Matti Eklund

Kort presentation

Jag har varit anställd som lärostolsprofessor vid Uppsala universitet sedan 2013. De flesta av mina arbeten faller inom metafysik, språkfilosofi, och logikens filosofi. Min bok Choosing Normative Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2017) handlar främst om metaetik. Ett pågående forskningsprojekt, Alien Structure: Language and Reality, är finansierat av Vetenskapsrådet. En bok med samma titel har 2024 publicerats av Oxford University Press.

Extern hemsida

Biografi

Employment

Summer 2013 –, Chair Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Uppsala University.

Summer 2007 – Summer 2013, Associate Professor, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University.

Summer 2005 – Summer 2007, Assistant Professor, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University.

Spring 2009, Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University.

Summer 2002 – Summer 2005, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder.

Fall 2001 – Spring 2002, Adjunct teaching, Philosophy, Institute of Humanities, University of Iceland.

Fall 2000 – Summer 2001, Visiting Assistant Professor, William Paterson University of New Jersey.

Education

PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2000

Fil. mag. Stockholms universitet 1995

Fil. kand. Göteborgs universitet 1994

Monographs

- Alien Structure: Language and Reality Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2024.

- Choosing Normative Concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. (Symposium published in Inquiry. Reviews published or forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Ethics, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Philosophical Review, Utilitas and Pro-Fil.)

Forthcoming articles

- “Normative Concepts", in David Copp and Connie Rosati (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaethics, Oxford University Press.

- "Alternative Concepts, Ardor, and Elusive Questions", in Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), Normative Realism, Oxford University Press.

- "Logical Pluralism", in Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Ferrari, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi and Gila Sher (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press.

- "Representation, Alien Languages, and Linguistic Idealism", in Richard Gaskin (ed.), The Question of Idealism, Oxford University Press.

- "Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Innovation", Inquiry. Published online first 2024: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2384066.

Published articles

- "Normative Properties", in Anthony Fischer and Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Properties, Routledge, 2024.

- “Schmoughts for Naught? Reply to Vermaire", Journal of Philosophy 120 (2023): 392-8.

- “Should Moral Intuitionism Go Social?", Noûs 57 (2023). Coauthored with Marvin Backes and Eliot Michaelson.

- "Edwards on Truth Pluralism", Inquiry 66 (2023), in book symposium on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth. Published online 2022.

- “Carnapian Frameworks Revisited", in Panu Raatikainen (ed.), Essays in the Philosophy of Language, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 2023.

- “Possible Limits of Conceptual Engineering: Magnetism, Fixed Points and Inescapability", Argumenta 8 (2023).

- “Thomasson on Modal Language", in Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Thomasson on Ontology, Palgrave MacMillan, 2023.

- "Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy", in Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, Routledge, 2021.

- “Collapse and the Varieties of Quantifier Variance”, in James Miller (ed.), The Language of Ontology, Oxford University Press, 2021.

- "What is Deflationism About Truth?", Synthese 198 (2021): 631-45. Also printed in Douglas Edwards (ed.), Truth: A Contemporary Reader, Bloomsbury, 2019.

- “The Existence of Personites”, Philosophical Studies 177 (2020): 2051-71.

- "Reply to Critics", Inquiry 63 (2020): 535-561. In book symposium on Choosing Normative Concepts. Replies to contributions by Stephanie Leary, Kris McDaniel, Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett.

- "The Normative Pluriverse", Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (2020): 121-146.

- "Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics", in Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen and David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering, Oxford University Press, 2020.

- "The Metametaphysics of Neo-Fregeanism", in Ricki Bliss and James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, Routledge, 2020.

- “Inconsistency and Replacement”, Inquiry 62 (2019): 387-402. (Symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth.)

- "Alien Structure and Themes from Analytic Philosophy", Giornale di Metafisica 41 (2019): 195-208.

- "Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox", in Sergi Oms and Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

- "Reply to Bykvist and Olson", Utilitas 31 (2019): 347-349.

- "Ramsey and Alien Structure", in Tobias Hansson Wahlberg and Robin Stenwall (eds.), Maurinian Truths - Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday. Published by the Department of Philosophy, Lund University, 2019.

- "Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions", Synthese 196:1225-1247.

- "Modesty, Esotericism and Ineffability: Remarks on Hofweber", Analysis 78 (2018): 291-303.

- "Thickness and Evaluation" (critical notice of Pekka Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude, and the Nasty), Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2017): 89-104.

- “Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism”, in Philip Ebertand Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism, Oxford University Press, 2016.

- “Carnap’s Legacy for the Contemporary Metaontological Debate”, in Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap, 2016.

- “Kripke, normativitet och mening”, Filosofisk tidskrift (2016).

- “Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed Points”, in Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, 2015.

- “Replacing Truth?”, in Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics, Oxford University Press, 2014.

- “On Quantification and Ontology”, Oxford Handbooks Online (2014)

- “Carnap’s Metaontology”, Noûs 47 (2013): 229-49.

- “Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality”, in Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts, Oxford University Press, 2013.

- “Williams on the Normative Silence of Indeterminacy”, Analysis 73 (2013): 264-71.

- “Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy”, Metaphysica 14 (2013): 145-59.

- “Trends and Progress in Philosophy”, Metaphilosophy 44 (2013): 276-92.

- “The Multitude View on Logic”, in New Waves on Philosophy of Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian Russell, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

- “Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence”, Synthese 187: 833-47. (Special volume, The Philosophy of Logical Consequence and Inference, edited by Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren and Dag Westerståhl.)

- “Alternative Normative Concepts”, Analytic Philosophy 53 (2012): 139-57.

- “Theories of Truth”, in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell, Routledge, 2012.

- “Recent Work on Vagueness”, Analysis Reviews 71 (2011): 352-63.

- “Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol.6 (2011), edited by Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman.

- “What are Thick Concepts?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2011): 25-49.

- “Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy”, in Cuts and Clouds, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

- “Rejectionism About Truth”, in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

- “On Some Recent Criticisms of the ‘Linguistic’ Approach to Ontology”, Dialectica 63 (2009): 313-23.

- “The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon’s Moral Fictionalism”, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2009): 705-12.

- “Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy”, Synthese 170 (2009): 393-414. (Special issue focusing on the Bad Company objection to Neo-Fregean philosophy of arithmetic, edited by Øystein Linnebo.)

- “Förkastliga värdebegrepp och Karl Marx antimoralism”, Filosofisk Tidskrift (2009). (In Swedish.)

- “Carnap and Ontological Pluralism”, in Metametaphysics, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, Oxford University Press, 2009.

- “Reality and Thought”, in John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy, Blackwell, 2009.

- “Reply to Beall and Priest”, Australasian Journal of Logic 6 (2008): 94-106. (Available on the web at http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008/2008_8.pdf)

- “The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages”, in The Revenge of the Liar, edited by J.C. Beall, Oxford University Press, 2008.

- “Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2008): 117-40.

- “Putnam on Ontology”, Maria Uxia Rivas Monroy, Concepcion Martinez Vidal and Celeste Cancela (eds.), Following Putnam's Trail: On Realism and Other Issues, Rodopi, 2008. (Proceedings from Conference on Hilary Putnam’s pragmatism in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 2004.)

- “The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability”, Philosophical Topics 35 (2007): 115-34. (Actual date of publication: 2010.)

- “The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump”, in Ted Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell, 2007.

- “Meaning-Constitutivity”, Inquiry 50 (2007): 559-74. Special issue edited by Douglas Patterson.

- “Characterizing Vagueness”, Philosophical Compass, November 2007.

- “Sider on Existence”, Noûs 41 (2007): 519-28. (With David Liebesman.)

- “Fictionalism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism, 2007. Revised version 2011.

- “Neo-Fregean Ontology”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics, (2006), ed. John Hawthorne.

- “Metaontology” Philosophy Compass, Blackwell, March 2006.

- “Schiffer on Vagueness” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 12-23.

- “The Liar Paradox and Metaphysics”, in J. Skilters, M. Eklund, O. Jonsson and O. Wiegand (eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication), University of Latvia Press, Riga, Latvia, 2006, pp. 25-31.

- “Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 557-79. [Italian translation, “Finzione, Indifferenziae Ontologia” published in Rivistadi Estetica 32 (2006): 71-92.]

- “What Vagueness Consists In”, Philosophical Studies 125 (2005): 27-60.

- “Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy”, The Monist 87 (2004): 489-511. Special issue on personal identity, edited by Tamar Gendler and Dean Zimmerman.

- “Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence”, Noûs 36 (2002): 465-85.

- “Inconsistent Languages”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 251-75.

- “Deep Inconsistency”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 321-31.

- “A Vindication of Tarski’s Claims About the Liar Paradox”, in Timothy Childers and Ondrej Majer (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2001, Prague: Filosofia, pp. 49-55. (Proceedings of the Logica 2001 Conference in Zahradky, Czech Republic.)

- “Is Hintikka’s Logic First-Order?”, Synthese 131 (2002): 371-88. (With Daniel Kolak.)

- “Peter van Inwagen on Material Beings”, Ratio 15 (2002): 245-56.

- “Paradoxer: en allmän diagnos”, Filosofisk tidskrift 23 (2002): 42-52.

- “Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic Overdetermination”, Dialectica 55 (2001): 363-78.

- “The Aims of Logical Empiricism as a Philosophy of Science”, Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 137-59.

- “On How Logic Became First-Order”, Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1996): 147-67.

Book reviews

- Review of Oystein Linnebo, Thin Objects, Oxford University Press, 2018, Philosophical Review 130 (2021).

- Review of Simon Kirchin, Thick Evaluation, Oxford University Press, 2017, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2018).

- Review of Amie Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy, Oxford University Press, 2015, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2017).

- Review of Nikolaj Pedersen and Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press, 2013, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014).

- Review of Alexis Burgess and John Burgess, Truth, Princeton University Press, 2011, History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2012): 106-8.

- Review of Eli Hirsch, Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology, Oxford University Press, 2011, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Available on the web at http://ndpr.nd.edu)

- Review of Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 752-4.

- Review of Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, Routledge, 2007, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2008). (Available on the web at http://ndpr.nd.edu)

- Review of Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press, 2006, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007). (Available on the web at http://ndpr.nd.edu)

- Review of Stewart Shapiro, Vagueness in Context, Oxford University Press, 2006. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2006). (Available on the web at http://ndpr.nd.edu)

- Review of Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences, Harvard University Press, 2003. Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 288-92.

- Review of William Alston (ed.), Realism and Antirealism, Cornell University Press, 2002. Dialogue 44 (2005): 786-88.

- Review of J.C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps, Oxford University Press, 2003. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2004). (Available on the web at http://ndpr.nd.edu)

Edited volumes

- J. Skilters, M. Eklund, O. Jónsson and O. Wiegand (eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication), University of Latvia Press, Riga, Latvia, 2006. Proceedings from Conference on Paradoxes, Riga, Latvia, November 2005.

- S. Lapointe, M. Eklund and A. Thomasson (eds.), 200 Years of Analytic Philosophy. Proceedings of the 4th Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication, in The Baltic Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2008.