Andrew Reisner

Short presentation

I am a professor in practical philosophy. Most of my research has been in the fields of normativity, both theoretical and practical, and value theory. I held a Vetenskapsrådet grant from 2019 to 2022 for the research project, 'Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Reasons for Belief'. My book, A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons is under contract with OUP. I was a visiting scholar at the Center for Adavnced Study, Oslo for most of 2023/2024.

Biography

My first post in philosophy was as a visiting assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins University, after which I joined McGill University as an assistant professor and where I later an associate professor. I joined the department at Uppsala University in autumn 2015. My first degree was in classics from Middlebury College, after which I read for an M.A. in philosophy at Bristol University under the supervision of Andrew Pyle and James Ladyman. I went on to read for D.Phil in Philosophy at Oxford University under the supervision of John Broome. I have held visiting fellowships or lectureships at CAS Oslo, the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Lund University, the University of Oxford, and Stockholm University. I have also been an academic visitor at the ANU. My primary research interests are in theoretical and practical reason and value theory. My (in progress) monograph, A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons, is under contract with OUP. I was a core participant in the CAS Oslo funded project, 'The Profoundest Problem', which investigates conflicts between moral and prudential reasons: https://cas-nor.no/project/profoundest-problem-ethics-profound.

At present my main research focus is on doxastic oughts and reasons, the dualism of practical reason (between requirements of morality and requirements of self-interest), and questions about the fundamentality of different normative properties.

In addition to my primary research interest, I am working on papers about Plato's ethical theory, the metaphysics of photographs, and the nature and properties of rational requirements.

Publications

Books (authored)

A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons. Under contract with OUP

Books (edited)

Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, a co-edited volume with Iwao Hirose. Oxford University Press: Oxford (2015).

Reasons for Belief, a co-edited volume with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011).

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

'Moral reasons, prudential reasons, ought all-things considered, and the project of de-moralisation'. In Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl & Attila Tanyi, Problems of Choice: Normativity, Rationality, Axiology, and Morality. London: Routledge (forthcoming).

'Against the First Views: Why None of Reasons, Fittingness, or Values are First'. In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster, Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University (2023).

'Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth'. Philosophical Topics 51 (2):53-72 (2023).

& Wallbank, Rebecca. 'Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief' in Epistemic Duties, Kevin McRae and Scott Stapleford (eds), Routledge: London (2020).

& Cuneo, Terence and Bengson, John. ‘The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism’. The Journal of Moral Philosophy (17): 471 to 478 (2020).

& Michaelson, Eliot. ‘Ethics for Fish’ in The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, Anne Barnhill, Mark Budoflson, and Tyler Doggett (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (2018).

‘Two Theses about the Distinctness of Theoretical and Practical Normativity’ in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (2018).

‘Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press (2018).

‘Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against’. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter (2016).

& Van Weelden, Joseph. ‘Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism’. Logos and Episteme (VI): 429-448 (2015).

‘Fittingness, Value, and trans-World Attitudes’. Philosophical Quarterly (260): 1-22 (2015).

“Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Preface” with Iwao Hirose, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

‘A Short Refutation of Strict Evidentialism’. Inquiry (5):1-9 (2014).

'Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?', Organon F, 20, no 4, special volume on the enkratic principle (2013), pp 436-462.

'Leaps of Knowledge' in The Aim of Belief, Timothy Chan (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp 167-183.

'Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?', Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 34-53.

'Introduction' with Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen in Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 1-10.

'Metaethics for Everyone'. Problema, 4, special volume on the philosophy Ronald Dworkin (2010), pp 39-64.

'Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 4, (2009), pp.379-395.

'Unifying the Requirements of Rationality'. Philosophical Explorations, 12:3 (2009).

'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Philosophical Studies, 145, 2, pp. 257-272 (2009).

'Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief'. Philosophical Studies, 138, 1, pp.17-27 (2008).

'Does Friendship Give us non-Derivative Partial Reasons?'. Les ateliers de l’éthique, 3, 1, pp.70-79 (2007.

'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game'. Theoria, 78, 4, pp. 304-16 (2007).

Book Reviews

Review of The Domain of Reasons (2011, OUP) by John Skorupski. For Philosophical Review, 122 (3), (2013), pp. 661-664.

Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries

'Normativity: A Unit of', The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2021).

‘Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2013).

‘John Broome’, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

Unpublished Cited Works

'Why Rational Requirements Are Not Normative Requirements'

'Anchoring Diachronic Rationality'