Andrew Reisner

Short presentation

I am a professor in practical philosophy. Most of my research has been in the fields of normativity and value theory. I held a Vetenskapsrådet grant from 2019 to 2022 for the research project, 'Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Reasons for Belief'. My book (in progress), A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons is under contract with OUP. I am a visiting scholar at CAS for most of 2023/2024 in assocation with the PROFOUND project.

Biography

My first post in philosophy was as a visiting assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins University, after which I joined McGill University as an assistant professor and where I later an associate professor. I joined the department at Uppsala in autumn 2015. My first degree was in classics from Middlebury College, after which I read for an M.A. in philosophy at Bristol University under the supervision of Andrew Pyle and James Ladyman and then a D.Phil in Philosophy at Oxford University under the supervision of John Broome. I have held or have scheduled visiting fellowships or lectureships at CAS Oslo, the CSMN, Lund University, Oxford University, and Stockholm University and have been an academic visitor at the ANU. My primary research interests are in theoretical and practical reason and value theory. I recently completed a Veteskapsrådet-funded three year project (2019-2022), 'Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Reasons for Belief'. The resulting monograph, A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons, is under contract with OUP. I am a core participant in the CAS Oslo funded project, 'The Profoundest Problem', which investigates conflicts between moral and prudential reasons: https://cas-nor.no/project/profoundest-problem-ethics-profound. This is a central focus of my upcoming research, especially in connection to problems related to state obligations to mitigate climate change.

In addition to work in normativity, value theory, and normative epsitemology, I am also interested in philosophy of photography.

Publications

Books (authored)

A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons. Under contract with OUP

Books (edited)

Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, a co-edited volume with Iwao Hirose. Oxford University Press: Oxford (2015).

Reasons for Belief, a co-edited volume with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011).

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

& Wallbank, Rebecca. 'Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief' in Epistemic Duties, Kevin McRae and Scott Stapleford (eds), Routledge: London (2020).

& Cuneo, Terence and Bengson, John. ‘The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism’. The Journal of Moral Philosophy (17): 471 to 478 (2020).

& Michaelson, Eliot. ‘Fish’ in T he Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, Anne Barnhill, Mark Budoflson, and Tyler Doggett (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (2018).

‘Two Theses about the Distinctness of Theoretical and Practical Normativity’ in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (2018).

‘Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press (2018).

‘Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against’. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter (2016).

& Van Weelden, Joseph. ‘Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism’. Logos and Episteme (VI): 429-448 (2015).

‘Fittingness, Value, and trans-World Attitudes’. Philosophical Quarterly (260): 1-22 (2015).

“Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Preface” with Iwao Hirose, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

‘A Short Refutation of Strict Evidentialism’. Inquiry (5):1-9 (2014).

'Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?', Organon F, 20, no 4, special volume on the enkratic principle (2013), pp 436-462.

'Leaps of Knowledge' in The Aim of Belief, Timothy Chan (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp 167-183.

'Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?', Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 34-53.

'Introduction' with Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen in Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 1-10.

'Metaethics for Everyone'. Problema, 4, special volume on the philosophy Ronald Dworkin (2010), pp 39-64.

'Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 4, (2009), pp.379-395.

'Unifying the Requirements of Rationality'. Philosophical Explorations, 12:3 (2009).

'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Philosophical Studies, 145, 2, pp. 257-272 (2009).

'Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief'. Philosophical Studies, 138, 1, pp.17-27 (2008).

'Does Friendship Give us non-Derivative Partial Reasons?'. Les ateliers de l’éthique, 3, 1, pp.70-79 (2007.

'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game'. Theoria, 78, 4, pp. 304-16 (2007).

Book Reviews

Review of The Domain of Reasons (2011, OUP) by John Skorupski. For Philosophical Review, 122 (3), (2013), pp. 661-664.

Encyclopedia and Dictionary Entries

'Normativity: A Unit of', The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (forthcoming).

‘Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2013).

‘John Broome’, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

Unpublished Cited Works

'Why Rational Requirements Are Not Normative Requirements'

'Anchoring Diachronic Rationality'