David Davies: "The Case Against Dance Objects"

Date
to
Location
English Park, Eng/2-1022
Type
Seminar
Organiser
Filosofiska institutionen
Contact person
Elisabeth Schellekens Dammann

The Higher Seminar in Aesthetics (NB, starts at 14:45.)

David Davies, McGill University: "The Case Against Dance Objects"


Abstract
I critically assess the claim that performable works of dance are properly thought of as abstract objects, or more specifically types. I have termed this view of performable works more generally ‘the classical paradigm’. I briefly sketch the classical paradigm, and the reasons it has been assumed to be ‘the only game in town’. I then present what I take to be powerful objections to this view in its ‘pure’ form, and some desiderata for any adequate philosophical account of performable works. The most plausible strategy for defending a ‘type’ theory of works in the performing arts, given these desiderata, is Levinson’s view of musical works as ‘initiated types’, but this fails to account for one very significant desideratum. But it can be amended so as to address this challenge, as illustrated by Anna Pakes’ account of dance works in her recent Choreography Invisible. I argue, however, that any account of performable works as types, pure or ‘initiated’, still faces serious difficulties. I draw on Wollheim’s account of multiple artworks, a principal source of the classical paradigm, in developing an alternative account of dance works that does not identify such works with abstract objects,. Properly understood, I argue, Wollheim provides us with a model of performable works which does not commit us to dance objects in any interesting sense.