Looking Beyond the NPT Review Conference

An outcome document would not have addressed the fundamental challenges in the nuclear landscape. In many ways, the conference itself was overshadowed, taking place against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire between Iran and the USA. This is the latest chapter to a conflict that began in 2025 when Israel—a nuclear weapon state outside the NPT—and the USA bombed Iranian civilian nuclear facilities in an aggressive counterproliferation campaign in violation of international law. Meanwhile, during the last week of the conference, Russia—jointly with Belarus—launched large-scale exercises involving its nuclear forces. This was part of nuclear signalling linked to the war in Ukraine, which began over five years ago following Russia’s invasion of the non-nuclear weapon state, in violation of the Budapest Memorandum.

The lack of agreement nevertheless marks another blow to global nuclear order, especially damaging given the presence of constructive dialogue around certain issues during this review cycle. These included efforts to enhance transparency around reporting, in particular by nuclear weapon states with respect to their disarmament obligations. Positive engagement also centred on nuclear risk reduction initiatives that sought to develop mechanisms to prevent inadvertent escalation through miscalculation or misunderstanding. Among a wide swath of NPT states parties, there also had been interest in addressing risk linked to emerging technologies—in particular artificial intelligence. Discussions around these and other topics will continue, including outside the NPT context. Nevertheless, it remains concerning that states parties can evidently no longer produce a blueprint for action to coalesce around.

It is almost impossible to argue that the NPT’s three pillars—of disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—are being upheld in a meaningful way. Reductions to the global nuclear stockpile have stagnated over the last decade, and there are no more formal limitations in place following the expiration of New START. All nuclear weapon states are modernizing their arsenals, with some increasing their numbers while being less transparent about them. In addition, some non-nuclear weapon states are leaning further on these capabilities for their national security, engaging in discussions on alternative deterrence arrangements. For some, the proceedings reflected ‘diametrically opposed visions’ for the treaty. While there have not been any defections from the NPT since North Korea withdrew in 2003, there is risk that the treaty simply fades into irrelevance.

Trends in nuclear capabilities, investments, and related thinking will not change overnight. But no changes to current developments not only threatens the credibility of the treaty, long considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, but may lead to a future characterized by unhindered arms racing, frequent nuclear crisis, and the ever-present spectre of nuclear use.

To begin, what is required is some modicum of trust- and confidence-building among the nuclear-armed states. Some observed as a positive sign that the review conference featured significant direct engagement among the five NPT nuclear weapon states: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA. Hopefully this can enable continued exchange, in bilateral and multilateral settings, and dialogue that can mitigate the current worst-case thinking and the deteriorated strategic context.

It is also imperative that all states, including non-nuclear weapon states, take forward concrete risk reduction measures in regional and sub-regional security environments. Nuclear developments are only part of current tensions and militarization trends. More critical examinations of threat perceptions and mapping of conventional-nuclear entanglement scenarios can lessen action-reaction dynamics that can contribute to inadvertent escalation. These considerations are especially relevant in the Nordic region, where states are investing heavily into advanced conventional capabilities.

Related, there is a need for states to take a more systematic and holistic approach to how emerging technologies impact on nuclear risk. Recent and ongoing conflicts demonstrate that there exists a wider array of relevant capabilities—including offensive cyber capabilities, outer space systems, and advanced conventional precision strike capabilities—that can drive escalation, including by putting nuclear forces at risk. Intensifying discussions of multidomain operations and de-siloing governance processes can reverse longer term trends and lead eventually to the revitalization of arms control and disarmament efforts, including in the NPT context.