Aesthetic Rationality

Abstract

Philosophers often associate being rational with being coherent, but this view has been underexplored in aesthetics. This project investigates whether two of our main aesthetic attitudes—namely, judging an object as aesthetically valuable and aesthetically liking it—are subject to coherence requirements. It also examines why meeting these requirements might be important for our aesthetic lives. While the lack of obvious negative consequences might explain the limited debate on aesthetic coherence compared to the practical or theoretical domains, this project questions that assumption.

The project introduces the concept of ‘aesthetic respect’ to explain the normative relationship between aesthetic judgments and likings. It suggests that agents with incoherent aesthetic attitudes may violate a duty of respect for aesthetic value. For example, disliking something judged to be valuable or liking something deemed to have little or no aesthetic merit reflects a lack of respect for the object’s value and a lack of self-respect, respectively.

This three-year project aims to deepen our understanding of how our mental states align structurally, resolve debates about proper engagement with aesthetic value, and explore the importance of aesthetic self-obligations.