Ylwa Sjölin Wirling: "Veritism and Ways of Deriving Epistemic Value"

Ylwa Sjölin Wirling, Göteborgs universitet och The University of Manchester: "Veritism and Ways of Deriving Epistemic Value"

Abstract
Veritists hold that only truth has fundamental epistemic value. They are committed to explaining all other instances of epistemic goodness as somehow deriving their value through a relation to truth, and in order to do so they arguably need a non-instrumental relation of epistemic value derivation. As is currently common in epistemology, many veritists assume that the epistemic is an insulated evaluative domain: claims about what has epistemic value is independent of claims about what has value simpliciter. The paper concludes that veritists should abandon this insulation approach to epistemic value because, I argue, it is incompatible with non-instrumental epistemic value derivation.