Folke Tersman

Kort presentation

Jag är professor i filosofi vid Filosofiska institutionen i Uppsala samt stf. VD för Institutet för framtidsstudier i Stockholm. Jag är också ledamot i Vetenskapsrådets styrelse samt i Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien. Jag är vidare PI för forskningsprojektet Dold konvergens i etiken som finansieras genom ett anslag från Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. För mer information, se biografin.

Biografi

Född 1964. Jag doktorerade i Stockholm 1993 men tillbringade en del av forskarutbildningen vid Cornell University. Innan jag kom till Uppsala var jag associate professor vid The University of Auckland, New Zealand (2005-2007), samt professor, forskarassistent och lektor vid Stockholms universitet (1995-2005). Jag har också varit gästforskare vid Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (1999), vikarierande professor vid Göteborgs universitet (2002-2003), samt gästprofessor vid The University of Sydney (2014-2015).

Jag var prefekt för Filosofiska institutionen i Uppsala mellan 2010 och 2017 och prodekan för Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten 2017 och 2018. Jag är för närvarande ledamot i Vetenskapsrådets styrelse samt stf. VD för Institutet för framtidsstudier.

Sedan 2019 är jag ledamot i Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien. Jag är dessutom ledamot i Academia Europaea samt i Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala.

Jag är PI för projektet "Dold konvergens i etiken" (2024-2027) som finansieras genom ett anslag från Riksbankens jubileumsfond.

Nya publikationer

• "Seeking a Reflective Equilibrium in the Face of Disagreement", Synthese 204, 2024. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04729-2.
• ‘Moral Disagreement’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement-moral/>

Böcker (engelska)

• Moral Disagreement. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 (pocketutgåva 2009). Se en recension av boken i Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews här.
• Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993.

Artiklar och antologibidrag (peer reviewed, engelska)

• ‘Skepticism and Moral Disagreement’ (w. Olle Risberg), in Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter and Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Disagreement, London: Routledge, 2024.
• ‘Hope for the evolutionary debunker: How evolutionary debunking arguments and arguments from moral disagreement can join forces’ (w. Olle Risberg), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022, DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y.
• ‘Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism’ (w. Olle Risberg), International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, 2020, 283-303. DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10017.
• ‘Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence’ (w. Olle Risberg), in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020, 97-114.
• ‘From Scepticism to Anti-Realism’, dialectica 73 (3), 2019, 411-27, DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12276.
• ‘A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism’ (w. Olle Risberg), Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2), 2019, 189-207. DOI: 10.1017/apa.2019.3.
• "Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics", Philosophy Compass 13 (6), 2018, 1-10, DOI: 10.111/phc3.12493.
• “Debunking and Disagreement”, Noûs 51 (4), 2017, 754-74, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135.
• “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge”. In Moral Skepticism: New Essays (ed. D. Machuca), London: Routledge, 2017, 183-97.
• "Explaining the reliability of moral beliefs". In Explanation in Ethics and Mathematic: Debunking and Dispensability (eds. U. Leibowitz, and N. Sinclair), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 37-57.
• "Disagreement. Ethics and Elsewhere", Erkenntnis 79, 2014, 55-72.
• "Disagreement, Moral", in International Encyclopedia of Ethics (eds. Hugh LaFolette, John Deigh and Sarah Stroud), Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
• "Methodology in Metaethics", in International Encyclopedia of Ethics (eds. Hugh LaFolette, John Deigh and Sarah Stroud), Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
• "Moral Disagreement: Actual vs Possible", in D. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, London: Routledge, 2013, 90-108.
• "Intuitional Disagreement", Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, 2012, 639-59.
• "The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology", Philosophical Topics 38, 2010, 181-204.
• "Contrasts and Demons: On Sinnott-Armstrong's moderate Pyrrhonian scepticism", in L. Haaparanta (ed.), Rearticulations of Reasons. Recent Currents. Acta Philosophica Fennica 88, 2010, 243-60.
• "The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, 2008, 389-405.
• "Ethics and Film", in Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, eds. P. Livingston and C. Plantinga, London: Routledge, 2008, 111-20.
• "Are We Lovers of the Good?", Synthese 138, 2004, 247-60.
• "Davidson and Quine's Empiricism", in Interpreting Davidson, eds. P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal, San Fransisco: CSLI Publishers, 2001, 269-83.
• "Cannibals, Communists and Cognitivists", Theoria 65, 1999, 70-85.
• "Quine on Ethics", Theoria 64, 1998, 84-98.
• "Stimulus Meaning Debunked", Erkenntnis 49, 1998, 371-85.
• "Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement", Philosophical Quarterly 48, 1998, 359-65.
• "Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency", Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, 1995, 361-71.
• "Coherence and Disagreement", Philosophical Studies 65, 1992, 305-17.
• "Utilitarianism and the Idea of Reflective Equilibrium", Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, 1991, 395-406.

Böcker (svenska)

• Tillsammans. En filosofisk debattbok om hur vi kan rädda vårt klimat, Bonnier Fakta, 2009. För en essä i DN som diskuterar boken, följ denna länk.
• Hur bör du leva?, Wahlström & Widstrand, 2004 (pocketutgåva 2005).
• Fem filosofiska frågor, Wahlström & Widstrand, 2001 (pocketutgåva 2003).

Böcker som Tersman är medförfattare till (svenska)

• Tillåt mig tvivla (m. Stefan Einhorn), Natur & Kultur, 2023.
• Folk & vilja (m. Torbjörn Tännsjö), Fri tanke förlag, 2020.
• Filosofiska frågor (med H. Ahlenius, S. Carlshamre, B. Haglund och B. Molander), Utbildningsradions förlag, 1998.
• Argumentationsanalys (med G. Björnsson, U. Kihlbom och A. Ullholm), Natur & Kultur, 1994.

Artiklar på svenska (urval)

• "Folkstyre vs upphettning– räcker tiden till för demokrati?", i Linton, M. (red.), Klimat & moral: Nio tankar om hettan. Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2021.
• Förord till svensk nyutgåva av Francis Bacons Novum Organum, Stockholm: Bokförlaget Fri tanke, 2020 (övers. Pär Svensson).
• "Synliggörandet som motkraft’, förord till en nyutgåva av Harald Ofstads Vårt förakt för svaghet, Karneval förlag, 2012, 11-19.
• "Värderingar varken sanna eller falska", Uppsala Nya Tidning (19/3), 2011 (för en webversion, följ denna länk).
• "Othello, Jago och moralen", Uppsala Nya Tidning (13/6), 2010 (för en webbversion, följ denna länk).
• "Världsparlament nästa!", Forskning och framsteg nr 2, 2010 (för en webbversion, följ denna länk).
• "Så blir du säker i den osäkra klimatdebatten", Dagens Nyheter (22/8), 2009).
• "Drömmar om det blå", Arena nr 3, 2002, 28-s9.
• "Hur skulle det gå om alla gjorde så? Om individuell rationalitet och kollektiv galenskap", Tvärsnitt nr. 2, 1998.
• "Om Erikssons grader av synd", Filosofisk tidskrift nr 3, 1997, 50-53.
• "Robert Nozick och libertarianismen", Hjärnstorm nr. 50-1, 1994, 11-13.
• "Onda cirklar och goda", Filosofisk tidskrift nr 4, 1994, 43-46.
• "Donald Davidsons tolkningsteori", Filosofisk tidskrift nr 4, 1993, 3-12.

Recensioner

• Review of Thompson, R., Paul, Evolution, Morality and the Fabric of Society (published in the series Elements in the Philosophy of Biology), Cambridge University Press, 2022, Metascience, 2023. Online access: https://rdcu.be/c4Bs4.
• Review of Derek Parfit's On What Matters, volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), European Journal of Philosophy 26, 2018, 668-72, DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12338.
• Review of Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S., (eds.), A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010), in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, 2015, 333-337: DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05031197.
• Review of Davidson, D., Problems of Rationality, Theoria 72, 2006, 233-239.
• Recension av Jedenheim, M.,The Compatibility of Effective Self-Ownership and Joint World Ownership, Stockholm Studies in Politics 91, Stockholms universitet, 2003,Tidskrift för Politisk filosofi, nr. 2, 2003.
• Recension av Crisp, R., Routledge philosophy guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism and Riley, J., Routledge philosophy guidebook to Mill on Liberty, Theoria 67, 2001, 177-283.
• Recension av Eriksson, B., Heavy Duty (doktorsavhandling), i Filosofisk tidskrift, nr. 3, 1995, 43-58.

Inbjudna föredrag och presentationer (urval, sedan 2010)

• 2024. “Holes in Oddie´s Realism”, Morris Colloquium: Value in Question, University of Colorado Boulder (August 7).
• 2023. “Seeking a reflective equilibrium in the face of disagreement”, First workshop (of three) in the Progress in Ethics network, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm (June 19-20).
• 2022. “Reflective Equilibrium and Higher-Order Evidence”, in the conference 51 years after A Theory of Justice, University of Bern, 12-14/5.
• 2021. “Can Skeptical Arguments from Moral Disagreement Stand Alone?”, in the conference "Moral Progress and Disagreement: Evolutionary Perspectives", Sapienza Università Di Roma (2-3/12).
• 2021. “Agreement and Disagreement: Sides of the Same Coin?”, in the Initial online workshop on the "Ethics of Conversation and Disagreement" (18-19/6).
• 2020. “Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics & The Reliability of Moral Intuitions. A Challenge from Neuroscience”, in the workshop “Reflective Equilibrium”, University of Bern (25/1).
• 2020. ”From Evolutionary Theory to Moral Skepticism, via Disagreement”, invited speaker, the workshop “Debunking and Disagreement”, Meta-Essen IV, Universität Duisburg Essen (23/1).
• 2020. ”From Evolutionary Theory to Moral Skepticism, via Disagreement”, Monika Betzler’s Oberseminar, Munich Centre for Ethics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (21/1).
• 2018. “From Disagreement to Skepticism. A Novel Approach”, invited paper to the conference “Moral Disagreement” (ACU Rome Seminar Series (7/9-9/9).
• 2017. ‘From Disagreement to Skepticism’ (w. Olle Risberg), invited speaker at the conference Debunking & Disagreement, Utrecht University (7/4).
• 2016. ‘Levels of Disagreement’, invited lecture at the conference Disagreement in Ethics, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg (7-9/7).
• 2015. ‘Explaining Moral Disagreement’, keynote lecture at the conference Deep Disagreements. Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, Humboldt University, Berlin (11-13/6).
• 2015. ‘Reliability and Necessary Truth’, Dpt of Philosophy, University of Melbourne (7/5).
• 2014. ‘Is the Benacerraf Challenge a Pseudo-Problem’, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney (10/10).
• 2013. ‘What is a debunking explanation?’, invited lecture at the conference Applying Philosophy, Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen (30-31/8).
• 2012. ‘Disagreeing Judgments: Ethics and Elsewhere’, plenary speaker at the conference Judgement & Justification, University of Tampere, Finland (24-26/9).
• 2011. ‘Intuitions, disagreements and debunking explanations’, invited lecture in the PhD-course Intuitions in Philosophy, University of Copenhagen (5-7/12).
• 2011. ‘Non-Debunking Explanations of Moral Intuitions’, invited speaker at ECAP 7 (Seventh European Congress of Analytic Philosophy), Milan (1-6/9).
• 2011. ‘Disagreement. Ethics and Elsewhere’, invited lecture at the workshop Disagreements, Tartu University, Estonia (28/8).
• 2011. ‘Intuitions as Evidence’, invited lecture in the Inaugural Lecture of the Neuroscience and Philosophy Seminar Series at CIN (Center for Integrative Neuroscience), University of Tübingen (7/7).
• 2011. ‘The Case for a Mixed Verdict On Ethics and Epistemology’, invited lecture at the Symposium on Disagreement in Ethics and Epistemology (41st Annual Philosophy Symposium), Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fullerton, Los Angeles (14-15/4).
• 2010. ‘How, why and when must recalcitrant intuitions be explained away?”, invited lecture at the conference Intuitions in Ethics, Department of Philosophy, Humboldt University, Berlin (23-25/9).
• 2010. ‘How, why and when must recalcitrant intuitions be explained away?”, invited lecture at the Symposium on Political Ethics: Its Nature and Its Methods (organized by the Nordic Network on Political Ethics), Uppsala University (16-18/6).

Refereeuppdrag

Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialectica, Dialogue, Disputatio, Economics & Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, Ethics, Graazer Philosophische Studien, Inquiry, Journal of Ethics, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Research, Journal of Political Philosophy, Journal of Social Philosophy, Journal of Value Inquiry, Mind, Noûs, Oxford University Press, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia, Philosophical Papers, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy Compass, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Ratio, Routledge, Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy, Synthese and Theoria.