Andrew Reisner: "Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason and De-Moralisation"

Andrew Reisner, Uppsala University: "Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason and De-Moralisation"

Abstract
Henry Sidgwick famously opined that the profoundest problem in ethics was the apparent impossibility of reconciling the conflicting requirements of morality and self-interest. One approach to addressing conflicts of morality and self-interest is the project of de-moralisation, which aims to expunge moral concepts from serious normative theorising. The project of de-moralisation is attractive, in part because it removes normatively irrelevant concepts associated with anger and irrelevant emotions, like blame and moral worth, from normative theorising. The general thought is (e.g. in Crisp 2006) that if reasons do not come in different kinds – if they are just reasons of wellbeing, for example – then one can assess what the totality of reasons says one ought to do. I wish to raise some questions about the extent to which de-moralisation can help with solving Sidgwick’s dualism and, even if we can, whether we can really do without at least more harmless (i.e. not anger/moral worth associated) moral concepts.