Daniel Bougt: A Sequence of Essays on Sequences of Auctions

  • Date: 3 June 2022, 14:15
  • Location: Hörsal 2, Ekonomikum, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10, Uppsala
  • Type: Thesis defence
  • Thesis author: Daniel Bougt
  • External reviewer: Per Hjertstrand
  • Supervisor: Ola Andersson
  • Research subject: Economics
  • DiVA

Abstract

Essay I (with Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu). The existence of declining prices in sequential auctions is a well-documented empirical pattern. Three explanations that can explain the puzzle are bidders being risk averse, loss averse, or ambiguity averse. We use a data set on bids and prices from sequential auctions of train tickets to confirm the existence of declining prices. We further document bidder behavior that is inconsistent with bidders being risk averse or bidders being loss averse.

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