Katrien Schaubroeck: "The Epistemic Significance of Practical Disorientation"

Katrien Schaubroeck, University of Antwerp: "The Epistemic Significance of Practical Disorientation"

Abstract
According to Harry Frankfurt, it is better for an agent to be wholehearted than ambivalent. This unity-ideal of agency (also adhered to by Kantian philosophers like Christine Korsgaard) has come under attack. One line of criticism brings to light the moral value of disorientation. In Disorientation and Moral Life (OUP 2016) Ami Harbin describes the phenomenon of being disoriented, a feeling known to all human beings but understudied by philosophers, as an experience of losing one’s bearings and not knowing what to do anymore spurred by major life shifts like a breakup or the dead of a beloved. She identifies the value of disorientation as the moral value of tenderizing. In my talk I first want to expand the realm of examples given by Harbin, by looking at major life shifts that are more positively laden (like falling in love) or feelings of disorientation that are not caused by an event (like a life-long vulnerability for mental health problems). Secondly I will argue that next to the moral value of tenderizing, experiences of disorientation also have an epistemic value. The upshot is that if we try to talk people out of their disorientation, we must be careful not to inflict epistemic injustice on them. I will use examples from movies (Melancholia, Brief Encounter) and from illness narratives. I will rely on literature on epistemic injustice, disorientation and neurodiversity.