Max McLoughlin: "Presentism and Simplicity"

Max McLoughlin, Uppsala University: "Presentism and Simplicity"

Abstract
Simplicity is considered by most philosophers and scientists to be a theoretical virtue. Ceteris Paribus, we prefer theories that possess greater simplicity. Therefore, it is an important matter, in debates within metaphysics, which theory we regard as possessing greater simplicity. Often it is claimed that presentism is our simplest metaphysical theory of time. And occasionally, explicit attempts are made to motivate presentism via appeal to its simplicity. Indeed, there is a powerful prima facie case to be made that presentism possesses greater simplicity than its rivals. However, this essay argues that presentism cannot claim to be the simplest metaphysical theory of time tout court. For it is only with regards to quantitative parsimony that presentism can claim to be simpler than its rivals. Eternalism, a rival of presentism, possesses greater ideological simplicity and qualitative parsimony. Furthermore, there is good reason to assign asymmetric theoretical value to quantitative and qualitative parsimony. Qualitative parsimony appears to have greater theoretical value than quantitative parsimony. Thus, not only is presentism not our simplest theory of time tout court, but it possesses less simplicity-derived theoretical value than its rival, eternalism.