Jessica Pepp
Forskare vid Filosofiska institutionen; Teoretisk filosofi; Övrigt verksamma
- E-post:
- jessica.pepp@filosofi.uu.se
- Besöksadress:
- Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Postadress:
- Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA
Publikationer
Urval av publikationer
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, s. 613-630, Oxford University Press, 2024
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Ingår i The Routledge Handbook of Fiction and Belief, Routledge, 2024
-
The size of a lie: from truthlikeness to sincerity
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 1-24, 2024
-
On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 246-274, 2023
- DOI för On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
-
Why we should keep talking about fake news
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 471-487, 2022
-
Towards a sensible bifurcationism (concerning what grounds thought about particulars)
Ingår i Theoria, s. 348-364, 2022
-
Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
Ingår i Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments, s. 106-127, Routledge, 2022
- DOI för Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
-
Ingår i The Philosophy of Online Manipulation, s. 91-107, Routledge, 2022
-
What is the commitment in lying?
Ingår i Journal of Philosophy, s. 673-686, 2022
-
Online Communication: Eliot Michaelson, Jessica Pepp, and Rachel Sterken uncover a new speech act
Ingår i Philosophers Magazine, s. 90-95, 2021
-
Assertion, Lying and Untruthfully Implicating
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, s. 829-850, Oxford University Press, 2020
-
Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
Ingår i Theoria, s. 801-820, 2020
- DOI för Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
-
Ingår i Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, s. 67-94, 2019
-
Ingår i Acquaintance, Oxford University Press, 2019
-
The Problem of First-Person Aboutness
Ingår i Croatian Journal of Philosophy, s. 521-541, 2019
-
The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction
Ingår i British Journal of Aesthetics, s. 289-304, 2019
-
What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
Ingår i Erkenntnis, s. 741-759, 2019
- DOI för What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
-
Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False
Ingår i Lying, s. 43-64, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Ingår i Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
A Unified Treatment of (Pro-)Nominals in Ordinary English
Ingår i On Reference, Oxford University Press, 2015
-
2012
-
Reference and Referring: A Framework
Ingår i Reference and Referring, s. 1-32, MIT Press, 2012
Senaste publikationer
-
Ingår i Conversations Online, s. 400-420, Oxford University Press, 2025
-
(Co-)Reference All the Way Down: A Unified Theory of (Pro) Nominals in Ordinary English
Ingår i Theoria, 2025
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, s. 613-630, Oxford University Press, 2024
-
Ingår i The Routledge Handbook of Fiction and Belief, Routledge, 2024
-
The size of a lie: from truthlikeness to sincerity
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 1-24, 2024
Alla publikationer
Artiklar i tidskrift
-
(Co-)Reference All the Way Down: A Unified Theory of (Pro) Nominals in Ordinary English
Ingår i Theoria, 2025
-
The size of a lie: from truthlikeness to sincerity
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 1-24, 2024
-
On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 246-274, 2023
- DOI för On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av On pictorially mediated mind-object relations
-
Why we should keep talking about fake news
Ingår i Inquiry, s. 471-487, 2022
-
Towards a sensible bifurcationism (concerning what grounds thought about particulars)
Ingår i Theoria, s. 348-364, 2022
-
What is the commitment in lying?
Ingår i Journal of Philosophy, s. 673-686, 2022
-
Online Communication: Eliot Michaelson, Jessica Pepp, and Rachel Sterken uncover a new speech act
Ingår i Philosophers Magazine, s. 90-95, 2021
-
Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
Ingår i Theoria, s. 801-820, 2020
- DOI för Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness-Fixing Explanatory?
-
Ingår i Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, s. 67-94, 2019
-
The Problem of First-Person Aboutness
Ingår i Croatian Journal of Philosophy, s. 521-541, 2019
-
The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction
Ingår i British Journal of Aesthetics, s. 289-304, 2019
-
What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
Ingår i Erkenntnis, s. 741-759, 2019
- DOI för What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought
Doktorsavhandlingar, monografi
Kapitel i böcker, delar av antologi
-
Ingår i Conversations Online, s. 400-420, Oxford University Press, 2025
-
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, s. 613-630, Oxford University Press, 2024
-
Ingår i The Routledge Handbook of Fiction and Belief, Routledge, 2024
-
Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
Ingår i Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments, s. 106-127, Routledge, 2022
- DOI för Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
- Ladda ner fulltext (pdf) av Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance in Public Conversations
-
Ingår i The Philosophy of Online Manipulation, s. 91-107, Routledge, 2022
-
Assertion, Lying and Untruthfully Implicating
Ingår i The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, s. 829-850, Oxford University Press, 2020
-
Ingår i Acquaintance, Oxford University Press, 2019
-
Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems About Saying What You Think is False
Ingår i Lying, s. 43-64, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Ingår i Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford University Press, 2018
-
A Unified Treatment of (Pro-)Nominals in Ordinary English
Ingår i On Reference, Oxford University Press, 2015
-
Reference and Referring: A Framework
Ingår i Reference and Referring, s. 1-32, MIT Press, 2012