[CANCELLED] Jonas Haeg: "The Criminogenic Objection to Punishment"

Jonas Haeg, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace: "The Criminogenic Objection to Punishment"

Abstract
Many philosophers agree that there is something morally objectionable about punishing “socially disadvantaged” offenders, especially if they’ve suffered “criminogenic injustices” (roughly, injustices that also tend to increase the likelihood of committing certain crimes). But there is a lot of disagreement about why it is morally objectionable. This paper pursues the thought that people have an interest in not committing wrongs partly because they have an interest in not incurring (potentially very) costly corrective duties. Further, it is argued, those who wrongfully push others towards committing wrongs can therefore incur their own (potentially very) costly duties to help shoulder the burdens required for the wrongdoers to correct their wrongdoing. Insofar as punishment is justified, at least partly, as a means of enforcing corrective duties, this view provides a powerful reason for states not to punish offenders who are also victims of criminogenic injustice.