
Trust, but verify? – Two centuries of arms control verification

Magnus Öberg, Director of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP); leader of the AMC working group on Data on Nuclear Rivalries, Negotiations, and Agreements

Siri Jansson, member of the AMC working group on Data on Nuclear Rivalries, Negotiations, and Agreements
How do states know that others are keeping their promises? A new study based on the Alva Myrdal Centre's AMC Data shows that verification in arms control is a surprisingly recent invention. It is also more fragile today than at any point since the Cold War.
Verification may seem like a given in arms control. Inspectors visit missile bases, satellites watch test sites, and international organizations account for fissile material down to the last gram. For most of the history of arms control, though, none of this existed.
In a forthcoming book chapter, we use the AMC Data platform to trace verification across 129 arms control agreements from 1817 to 2025. The picture that emerges is one of slow beginnings, a remarkable expansion, and now a worrying decline.
A century without verification
Of the 129 agreements in our data, 104 contain at least one weapon-specific obligation that could, in principle, be verified. Only 41 actually include verification mechanisms or establish a relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
For the first hundred years, there was nothing to verify with. The St Petersburg Declaration of 1868 had no verification provisions. Neither did the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical and biological weapons in war, nor the Washington and London naval treaties of the interwar years. States relied on good faith, published shipbuilding plans and the watchful eyes of naval attachés.
The first verification mechanism in our data appears in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. It was imposed on a defeated Germany, and Allied commissions were free to go anywhere on German territory. Even this intrusive regime didn't stop Germany from evading restrictions through secret military cooperation with the Soviet Union. More ambitious proposals for international inspection bodies were discussed at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932–34, but the conference collapsed before any were adopted.
The Cold War: from satellites to inspectors on the ground
Mutually agreed verification only becomes common after the Second World War. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 opened installations on the continent to inspection by other parties. Several later multilateral treaties also provided for inspections, among them the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. None of the latter mentioned, however, created the institutions needed to carry out inspections, and these mechanisms have never been used.
The real innovations came from two directions. The Non-Proliferation Treaty delegated verification to a dedicated international body, the IAEA, whose safeguards remain the backbone of nuclear verification today. In the US–Soviet relationship, verification expanded step by step. The 1972 Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty relied solely on "national technical means", mainly satellite surveillance. By 1987, the INF Treaty contained nine distinct verification mechanisms. It was also the first US–Soviet nuclear agreement with systematic on-site inspections.
Where things stand today
Much of this architecture is now suspended or gone. Russia withdrew from the CFE Treaty in 2023, and NATO members responded by suspending their participation. The Open Skies Treaty remains formally in force, but has largely stopped operating since the US and Russian withdrawals. New START inspections were suspended in 2023 and the treaty expired in February 2026. The inspection regime under the Iran nuclear deal is effectively defunct along with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Some regimes continue to work, often quietly. IAEA safeguards remain in operation. The Brazilian–Argentine agency ABACC carried out 112 inspections in 2024. Inspections under the Antarctic Treaty continue. The CTBT's global monitoring network is being built out to 321 stations and 16 laboratories, even though the treaty itself has not entered into force.
Two lessons
First, verification on paper is not the same as verification in practice. A surprisingly large share of the mechanisms written into treaties have never been activated. Second, the regimes that last tend to be those backed by permanent institutions with staff, budgets and clear mandates. The NPT and the IAEA safeguards system remain the clearest example.
Explore the data
The findings in this post draw on AMC Data, our free online database of arms control agreements. On the platform you can:
- read agreement profiles that summarize each treaty's obligations, verification mechanisms and associated organizations in a standard format
- use the Control System Catalogue to filter all agreements by type of verification, for example every treaty with on-site inspections
- download the datasets, including the Verified Compliance Dataset, for your own research or teaching
Explore more AMC Data at amcdata.uu.se. The comprehensive study will be published in Verification in Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Getting to Compliance. This volume, edited by Armend Bekaj & Peter Wallensteen, features contributions from AMC's wide range of experts and will be available in December 2026 from Routledge (https://www.routledge.com/Verification-in-Nuclear-Disarmament-and-Non-Proliferation-Getting-to-Compliance/Bekaj-Wallensteen/p/book/9781041223535).