Our researchers in media


  •  Pakistan chạy đua nối lại đàm phán Mỹ - Iran trước hạn ngừng bắn
    Read more

  • Lagrådets kritik ignoreras alla oftare
    Regeringen både till höger och vänster struntar allt oftare i Lagrådets kritik – en utveckling som pågått i över 20 år.
    Read more

  • SNS Demokratiråd 2026: Fördubblad lagrådskritik mot sittande regering - och riksdagen reagerar sällan
    Read more

  • Kriget i Sudan går in på fjärde året – drönarkrig plågar befolkningen Utrikes 2 min
    Världens ögon är riktade mot Iran, Libanon, Ukraina och Gaza. I Sudan går inbördeskriget samtidigt snart in på sitt fjärde år, med allt mer intensiva drönarattacker som plågar civilbefolkningen. I veckan dödades 30 personer i en attack mot ett bröllop. – Det finns tyvärr ingen fred i sikte, säger SVT:s Afrikakorrespondent Johan Ripås.
    Read more

  • Korta samtal i Pakistan – tillvaratog inte möjlighet
    Förhandlingarna i Pakistan avslutades snabbare än väntat trots stora motsättningar, enligt Isak Svensson, professor vid Uppsala universitet.
    Read more

  • Fredssamtalen mellan USA och Iran: ”Kan inte lösas ut militärt”
    Efter helgens samtal mellan USA och Iran gick parterna skilda vägar utan någon överenskommelse. Parterna beskyller varandra för att samtalen bröt samman.
    Read more

  • Indian media fails to digest Pakistan's peacemaker role - and doesn't hide it
    KARACHI: As the Pakistan-mediated 'Islamabad Talks' between the United States and Iran began on Saturday, the world watched closely except for some "evil eyes" across the border still clinging to propaganda over nuance.Consistent with a long-standing pattern of criticising Pakistan, Indian broadcast media and its hyperventilating anchors attempted to undermine Islamabad's efforts, and even appeared to cast doubt on the viability of the Islamabad talks. In doing so, they risked further eroding whatever little credibility they had and invited criticism for sensationalism.This approach aligns with the broader policy stance articulated by Narendra Modi, who, after his first election as India's prime minister in 2014, stated his intention to make Pakistan a "pariah" globally over its alleged support for terrorism.Former US diplomat Jeffery Gunter did not hold back when an Indian anchor pressed him on whether US Vice President JD Vance would be safe in Pakistan.Giving them what can only be described as a televised reality check, Gunter said, "I feel like the schoolteacher about to discipline each and every one of you."He did not stop there."This is about lives. This is about livelihood. This is about expensive gasoline for everyday Indians, everyday Americans," he said during a live broadcast on India's Times Now TV, before calling out the drama unfolding in front of him.Turning a serious geopolitical moment into a Pakistan versus India shouting match, he added, was "actually quite embarrassing" and "shameful".You could almost hear the collective detention bell ring.Because right now, all eyes are on Pakistan. Some are watching with curiosity, others with cautious hope that maybe, just maybe, peace might actually stand a chance. And yet, there are some "evil eyes" in the room too, two of them very visibly, Israel and India.Both appear unsettled by the direction things are taking. Israel launched strikes in Lebanon almost immediately after Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke of a ceasefire, while across the border, Indian media slipped into overdrive, spinning narratives before facts had time to land.Prime-time debates on leading Indian news channels, including Aaj Tak, Republic TV, and Times Now, have expressed surprise and concern over Pakistan's emerging role as a diplomatic bridge between the Middle East and the West, noting that it challenges the long-held perception of Pakistan's international isolation.But this ceasefire is beyond this. If the conflict spirals, the fallout will not politely stay confined to one region. It will travel to South Asia, to Europe, and well beyond, bringing energy shocks, rising inflation, disrupted trade, and humanitarian crises, the kind of domino effect no one really signs up for. In moments like this, urgency is expected, not theatre.Yet instead of restraint, what we saw was performance, where urgency was the need of the hour, but parts of the Indian media chose spectacle instead.Take one rather cinematic episode. A live broadcast of India Today confidently claimed, citing "Israeli sources", that Vance would not even make it to Pakistan. According to this version of events, his plane might turn around mid-air and head back to the US.A bold claim. A dramatic one. Also, completely wrong. Vance landed in Pakistan. Not diverted. Not missing. Landed. And, awkwardly for the scriptwriters, welcomed.Vance arrived as part of a US delegation for discussions on the US-Iran ceasefire, referred to as the "Islamabad Talks 2026" by the Foreign Office.The commentary, however, did not lose momentum. In the same broadcast, there were claims that no one wanted to give Pakistan any credit. Then came the more imaginative additions, with prayers allegedly being offered for the plane to disappear before arrival, as one television anchor claimed:"Currently, there are prayers happening in Padmanabhaswamy Temple, where Prime Minister Modi has given the local pundits 3000 rupees each to start praying that the plane of JD Vance disappears before reaching Pakistan." There were also guarantees that it would "never reach Pakistan".At that point, it felt less like news and more like a thriller that forgot to fix the ending.Pakistan has emerged as the epicentre of global peace talks between Tehran and Washington. Not a minor development, but a real diplomatic moment that places Islamabad in the role of a bridge between East and West, while other countries largely watched as spectators with limited effort or engagement.The fragile truce follows four weeks of intense conflict and is based on a two-week pause in hostilities aimed at halting major strikes and reopening strategic routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, even as key disagreements remain unresolved.At the centre of the arrangement is a 10-point Iranian proposal described by the US as a workable basis for negotiations, covering non-aggression commitments, operations of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, and broader cessation of hostilities, which is expected to guide talks in Islamabad toward a more durable settlement.Naturally, that has not gone down well in certain circles. As soon as the ceasefire was announced, parts of the Indian media appeared to switch on their usual propaganda machine, with rumours quickly circulating that Iran had refused to participate altogether.Across social media, particularly in Indian and Israeli spaces, the reaction has ranged from dismissive to outright mocking."Indian media chagrin on Pakistan hosting the talks was a sad spectacle. Their wanting it to fail is even more so. Grow up, India," said Javed Hassan, a Pakistani economist and public policy expert, commenting on the reaction of sections of the Indian media to the developments in Islamabad.Even a Swedish-Indian political scientist and professor at Uppsala University, Ashok Swain, called the Indian media a "joke".Some media outlets went rogue while others have been less subtle, recycling familiar talking points with the kind of enthusiasm usually reserved for breaking news.And yet, the numbers tell a different story for Pakistan. More than 40 international media outlets have applied for visas to cover the talks in Islamabad. At least 20 journalists have already been cleared. Delegations are arriving. The world, it seems, is paying attention even if some would rather pretend it is not.Then there is Arnab Goswami, an Indian television news anchor and journalist, who dismissed the entire development and ceasefire as a "running joke", questioning how Pakistan could possibly mediate between the US and Iran.It is a familiar tone, confident, dismissive, slightly louder than necessary. But it does not exist in isolation.This kind of coverage reflects a broader narrative shaped under Modi, where isolating Pakistan internationally has been a consistent policy direction. Over the years, India has repeatedly labelled Pakistan a "terror factory" and the "pre-eminent export factory for terror" on global platforms.Former Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj once summed it up rather bluntly at the United Nations, saying India produces scholars, doctors and engineers, while Pakistan produces "terrorists".It is rhetoric that fits neatly into what is often described as the Doval Doctrine, associated with India's National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. The idea is simple enough. Take a more assertive stance. Counter threats beyond borders. Use diplomacy, intelligence and pressure in equal measure. And, crucially, keep Pakistan and its terrorism framed as the central problem.Over time, that narrative has helped India build alignment with Western partners and shape global perception. Or at least, attempt to.A 2020 investigation by EU DisinfoLab exposed a 15-year global disinformation network dubbed "Indian Chronicles", allegedly designed to shape international perceptions against Pakistan through influence operations targeting institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council and the European Parliament.The report claimed the network involved at least 750 fake media outlets operating across nearly 100 countries, along with more than 265 pro-Indian websites identified in earlier findings and a wider ecosystem spanning over 500 websites used for amplification. It also alleged the use of at least 10 UN-accredited NGOs and several defunct or impersonated organisations, including cases where identities of deceased individuals were reportedly re-used to lend credibility.According to the investigators, the operation was one of the most complex they had seen, aimed at manufacturing a sustained narrative against Pakistan on global platforms and creating an illusion of broad international consensus.It was, in many ways, information warfare dressed up as consensus.Which brings us back to the present moment.Not all voices within India's political and media landscape adopt a biased stance. There are also more measured perspectives. Senior Indian National Congress leader Shashi Tharoor, for instance, struck a balanced note by stressing that "not everything is a zero-sum game" and cautioning against framing every regional development as a rivalry between states.He noted that if Pakistan were being accused of actions that undermine India's security, the equation would be different, but when its role intersects with a peace process that broadly serves regional stability, it should be assessed with pragmatism rather than reflexive hostility.He further argued that Pakistan's involvement should not be dismissed outright, stressing that geography and regional realities give Islamabad a direct stake in preventing escalation, especially given its proximity to Iran and the broader risks of regional spillover."We should be celebrating" any genuine steps toward de-escalation, he implied, pointing out that stability would ultimately serve shared interests, including energy security and economic stability.For all the noise, the exaggerations and the occasional prophecy about disappearing planes, something real is happening in Islamabad. Pakistan is not just part of the conversation. It is helping shape it. None of this means the path ahead is smooth.The next couple of days will be crucial in determining the course of history, but whatever unfolds or the Indian media says, Pakistan will remain in the frame as a successful mediator of the Iran-US ceasefire.
    Read more

  • Experten om grusade fredsförhandlingar: ”Märkligt”
    Fredsförhandlingarna fick ett abrupt slut. Kvar finns bara förlorare. – Det är ett högriskspel, säger Isak Svensson, professor i freds- och konfliktforskning.
    Read more

  • A re-enactment of Gaza in Lebanon
    How is Israel’s inhuman campaign to displace yet another population getting so little international attention, asks Ashok Swain
    Read more

  • Fredsforskaren: ”Båda sidorna behöver något” USA och Iran ska mötas i Pakistan • Deadline för fred: Två veckor
    Efter över en månads krig väntas USA och Iran mötas i fredssamtal under helgen. Det kommer vara svårt men inte omöjligt att komma överens, säger fredsforskaren Isak Svensson.
    Read more

  • The advantage of access: Why Pakistan has emerged as the mediator between Iran and the US
    It can carry messages, test positions, reduce the political cost of contact and provide a venue for talks without either side appearing to surrender.Ashok SwainNo one should be surprised that Pakistan has emerged as the intermediary between Iran and the United States, helped secure a two-week ceasefire at a moment of extreme danger and is now hosting peace talks in Islamabad. To see this as an unexpected diplomatic leap is to ignore both Pakistan’s strategic location and its long, if uneven, history of backchannel diplomacy. Islamabad did not suddenly acquire relevance because this war became dangerous. It was already relevant because it has spent decades positioning itself at the intersection of rival power centres, often talking to states that do not trust one another but still need a messenger they can all use.Pakistan’s current role is rooted first in geography. Iran is not a distant crisis for Pakistan. It is a neighbour with whom Pakistan shares a long border, overlapping ethnic population, security concerns, energy anxieties, and deep religious and social connections. A war that weakens or destabilises Iran does not remain confined to Iranian territory. It threatens to spill directly into Pakistan through sectarian tensions, refugee flows, fuel shocks, and militancy in Balochistan. For Islamabad, mediation is therefore not some idealistic project dressed up as global leadership. It is a hard calculation of national interest. Preventing the collapse of order next door is simply too important for Pakistan to remain passive.But many states have a stake in regional calm. What makes Pakistan different is that it can still talk to almost everyone involved. It has working ties with Washington and its army chief is close to the President Donald Trump. It has durable channels to Tehran. It has deep military and political relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. It remains one of China’s closest partners.It does not carry the same baggage in Iranian eyes as several Arab states aligned too openly with the United States nor does it look to Washington like a hostile ideological global power. That combination is rare. Pakistan has enough credibility with all sides to make itself useful when direct communication breaks down.That is exactly what seems to have happened in this crisis. The significance of Pakistan’s role lies not in some romantic idea of neutral peacemaking. Pakistan is not neutral in the abstract sense and no serious country ever is. What it does possess is access. It can carry messages, test positions, reduce the political cost of contact, and provide a venue where talks can begin without either side appearing to surrender.This is what negotiation often looks like in the real world. It is less about moral authority than about strategic usability.Pakistan has played this kind of role before. The most famous case came in July 1971, when it helped facilitate US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing. That mission opened the path to US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972 and changed the architecture of the Cold War.Pakistan was chosen because it was one of the very few states trusted by both Washington and Beijing. It could protect secrecy, carry messages, and manage a diplomatic manoeuvre whose consequences were far bigger than itself. That episode remains the clearest proof that Pakistan has long been capable of serving as a channel between adversaries when the stakes are high enough.Its role in Afghanistan offers another example, though a more complicated one. During the negotiations surrounding the 1988 Geneva Accords that paved the way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan was not a detached bystander. It was a frontline state, a signatory, and an intermediary all at once. That dual role made its diplomacy controversial, but it also made it indispensable. Pakistan knew the actors, held influence over key networks, and could not be ignored in any serious effort to manage the conflict.The same pattern returned in the post-2001 era. Pakistan hosted the first publicly acknowledged direct talks between the Afghan Taliban and the government in Kabul in Murree in 2015. Later, in the run up to the Doha process that culminated in the 2020 agreement between the United States and the Taliban, Pakistan again played a central role. It used its longstanding ties with the Taliban leadership, coordinated with Qatar, facilitated travel and access, and helped sustain channels that Washington could not build alone.That mediation was deeply contested and often morally compromised, but it still demonstrated something important. Pakistan becomes valuable precisely in those conflicts where other powers need access to actors, they cannot easily reach themselves.That history matters now. Iran does not have to love Pakistan to see its utility. The United States does not have to trust Pakistan completely to rely on its channels. Both sides only need to recognise that Islamabad can do something neither can do directly under current conditions. It can keep the conversation alive without forcing either party into premature public concessions.Pakistan has also spent years trying to ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These efforts did not produce the eventual breakthrough that China brokered in 2023, but they were far from meaningless. Pakistani leaders made repeated attempts at shuttle diplomacy in 2016 and 2019, hoping to keep open a line between Riyadh and Tehran at moments when regional tensions risked becoming unmanageable.Even where Pakistan did not deliver a final settlement, it often helped preserve the possibility of one. That too is a form of diplomatic labour, even if it is less celebrated than signing ceremonies.Another reason Pakistan was always a likely facilitator lies in its internal composition. It is not merely a Sunni Muslim state looking at Iran from the outside. It has 20 million-25 million Shia population, one of the largest Shia populations in the world. Any conflict involving Iran reverberates within Pakistan’s own social fabric.This creates both vulnerability and understanding. Islamabad knows that a prolonged war with Iran can inflame sectarian passions at home, but it also knows that this internal diversity gives Pakistan a degree of social and political sensitivity that many other American partners lack. In a crisis shaped as much by identity and symbolism as by military calculations, that matters.Then there is the military factor. Pakistan’s armed forces remain central to the country’s foreign policy, and that reality is often criticised. Yet in moments of high-risk diplomacy, it can also be an advantage. External actors want to know whether a mediator can deliver, whether its commitments will survive partisan change, and whether its security establishment is aligned with its civilian leadership.In Pakistan’s case, both the prime minister and the military command have been visibly engaged in the negotiation effort. That gives Pakistan a kind of state coherence that outside powers take seriously, especially when the issue involves war, deterrence, and regional military escalation.Pakistan’s emergence is also a reminder of how much diplomatic space India has surrendered. India once cultivated an image of nonalignment and bridge building. Today, its increasingly visible strategic alignment with the United States and its closeness to Israeli positions have narrowed its room for manoeuvre.Pakistan, by contrast, has retained enough ambiguity to remain useful across rival camps. What is often dismissed as inconsistency in Pakistani foreign policy is, in moments like this, a source of flexibility.None of this means Pakistan will produce a durable peace. The ceasefire could collapse. The talks in Islamabad may fail. The gaps between Tehran and Washington may remain too wide to bridge. But that is not the point.The real point is that Pakistan’s role should not shock anyone who has paid attention to its diplomatic history. From the United States and China to Afghanistan, from Saudi Arabia and Iran to the present crisis, Pakistan has repeatedly inserted itself where rivals need contact but do not yet trust engagement. It has long specialised in opening doors that others cannot open themselves.Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Read more

  • How the US will pay for Trump’s expansionism
    By using coercive diplomacy to try to counter China’s rise, Trump may be strengthening his principal rivalAshok SwainPublished: 05 Apr 2026 at 7:58 PMDonald Trump’s second term has stripped away the ideological veil that once softened America’s manoeuvres for global dominance. What earlier US administrations framed as the defence of democracy and a rules-based international order has now been recast in blunt, transactional terms. This is not a stylistic shift. It’s a more profound transformation and has come at a moment when American hegemony is being challenged by the rise of China. Paradoxically, though, in trying to counter China’s rise through coercive diplomacy and aggressive expansionism, Trump’s strategy seems to be accelerating the erosion of American power and strengthening its principal rival.In the Trump doctrine of US national security, China is no longer an ideological adversary but an economic competitor. Gone is the moral posturing of old, the language of democracy and human rights that once underpinned America’s claim to global leadership. The narrowing of focus on economic protectionism and material advantage betrays a loss of confidence and/or interest in its universal appeal or acceptance. This shift appeared pragmatic to many — certainly to his ‘America First’ MAGA base — but the sacrifice of values has come at the cost of influence.Trump’s naked ambition to annex new territories, his assertions to dominate the Western Hemisphere have further eroded America’s stature. The bid to reassert US primacy through economic pressure and war signals a neo-imperialist design, but the approach misunderstands the nature of contemporary power.Influence in Latin America and Africa, for example, will no longer be determined by military presence but through trade, investments and long-term economic engagement. China’s deepening ties with the Global South cannot be undone through coercion. On the contrary, heavy-handed American policies are pushing the region further into Beijing’s orbit.The military campaign against Iran, launched with the aim of degrading its strategic capabilities and reshaping regional dynamics, has also revealed the limits of America’s coercive power. What was presented as a quick, decisive operation has turned into a protracted, uncertain conflict, with Iran waging an asymmetric war on its own terms.The war has other strategic costs for the US. Apart from further straining alliances and raising questions about the reliability of American leadership in times of crisis, the conflict has forced the US to commit both military resources and political attention to West Asia. Which in turn will affect its capacity to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific. The diversion creates strategic space for China to strengthen its position, both economically and militarily. The pattern is familiar. Previous American entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan provided Beijing with the opportunity to rise with minimal interference. A similar dynamic is playing out now, except that China today has vastly enhanced capabilities.China’s response to the Iran war has been remarkably restrained and calculated. Rather than getting entangled in the conflict, Beijing has positioned itself as a cautious observer, avoiding direct confrontation while securing its economic interests and providing intelligence to Iran. This approach allows China to benefit at the cost of an overstretched America, without incurring significant costs. The war also reinforces China’s narrative of the US as a destabilising force, enhancing its appeal among countries in the region and outside seeking alternatives to Western dominance. In this sense, the Iran conflict is not just a regional crisis but the precursor to a global strategic shift that will further tilt the balance of power in Beijing’s favour.Trump’s foreign policy approach amplifies these dynamics. His willingness to undermine longstanding alliances within NATO and the Quad and his penchant for unilateral action has weakened the network of partnerships that historically extended American influence. At the same time, his inconsistent stance on China, oscillating between confrontation and accommodation, creates uncertainty about US intentions. This lack of coherence undermines credibility and reduces the effectiveness of US policy.For decades, the United States positioned itself — even if the reality was different — as a model of governance, a guardian of the rules-based international order. That claim lies in tatters. The Iran war, widely seen as an act of unilateral aggression, has reinforced scepticism about American intentions. As this perception spreads, it will further erode American leadership and strengthen China’s push towards an alternative global order. For China, Trump’s missteps are a cheap way to expand its influence without even confronting the US directly.Trump loyalists stubbornly argue that his disruptive policies are necessary to confront an unfair international system and to counter China’s rise. They contend that previous strategies had failed to address structural imbalances in trade and technology. These concerns are not entirely without merit, but the paradox of Trump’s foreign policy lies in its unintended consequences. By abandoning the ideological framework that once legitimised American power, it weakens that power. By engaging in expansionist actions and costly conflicts, it accelerates strategic over-stretch. By focusing on short-term dominance rather than long-term stability, it creates conditions that favour the rival it seeks to contain. Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here
    Read more

  • Iran folly cripples US credibility
    Read more

  • US Hegemony Ending? क्या चीन के सामने अमेरिका पस्त? | Prof. Muqtedar Khan & Ashok Swain
    क्या अमेरिका का साम्राज्य खत्म हो रहा है? इस विशेष चर्चा में, वरिष्ठ पत्रकार आशुतोष ने प्रसिद्ध अमेरिकी प्रोफेसर मुक्तदर खान और यूरोपीय प्रोफेसर अशोक स्वैन से बात की। उन्होंने विश्लेषण किया कि कैसे ईरान युद्ध ने अमेरिका की कमियों को उजागर किया है और क्यों दुनिया अब उसे पहले जैसा शक्तिशाली नहीं मानती। क्या चीन अब अमेरिका को पछाड़कर दुनिया का नया 'सुपरपावर' बनने की ओर है? अमेरिका के गिरते प्रभुत्व के असली कारणों को समझने के लिए यह वीडियो देखें।
    Read more

  • Politikerhatet ökar under valår: ”Skulle slaktas som en kossa”
    LULEÅ/UPPSALA. Therez Almerfors (M) fick höra att hon skulle slaktas som en kossa. Carina Sammeli (S) blev spottad på. Båda kampanjar inför valet i höst. Hot och trakasserier mot politiker ökar under valår. – Många kommuner och regioner är inte så bra rustade, säger forskaren Sandra Håkansson.
    Read more

  • Cuba next on Trump’s imperial hitlist
    Trump’s fixation with Cuba is driven neither by ideological hostility nor security concerns, writes Ashok SwainDonald Trump has not been coy about Cuba. He has openly coveted the ‘honour’ of taking the island. He has also suggested he can do what he likes with it. These seemingly unhinged remarks are not without political intention. Trump’s fixation with Cuba is not driven by ideological hostility towards Communism, even though that language is politically useful at home. Nor is it really about security concerns. It is a fusion of geopolitical ambition and a transactional worldview. Cuba appears, in this frame, as a nearby and weakened state whose economic distress can be leveraged into political submission. Its proximity and untapped economic potential make it particularly attractive in Trump’s calculus.The crippling economic sanctions Cuba is battling must be seen in this context. The sanctions are meant to produce the kind of distress conditions that will make a ‘regime change’ easy. This vision of ‘regime change’ mirrors what unfolded in Venezuela. The aim is to reshape the top leadership in a way that preserves administrative continuity while aligning the system more closely with US interests.The influence of hardline Cuban exile groups in the US and the longstanding hawkishness of secretary of state Marco Rubio has reinforced this policy direction vis-à-vis Cuba.The bullying tactic is transparent: by tightening restrictions on energy supplies and effectively cutting off external support, Washington has brought Cuba’s economic crisis to breaking point. Cuba produces only 40 per cent of the oil it needs and the US has choked all possible imports. The resulting shortages have plunged the island nation into darkness and driven its citizens to desperation.This is where the Venezuela parallel is revealing. The idea is not to dismantle the existing state apparatus but to replace some key figures in it so that Cuba’s economic policy may be bent to America’s advantage. The strategy, if it worked, would allow Trump to claim success without the risks, complexities or costs of attempting a fuller transformation. The campaign will possibly be cloaked in the language of freedom and democracy, but nothing could be farther from the real agenda — to pry open the Cuban economy to American investments and commercial engagement on terms favourable to Trump’s crony capitalists. Yet Cuba presents a more complicated landscape than Trump can perhaps fathom. Political authority in the island nation is not concentrated in a single individual but distributed across the Communist Party, the government and the military. This structure makes it more resilient to external pressure and less susceptible to abrupt internal reconfiguration. The Cuban leadership has firmly rejected any negotiation with its political system, framing such demands as a violation of its sovereignty.The history of this pushback is crucial. Cuba’s political identity has been forged in the fire of opposition to US intervention. The memory of pre-Castro periods of domination — when Washington exercised direct and indirect control over the island — is deeply embedded in both state narratives and the public consciousness. What is now being proposed echoes those dynamics, even if couched in transactional terms.For the moment, Cuba is on the backburner because the war in Iran has gone off-script. It has dragged on longer than the aggressors had anticipated and extracted costs way beyond their calculations. The asymmetric war has not just stretched the mighty US militarily but has also imposed humongous economic costs on the world — and forced the Trump administration to hold off on its broader imperialist agenda.Iran’s refusal to yield to Trump’s threats and the damage it has managed to inflict upon America’s allies in the Gulf, on Israel and their sympathisers by weaponising the Strait of Hormuz has forced this recalibration of US priorities. But the delay should not be mistaken for a change of direction. If anything, the difficulties encountered in Iran may increase the appeal of pursuing more immediate and visible success closer home.Cuba, already weakened by sustained economic pressure, may be seen as an opportunity to achieve the kind of quick outcome that has proven elusive in Iran. A decisive move against Havana could be presented domestically as a demonstration of strength and effectiveness, deflecting attention away from the frustrations and anger of a prolonged conflict in West Asia.Tempting as it might seem to Trump and his advisors, even this calculation would be risky. It underestimates the resilience of the Cuban state and the potential consequences of external intervention. Cuba’s political system, while under strain, remains cohesive and supported by institutions that have weathered decades of pressure. Its security apparatus is experienced, and its leadership is unlikely to capitulate under threat. Any attempt to force change from the outside would likely provoke strong resistance, not only from the state but also from segments of the population for whom national sovereignty remains a powerful mobilising force.The Trump administration’s regime-change forays are not winning the US any friends in the world. And a move on Cuba is more likely to generate a broader diplomatic backlash and complicate relations with allies than isolating Cuba.In any case, efforts to impose political change from the outside often end up strengthening the very systems they aim to weaken. In Cuba’s case, external pressure has historically reinforced a siege mentality that legitimises centralised control and limits space for internal reform. By intensifying pressure, Washington risks entrenching these dynamics rather than effecting a transformation to its own advantage.Trump may believe that Cuba can deliver a quick and symbolic victory, especially in contrast to the drawn out and costly confrontation with Iran. But to believe this is to misread the island nation’s internal dynamics and its history. Cuba is not an empty stage on which external powers can easily script political outcomes. It is a state with its own institutions, its own political logic and a long history of resisting precisely this kind of intervention. The danger lies not only in the possibility of conflict but in the assumptions that make such a conflict appear attractive. Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here.
    Read more

  • Hat och hot mot ungdomspolitiker – Steven fick dödshot på posten
    Steven Nordvall är avgående språkrör för Grön Ungdom. Under sin tid som ungdomspolitiker har han under lång tid fått hot och han larmar nu om ett allt hårdare klimat.
    Read more

  • El laboratorio sueco que disecciona todas las guerras del mundo
    Therese Pettersson es unade las responsables delPrograma de Datos deConflictos, un centro fun-dado en los años 70 conregistros desde 1946 queanaliza todas las guerras,las que aparecen en losmedios y las “olvidadas”:“En los últimos añosvemos niveles crecientesde violencia dirigidaexplícitamente contraciviles”, avisa
    Read more

  • Lessons from a mindless ‘war of choice’ and why military might cannot force regime change
    Read more

  • Mindfulness and how we can use it for student learning
    Mindfulness enjoys a lot of popularity these days. In this episode, we talk to Professor Karen Brounéus (Uppsala University) about how we can integrate mindfulness exercises into our classrooms and how mindfulness can assist student learning. Not only has Karen been using mindfulness in her own peace and conflict studies courses, but she also offers mindfulness training to Swedish members of parliament. Karen shows how a lay person can make of these techniques and even offers an example of how this can be done. 
    Read more

Last modified:

FOLLOW UPPSALA UNIVERSITY ON

Uppsala University on Facebook
Uppsala University on Instagram
Uppsala University on Youtube
Uppsala University on Linkedin