Objectivism and Subjectivism about Moral Obligation”, Philosophical Society, Umeå, 25 November 2010. (Invited.)
(40) “Betterness, Goodness, and Organic Unities”, UmeåUniversity, 26 November 2010. (Invited.)
(41) “Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, 2 December 2010. (Invited.)
(42) “Defining Goodness and Badness in terms of Betterness without Negation”, CopenhagenUniversity, 7 April 2011. (Invited.)
(43) “Goodness and Badness Defined in terms of Betterness without Negation”, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 17 May 2011. (Invited.)
(44) “Goodness and Badness Defined in terms of Betterness without Negation”, University of Geneva, 27 May 2011. (Invited.)
(45) “Objectivism and Subjectivism about Moral Obligation”, Filosofidagarna, Gothenburg, 12 June 2011. (Invited.)
(46) “Value Incomparability and Vagueness”, College of New Jersey, 7 November 2011. (Invited.)
(47) “Parity Demystified”, RutgersUniversity, 8 November 2011. (Invited.)
(48) “Goodness and Badness Defined in terms of Betterness without Negation”, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 11 November 2011. (Invited.)
(49) “Goodness and Badness Defined in terms of Betterness without Negation”, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, 14 November 2011. (Invited.)
(50) “Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”, The Franco-Swedish Program in Philosophy and Economics, Paris, 12 June 2012. (Invited.)
Referee work
Journals
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Dialectica
Economics and Philosophy
Erkenntnis
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Ethics
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy
The Journal of Moral Philosophy
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Journal of Philosophical Research
The Journal of Value Inquiry
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mind
Noûs
Philosophers’ Imprint
Philosophical Studies
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Politics, Philosophy and Economics
Prolegomena
Synthese
Theoria
Utilitas
Encyclopedias
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Book publishers
Acumen Publishers
Kluwer Academic Publishers
OxfordUniversity Press
Publications
Recent publications
Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 535-545, 2024
- DOI for Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
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Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness
Part of Philosophia, 2024
- DOI for Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness
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Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
Part of Utilitas, p. 229-237, 2023
- DOI for Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
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Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm
Part of Theoria, p. 748-754, 2023
Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
- DOI for Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
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All publications
Articles in journal
Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 535-545, 2024
- DOI for Pitcovski's Explanation-Based Account of Harm
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Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness
Part of Philosophia, 2024
- DOI for Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness
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Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
Part of Utilitas, p. 229-237, 2023
- DOI for Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
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Unruh's Hybrid Account of Harm
Part of Theoria, p. 748-754, 2023
Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2023
- DOI for Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
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A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness
Part of Philosophia, p. 2147-2150, 2023
- DOI for A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness
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Part of Philosophical Studies, p. 553-565, 2023
Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2023
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Part of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p. 420-445, 2022
The Significance of Tiny Contributions: Barnett and Beyond
Part of Utilitas, p. 488-496, 2021
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Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
Part of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 164-174, 2021
- DOI for Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
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Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, p. 407-413, 2020
- DOI for Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
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Organic unities and conditionalism about final value
Part of Journal of Value Inquiry, p. 175-181, 2020
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Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem
Part of Utilitas, p. 477-481, 2019
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More Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, p. 795-807, 2019
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Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit
Part of Utilitas, p. 198-208, 2018
- DOI for Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit
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“Organiska helheter och kontextualism om finalt värde”
Part of Filosofisk Tidskrift, p. 31-37, 2016
Part of Noûs, p. 213-223, 2016
Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle
Part of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, p. 449-463, 2013
The small-improvement argument rescued
Part of The Philosophical Quarterly, p. 171-174, 2011
Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability
Part of Mathematical Social Sciences, p. 71-76, 2011
Generalized extensive measurement for lexicographic orders
Part of Journal of mathematical psychology (Print), p. 345-351, 2010
Part of Theoria, p. 119-128, 2010
Extensive measurement with incomparability
Part of Journal of mathematical psychology (Print), p. 250-259, 2008
Part of Filosofisk tidskrift, p. 29-30, 2007
Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity
Part of Theoria, p. 3-25, 2007
"Cirkulär tid och den eviga återkomsten"
Part of Filosofisk tidskrift, p. 33-37, 2006
“A New Time Travel Paradox Resolved"
Part of Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, p. 263-273, 2005
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
Part of Utilitas, p. 220-224, 2004
The Presumption of Nothingness
Part of Ratio, p. 203-221, 2001
Chapters in book
On Some Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics
Part of The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2019
Part of Introduction to Formal Philosophy, p. 523-534, Springer, 2018
Aggregate and Average Utilitarianism
Part of The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, Continuum Press, 2012
Part of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012
Defining Goodness and Badness in Terms of Betterness without Negation
Part of Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior, p. 51-66, World Scientific, 2011
Routledge, 2010
Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability
Part of Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz, p. 99-110, Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2009
Incomparability and Measurement of Value
Part of The Good, the Right, Life and Death, p. 19-43, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006
Intransitivity without Zeno's Paradox
Part of Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, p. 273-277, Springer, 2005
Part of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2005
Collections (editor)
Dept of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2001
Other
Review of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Part of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004