Statecraft in the Boardroom: Political posts, the magnitude of political power, and the economic implications of corporate political connections in Russia

Abstract: Russia is one of the most politicized economies globally (Faccio, 2006), with present and former top government officials holding posts in no fewer than 43% of Russia's largest corporations (Trifonov, 2021). How do these ties between Russian corporations and the government function as economic and managerial assets? Dmitri Trifonov elaborates on this in his recent research devoted to the economic effects of corporate connections to different kinds of Russian politicians. Within the first-ever presentation of this study, Trifonov will share his answers to the following questions:

Connections to which kinds of Russian politicians are lucrative for Russian corporations, and to which ones are detrimental?

Is it true that various sectors of the Russian economy attract specific kinds of Russian politicians? If so, what are the patterns?

Do more powerful politicians yield greater profits for Russian companies, or not?

What is the difference between federal and regional-level politicians in Russia concerning corporate connections to them?

From an economic standpoint, what happens when federal politicians enforce government policies on Russian corporations?

Dmitri Trifonov is a postdoctoral visiting researcher at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES), Uppsala University. Trifonov defended his Ph.D. dissertation in the field of applied economics and quantitative finance in 2022. His current research interests concern political connections of Russian corporations and their economic, financial, and managerial repercussions.