Game Theory
Syllabus, Bachelor's level, 1MA083
This course has been discontinued.
- Code
- 1MA083
- Education cycle
- First cycle
- Main field(s) of study and in-depth level
- Mathematics G1F
- Grading system
- Pass with distinction (5), Pass with credit (4), Pass (3), Fail (U)
- Finalised by
- The Faculty Board of Science and Technology, 30 August 2018
- Responsible department
- Department of Mathematics
Entry requirements
Mathematics 30 credit points or 60 credits in Science, Technology, Economics, Political Science or Philosophy.
Learning outcomes
On completion of the course, the student should be able to:
- give an account of the following concepts: preference relation, utility function and expected utility;
- define the concept of strategic game and give an account of the concepts of mixed strategy, Nash equilibrium, maxmin strategy and dominance;
- characterise pure and mixed Nash equilibria, compute such equilibria in two person games, and solve games through iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies;
- rewrite two-person zero-sum games as linear programming problems, and solve such games in simple cases;
- define the concept of extensive game, construct the game tree of an extensive game, determine the equivalent strategic form and compute subgame perfect equilibria;
- define the concept of coalitional game and give an account of the following concepts: imputation, core, nucleolus and Shapley value;
- compute the core, the nucleolus and the Shapley value of a game in simple cases;
- give an account of some game theoretic applications.
Content
Utility theory: preference relations, utility functions, expected utility, von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences.
Strategic games: pure and mixed strategies, Nash equilibrium, maxmin strategy, dominance, and iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Two-person zero-sum games: optimal strategy and optimal value, connection with linear programming.
Extensive games: game tree, perfect information, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, chance moves, information set, incomplete information, perfect recall. Various oligopoly models.
Coalitional games: imputation, kernel, nucleolus and Shapley value. Coalitional games without transferable payoff exemplified by exchange economies.
Instruction
Lectures and problem solving sessions.
Assessment
Written examination at the end of the course combined with assignments given during the course.
If there are special reasons for doing so, an examiner may make an exception from the method of assessment indicated and allow a student to be assessed by another method. An example of special reasons might be a certificate regarding special pedagogical support from the disability coordinator of the university.