Seminarium: Walker Hanlon, Northwestern

Abstract:

Political economy theories of constituent-representative interactions typically focus on elections, yet many important issues arise between elections. We study how constituent and representatives interact outside of elections and how this interaction is shaped by the work of advocacy groups. In our model, representatives have an imperfect understanding of constituent preferences when faced with a novel policy issue and constituents face a coordination problem in signaling their preferences which advocacy groups can help overcome. To study these issues empirically we focus on a key period in the development of the women's rights movement in the U.K. (1860s-1880s), a setting where the availability of detailed data on constituent petitions offers unique visibility into constituent-representative interactions. Our results show that advocacy efforts can create persistent increases in constituent signaling and that constituent signals influence MP votes. Advocacy and signaling focused on one policy can have spillover effects onto related policy areas, both by solving coordination problems and because representatives update their beliefs about constituent preferences.