Antonia Peacocke: "Aesthetic Particularism and the Grounding Problem"

Antonia Peacocke, Stanford University: "Aesthetic Particularism and the Grounding Problem"

Abstract
Aesthetic particularists claim that there are no true, finite, general principles about how the non-value properties of an object (like shape, size, authorship, etc.) result from its aesthetic value (beauty, sublimity, elegance, etc.). All of them agree that aesthetic value is nonetheless grounded in non-value properties. This presents a serious problem, because metaphysicians who work on grounding have suggested that there must be such grounding principles that subsume any instance of ground. This is said to be central to the explanatory nature of grounding: if something is F in virtue of being G, then it's possible to explain its F-ness in terms of its G-ness, and such explanation seems inherently unificatory across cases. In this talk, I'll consider two ways to reconcile these claims and protect the explanatory power of grounding in aesthetics. Then I'll illustrate the proper solution using an example: Kathleen Ryan's Bad Lemon (Creep).