Andrew Reisner
Professor vid Filosofiska institutionen; Praktisk filosofi; Anställda
- E-post:
- andrew.reisner@filosofi.uu.se
- Besöksadress:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postadress:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
Publikationer
Senaste publikationer
-
Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth
Ingår i Philosophical Topics, s. 53-72, 2023
-
Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
Ingår i Value, Morality & Social Reality, s. 383-402, Lund University Open Access, 2023
- DOI för Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
-
Trust, Testimony and Reasons for Belief
Ingår i Epistemic Duties, Routledge, 2021
-
The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism
Ingår i Journal of Moral Philosophy, s. 471-498, 2020
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, s. 189-208, Oxford University Press, 2018
Alla publikationer
Artiklar i tidskrift
-
Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth
Ingår i Philosophical Topics, s. 53-72, 2023
-
The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism
Ingår i Journal of Moral Philosophy, s. 471-498, 2020
-
Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
Ingår i The Philosophical Quarterly, s. 1-22, 2015
-
Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism
Ingår i Logos & Episteme, s. 429-448, 2015
Kapitel i böcker, delar av antologi
-
Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
Ingår i Value, Morality & Social Reality, s. 383-402, Lund University Open Access, 2023
- DOI för Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Against the 'First' Views: Why none of Reasons, Fittingness, or Value are First
-
Trust, Testimony and Reasons for Belief
Ingår i Epistemic Duties, Routledge, 2021
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, s. 189-208, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, s. 705-728, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
Ingår i Normativity, s. 221-240, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against
Ingår i Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, s. 95-114, Walter de Gruyter, 2016
-
Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity
Ingår i Weighing and Reasoning, s. 189-206, Oxford University Press, 2015
-
Ingår i International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013
Samlingsverk (redaktörskap)
-
Weiging and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome
Oxford University Press, 2015