Carlotta Pavese: "Essentially Intentional Actions and Action-Theoretic Foundationalism"

Carlotta Pavese, Oxford University: "Essentially Intentional Actions and Action-Theoretic Foundationalism"

Abstract
Foundationalisms in action theory are commonly taken to be divided on the question as to whether the basic actions they invoke to stop the regress of intentionality are bodily or mental, external or internal. I argue that the main divide among foundationalisms is not whether basic actions are external or internal; instead, it is whether the basic actions that are invoked to stop the regress of intentionality are “essentially intentional.” Accordingly, I oppose two main forms of foundationalisms. One form of foundationalism takes the basic actions to be bodily or mental movements that do not have their intentionality essentially. Another form of foundationalism instead is committed to basic actions being essentially intentional actions of “tryings”. But are tryings essentially intentional? And is any action essentially intentional? Though widely assumed in action theory, I discuss some puzzles for the doctrine of essentially intentional actions that suggest that it is incompatible with the kind of agents that we are. The ensuing question is discussed of what kind of foundationalism and what picture of human agency we can afford.