Sanctions alone may not stop nuclear proliferation - smart inducements might

The world seems to be on a slippery slope towards a new nuclear arms race. The erosion of U.S.–Russia arms control agreements, recent attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, and the war in Ukraine have reignited fears of nuclear sabre-rattling. As global trust in multilateral mechanisms declines, politicians and policymakers are once again turning to sanctions as their default tool of control. This is an intuitive policy response in international relations which often does not produce results. It also betrays a rather poor and uncreative mode of thinking on how to tackle complex proliferation challenges of today.

In a recent policy brief I wrote together with Professor Peter Wallensteen, we argue that sanctions alone rarely deliver disarmament. Instead, they often reinforce the resolve of targeted regimes and deepen international divides. What is needed is a more nuanced strategy — one that balances coercive measures with inducements.

The limits of coercion

Since the early days of the Cold War, sanctions have been used to influence states’ behaviour across a range of issues — from ending civil wars to curbing terrorism. Within the nuclear field, they have been a preferred tool for non-proliferation enforcement, as per Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Yet their record is sobering. Among states subjected to major nuclear-related sanctions, only Libya and South Africa ultimately abandoned their weapons programmes voluntarily. Others, such as Iran, remain ambiguous cases, while Iraq and Syria gave up their nuclear ambitions only after military intervention. In other words, the success rate of sanctions alone hovers at around 20–30% — roughly the same as in other policy domains.

Further, sanctions may have inadvertent effects. They can generate a “rally around the flag” momentum, enabling targeted governments to frame foreign pressure as proof of national victimhood. This can strengthen authoritarian legitimacy and delay the very reforms that sanctions aim to provoke.

The promise of inducements

Positive sanctions or inducements deserve far more attention. These can include diplomatic recognition, development aid, trade incentives, or security guarantees in exchange for verified disarmament steps.

This approach is not naïve idealism. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, for instance, showed that the offer of concessions can produce real negotiations and verifiable results. The logic aligns with well-known conflict-resolution frameworks such as the “Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction” (GRIT) model and tit-for-tat strategies from game theory, both of which emphasize reciprocity over coercion.

Inducements can help break isolation and foster internal divisions within the targeted state, empowering actors who see benefits in cooperation rather than confrontation. They also help lay the groundwork for long-term reintegration into the international community, something punishment alone can never achieve.

The future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) may well depend on such creativity. As Peter and I emphasized in our recent book, durable peace stems not from coercion alone but from reciprocal trust and reintegration. This is a lesson as urgent today as at any point since the atomic age began.

In order to ensure a robust international non-proliferation regime, the following recommendations should be considered by policymakers:

1. Communicate clearly and consistently. Sanctions should have explicit goals and criteria for lifting them. Mixed messages (such as U.S. ambivalence toward India and Pakistan’s nuclear programmes in the past) undermine credibility.
2. Pair sanctions with inducements. Creative diplomacy, economic incentives, and credible security guarantees can transform sanctions from blunt punishment into stepping stones for negotiation.
3. Ensure monitoring and reciprocity. Agreements must include transparent verification and the possibility of reinstating sanctions if commitments are broken.

These steps would help transform sanctions into part of a broader process of negotiation that include inducements, and not an end in themselves.