Matteo Ravasio: "Methodology in the Philosophy of Music"

  • Datum: 9 april 2025, kl. 14.15–16.00
  • Plats: Engelska parken, Eng/2-1022
  • Typ: Seminarium
  • Arrangör: Filosofiska institutionen
  • Kontaktperson: Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann

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Matteo Ravasio, Peking University: "Methodology in the Philosophy of Music: The Question of Value Neutrality"


Abstract
If one reads a history of western philosophy of music, a striking contrast emerges. Some thinkers are deeply enmeshed in the artistic life of their times, taking sides in contentious and divisive disputes involving widespread musical practices and well-respected practitioners. Think of Rousseau against Rameau, or Adorno against Stravinsky. Other philosophers seem content to describe musical practices from a safer distance. The latter approach becomes far more common as one moves closer to the present. One could say: Philosophy’s point is no longer to change the world, but only to interpret it. I refer to this attitude as value neutrality. In this talk, I introduce what I believe are the most interesting questions about it. First, I sketch a brief history of the idea. As expected, explicit commitments to value neutrality become more common and substantial over time. I argue that value neutrality is the clearest defining feature of analytic philosophy of music, as it is at the intersection of several other proposed central features of the analytic approach. Second, I note that the available histories of western philosophy of music pay little heed to value neutrality. However, there is important historical work to be done to trace its historical origins. Moreover, it may be tempting for contemporary philosophers to describe past theorizing as if it had been carried out from a value-neutral standpoint, whereas this was not the case. Finally, I discuss some theoretical issues related to value neutrality. Jonathan Neufeld is one of the few philosophers to have explicitly questioned value neutrality. He argues that musical ontology should not (and perhaps cannot) be value-neutral. I discuss some of his claims, and ask what the scope of value neutrality ought to be, as well as some of the characteristic pitfalls for the approach.

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