Paolo Santorio: "Semantic Resolutions"
- Date
- 10 June 2026, 10:15–12:00
- Location
- English Park, Eng/2-0022
- Type
- Seminar
- Organiser
- Department of Philosophy
- Contact person
- Matti Eklund
The Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy (NB, day and venue.)
Paolo Santorio, University of Maryland, College Park: "Semantic Resolutions"
Abstract
On the classical view, the basic modal units used in semantics are possible worlds. For example, (1) quantifies over a domain of worlds that are compatible with the speaker's knowledge.
(1) Alice might be in Berlin.
I argue that the basic units of modal semantics are, instead, possibilities. The notion of a possibility generalizes the notion of a possible world: possibilities are consistent, but may leave some facts unsettled. For example, a possibility may settle that Alice had dinner at 8 yesterday, and fail to settle anything else, including what she ate and how long it took her. What possibilities we use in a given context is fixed by a variable parameter, which I call a "resolution". I show that switching to possibilities explains a number of facts across several domains. These include some elusive properties of "might"-claims, some puzzling asymmetries between will-claims and indicative claims, and some apparent failures of closure in knowledge ascriptions.